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THE RHETORIC OF INNOCENCE
William S. Laufer*
Abstract- This Article promotes the serious consideration of innocence in the criminal
process, and gives meaning to the rhetoric surrounding the presumption of innocence. The
first part illustrates the near irrelevance of innocence in an accusatorial system of justice
where burdens of proof require proof of guilt The second and third parts of the Article
discuss the meaning of the presumption of innocence. It is argued that legislatures and courts
have ignored the tension between the conflicting goals of the criminal process by thinking of
the presumption of innocence as a legal presumption. As a legal presumption, its effects are
indistinguishable from the reasonable doubt rule. Arguments are presented that the
presumption should be factually based so that jurors are asked to assume the accused's
innocence in fact. This Article concludes with a proposal for a factually based assumption of
innocence.
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INTRODUCTION
Before the appearance of the jury trial in Europe, proof of an
accused's guilt or innocence was often obtained through torture!
Arbitrariness and cruelty were the hallmarks of medieval and post-
medieval justice.2 Ancient methods of justice included trials by battle
and the ordeals of hot iron, boiling water, cold water, and cursed morsel.'
These trials and ordeals involved significant physical challenges that
1. See, e.g., Sir James Fitjames Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law ..f England (1883); Sir
Leon Radzinowicz, A History of English Criminal Law and its Administration From 1750 (1968).
2. Even early English criminal procedure allowed for bloodthirsty and barbaric practices. An
accused had to expressly accept a trial by jury by declaring a plea-guilty or not guilty-and by
declaring that "I put myself upon the country." Those unfortunate souls who refused to make such
declarations were subjected to peineforte et dure. Prisoners were stretched naked on their backs
between two wooden boards with heavy iron weights placed over their bodivs. Food was withheld
until pleas were made-or until death. This practice was abolished in 1772. See Theodore F.T.
Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law 126 (1956); Barbara A. Hanawalt, Crime and
Conflict in English Communities 1300-1348 (1979).
3. See Melville Madison Bigelow, History of Procedure in England From the Norman Conquest
322 (1880) (noting that the ordeal "was a solemn invocation to Heaven to decide the matter in
dispute; and the result of the test was regarded by the credulous masses as effected by the direct
interposition of the Almighty"). For a thorough treatment of the supernatural theory and mortal
practice of the ordeal, see John H. Wigmore, A Kaleidoscope of Justice (1941). Professor
wigmore's survey of ancient adjudicatory practices in Europe, Asia, Africa, America, and Oceania is
nothing short of remarkable.
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determined the accused's factual guilt or factual innocence.4  A
successful combatant in a trial by battle demonstrated factual innocence.
Hands free of scars after carrying hot irons or touching boiled stones in
an ordeal belonged to the blameless and virtuous.5
The development of the jury trial in England and the Romano-canon
inquisition process on the Continent transformed the cruel methods of
compurgation and trial practices prescribed by medieval law.6 Those
accused of crimes were no longer physically and psychologically
tortured to determine their legal or moral culpability.7 Convictions were
no longer obtained on the basis of irrational proofs.8 As modem
standards emerged and burdens of production and persuasion shifted
from the accused to the accuser, evidence of factual innocence became
increasingly irrelevant.9 An accused did not have to demonstrate
4. This Article will consider the role of three conceptually distinct determinations of innocence
and three determinations of guilt. The presumption of innocence will be discussed in parts I and II
as an analogue of legal innocence-a conclusion of law in favor of the accused. An accused is
legally innocent until or unless guilt (legal guilt) is established beyond a reasonable doubt All
defendants, whether guilty in fact or not, are legally innocent until or unless convicted. If convicted,
whether factually guilty or not, one is legally guilty. Actual innocence, applied on appeal, is a
standard of proof requiring: (1) a fair probability that a judge or jury would have acquitted had
certain evidence been available, (2) the absence of evidence that would lead a rational trier of fact to
conclude that the accused was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, or (3) evidence sufficient to support
a colorable claim of innocence. Actual innocence is required by some courts in order to proceed
with claims of newly discovered evidence after conviction. Finally, factual innocence is simply the
state of being innocent in fact. Proof of factual innocence is required by those claiming
compensation for wrongful conviction and incarceration. Legal innocence and legal guilt require a
judicial determination of whether an accused committed the criminal act beyond a reasonable doubt.
5. A person could prove factual innocence or face the consequences of definite guilt, which often
meant death. See Marcello T. Maestro, Voltaire and Beccaria as Reformers of Criminal Law 13
(1972).
6. See Plucknett, supra note 2, at 118-5. See also Gerhard O.W. Mueller, Memoranda on Laymen
as Judges in Germany andAustria (1954) (unpublished manuscript, University of Chicago School of
Law, on file with the Washington Law Review).
7. See S.F.C. Milsom, Historical Foundations of the Common Law 403-13 (1981); T.F.T.
Plunknett, A Concise History of the Common Law (1956).
8. See Barbara J. Shapiro, "Beyond Reasonable Doubt" and "Probable Cause": Historical
Perspectives on the Anglo-American Law of Evidence 1-41 (1991); J.S. Cockburn and Thomas A.
Green, Twelve Good Men and Ture: The Criminal Trial Jury in England, 1200-1800 (1988);
Thomas A. Green, Verdict According to Conscience: Perspectives on the English Criminal Trial
Jury, 1200-1800 (1985); Karl H. Kunert, Some Observations on the Origin and Structure of
Evidence Rules Under the Common Law System and the Civil Law System of "Free Proof' in the
German Code of Criminal Procedure, 29 Buff. L. Rev. 122 (1959).
9. See, e.g., M.N. Howard et al., Phipson on Evidence 91 (1990) (noting that "[iun early times the
law appears to have presumed guilt, not innocence"); George P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law
517 (1978), has traced a transition in the allocation of burdens of persuasion to private litigation in
the middle nineteenth century. See also George P. Fletcher, Two Kinds of Legal Rules: A
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innocence by hands unscarred from hot coals, irons, or"stones. An
accused did not have to bring together twelve peers in a. wager of law to
swear that his or her oath of innocence was clean and trustworthy. God
could no longer reveal the innocent from the murderer, ihief, and robber.
Proof of factual innocence was replaced by proof of legal guilt or its
absence, legal innocence.'0
This was much more than a change in jurisprudential semantics.
Legal standards and burdens of proof acknowledged what ancient fact
finders and jurists could not: Definitive proof of factud innocence was
too much of a burden for mortals to bear." Without divine judgments,
the law must presume goodness, honesty, and duty. 2 A mere accusation
could not amount to a presumption of guilt. 3 As the General Court of
Massachusetts noted in 1657, "... in the eye of the law every man is
honest and innocent, unless it be proved legally to the contrary."'14 The
evolution from an inquisitorial system to an adversarial system of justice
reflected a consensus that a number of fundamental interests and rights
required that the burdens of production and persuasion be shifted to the
state. 5 In allocating burdens, courts and commentators repeatedly
Comparative Study of Burden-of-Persuasion Practices in Criminal Cases, 17 Yale L.J. 880, 889-
900 (1968).
10. The distinction between legal innocenc6 (i.e., a finding of "not guilty") and a finding of
factual innocence is critical. Common law carts determine guilt or its apparent absence, not factual
innocence. If wrongly accused, the best that one can hope for-before an appeal or collateral attack
of a conviction-is a determination that the evidence of factual guilt was insufficient.
11. For a discussion of the move away from divine judgments, see Bigelow, supra note 3, at 322-
40. See also Rupert Cross, The Golden Thread of the English Common Law. The Burden of Proof
(1976).
12. See, e.g., James Bradley Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidenc, at the Common Law
(1898).
13. See Jeff Thaler, Punishing the Innocent: The Need for Due Process and the Presumption of
Innocence Prior to Trial, 1978 Wis. L. Rev. 441, 460; Hermne Herta Meyer, Constitutionality of
Pretrial Detention, 60 Geo. L.J. 1140, 1147 (1972). According to Andrew Ashworth, the
presumption of innocence is tied to the severe consequences of criminal conviction, along with the
dramatic imbalance in power and resources of an accused and the state. A presumption of guilt
"would impose an oppressive burden on individual citizens, and would place immense power in the
hands of the state officials who decide on prosecution." Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal
Law 74 (1991).
14. Records of Massachusetts, iii, 434-35, cited in Thayer, supra note 12, at 552. As Fletcher has
noted: "ei incumbit probatio qui dicit; non qui negat." [The burden of proNing a fact rests on the
party who asserts it, not on the party who denies it.] George P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law
520 (1978).
15. Commentators have noted that, after moving away from inquisitorial models of inquiry, the
criminal process in England, and then later in the United States, left the accusatorial model for one
that is adversarial. As Justice Frankfurter noted in 1961, "[O]urs is an accusatorial and not an
inquisitorial system-a system in which the State must establish guilt by evidence independently and
Rhetoric of Innocence
affirmed that an individual's liberty interest was valued over society's
interest in obtaining a conviction." It is a fundamental value of Anglo-
Saxon justice that "it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a
guilty man go free."17 Evidence of this value, as a reflection of the
freely secured and may not by coercion prove its charge against an accused out of his own mouth."
Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961). See also Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862
(1975) (noting that the "very premise of our adversarial system... is that partisan advocacy on both
sides of a case will best promote the ultimate objective that the guilty be convicted and the innocent
go free"). For related commentary, see Abraham S. Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance
ofAdvantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 Yale L.J. 1149, 1149-53 (1960); Crime in England: 1550-
1880 (J.S. Cocburn, ed. 1988). Evidence of these fundamental interests developed over time.
Notably, a presumption of guilt was maintained, in various forms, for many centuries under the
ancient law of England. See Bigelow, supra note 3, at 322. For two excellent discussions of the
development of reasonable doubt rule, see Theodore Waldman, Origins of the Legal Doctrine of
Reasonable Doubt Rule, 20 J. Hist. Ideas 299 (1959); Anthony A. Morano, A Reexamination of the
Development of the Reasonable Doubt Rule, 55 B.U. L. Rev. 507 (1975).
16. As Professor Underwood has astutely observed, the reasonable doubt rule serves to reduce the
likelihood of conviction by placing a thumb "on the defendant's side of the scales of justice" The
reasonable doubt rule creates a deliberate imbalance in favor of the accused. Barbara D.
Underwood, The Thumb on the Scales of Justice: Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases, 86 Yale
L.J. 1299 (1977). There are some practical reasons for this imbalance. As the Court noted in In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970): "The accused during a criminal prosecution has at stake interests
of immense importance, both because of the possibility that he may lose his liberty upon conviction
and because of the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the conviction.' Judge Richard A.
Posner, in his treatise The Problems of Jurisprudence, commented on the dilemma that this
imbalance creates: "In general, unless the resources devoted to determining guilt and innocence are
increased, the only way to reduce the probability of convicting the innocent is to reduce the
probability of convicting the guilty as well." Richard A. Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence 216
(1990). See also Glanville Williams, Letting Off the Guilty and Prosecuting the Innocent, 1985
Crim. L. Rev. 115.
17. In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 372. This maxim may be traced to Hale who noted in the late
1600s that it is better that five guilty men should be acquitted before one innocent man is convicted.
Matthew Hale, Pleas of the Crown, or, A Brief but Full Account of Whatsoever Can Be Found
Relating to that Subject, 289 (1678). Similar references may be found in the work of Fortescue, who
wrote: "I would rather wish twentie evill doers to escape death through pitie than one man to be
unjustly condemned." De Laudibus legum Angliae c. 27 (1545). Blackstone observed that "the law
holds, that it is better that ten guilty persons escape than that one person suffer." 4 William
Blackstone, Commentaries, 358 (1765). This 10:1 ratio is known as the "Blackstone ratio." For
earlier examples, see William S. Holdsworth, History of English Law 620 (1925). Bentham reveals
the limits of the maxim's logic in writing that: "But we must be on our guard against those
sentimental exaggerations which tend to give crime impunity, under the pretext of insuring the safety
of innocence. Public applause has been, so to speak, set up to auction. At first it was said to be
better to save several guilty men, than to condemn a single innocent man; others, to make the maxim
more striking, fix the number ten; a third made this ten a hundred, and a fourth made it a thousand.
All these candidates for the prize of humanity have been outstripped by I know not how many
writers, who hold, that, in no case, ought an accused person to be condemned, unless evidence
amount to mathematical or absolute certainty. According to this maxim, nobody ought to be
punished, lest an innocent man be punished." Bentham, Principles of Judicial Procedure 169
(1829). Bentham, however, is mindful of the difference between erring on the side of acquitting the
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presumption of innocence, may be seen in the reasonable doubt rule, as
well as a series of substantive and procedural safeguards that arguably
presuppose legal innocence,18  e.g., the privilege against self-
incrimination and the right to remain silent while in police custody and
during trial;19 the duty of the state to disclose exculpatory evidence;" the
right to compulsory evidence;" the right to confront adverse witnesses;22
and the right to effective assistance of counsel. 3
Even though the requirement that an accused demonstrate factual
innocence became inapposite following the abolition of ordeal and other
ancient modes of trials, rhetoric of the importance of factual innocence
remains in law today.24 In fact, myths of the importance of an accused's
guilty versus convicting the innocent. Both may be calculated as great evils, according to Bentham,
but the latter clearly creates more injustice. Id.
18. These constitutional safeguards have the definite effect of making the state's task of
overcoming the presumption of innocence more difficult-but not impossible. Herrera v. Collins,
113 S. Ct. 853, 860 (1993). See In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364 (noting that "the Due Process Clause
protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged"); see also Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S.
684 (1975); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977); Jackson v. Virginiz, 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
As the court noted in Patterson, "[d]ue process does not require that every cor ceivable step be taken,
at whatever cost, to eliminate the possibility of convicting an innocent person." 432 U.S. at 208. An
excellent discussion of the relation between certain safeguards and innocence appears in a treatise by
Henry L Abraham, The Judicial Process 95--97 (1993). One of the better discussions of the
presumption of innocence in relation to constitutional law is found in Jeff Thaler, Punishing the
Innocent: The Need for Due Process and the Presumption of Innocence Prior to Trial, 1978 Wis. L.
Rev. 441.
19. For an interesting analysis of the right to silence, generally, and the privilege against self
incrimination, see Note, Adverse Inferencesfiom Silence, 22 Mich. J. L. Reform 1019 (1989). See
also United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499 (1983) and Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288 (1981) for
discussions of the right to silence in relation to permissible inferences of guilL In Carter, the Court
ruled that a "no inference from silence" instruction from the judge was required by the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 305. See also Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (holding
the Fifth Amendment forbids adverse prosecutorial comments on an accused's silence or judicial
instructions that silence is evidence of guilt); Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 3:13 (1978) (holding that
jury instruction on failure to testify did not amount to lead to adverse inferences); Bruno v. United
States, 308 U.S. 287 (1939). The court has noted that jury instructions on the Fifth Amendment's
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination are critical because "[t]oo many, even those who
should be better advised, view this privilege as a shelter for wrongdoers. They too readily assume
that those who invoke it are... guilty of crime... " Ullmann v. United Stases, 350 U.S. 422, 426
(1956), overruled by D'Elia v. Pennsylvania Crime Comm'n, 555 A.2d 864 (1989).
20. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
21. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988).
22. Coyv. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
23. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
24. For a discussion of the role of rhetoric in law, generally, see Haig Bommajian, Metaphor and
Reason in Judicial Opinions (1992); Lawrence M. Solan, The Language of Jdges (1993). See also
Robert Prentice, Supreme Court Rhetoric, 25 Ariz. Law Rev. 86 (1983); Richard Posner, Law and
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factual innocence in the criminal process abound.z Time-honored and
revered presumptions are held out as evidence of an accused's innocence
from time of arrest through trial.26 Courts, legal commentators, and the
lay public often mischaracterize dispositions of "not guilty" as findings
of factual innocence.2 Appellate courts add credibility to the importance
of innocence by requiring a showing of actual innocence in order for a
petitioner to proceed with certain post-conviction remedies. 28 And,
finally, Congress and a host of state legislatures have enacted erroneous
conviction statutes with an apparent interest in providing procedural and
financial remedies for convicted innocents.29 These presumptions,
findings, verdicts, requirements, and compensation schemes suggest that
evidence of factual innocence is important if not central in substantive
criminal law and criminal procedure. However, even a cursory review of
Literature: A Misunderstood Relation (1988); Thomas Ross, Metaphor and Paradox, 56 Ga. L. Rev.
1053 (1989); Burr Henly, "Penumbra": The Roots of a Legal Metaphor, 41 Hastings Const. L. Q.
81 (1987); Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 74
Stan. L. Rev. 1371 (1988); Steven L. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense: Metaphoric Reasoning and
the Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1105 (1989). Existing studies of innocence and
rhetoric consider the "innocent white victim" of affirmative action. See Thomas Ross, Innocence
and Affirmative Action, 43 Vand. L. Rev. 297 (1990).
25. See infra notes 280-94 and accompanying text.
26. The presumption of innocence is commonly thought of as a factual presumption when it is at
most a presumption of legal innocence and, at least, an ineffective rhetorical device. It is often said
that "one is presumed innocent, until proven guilty." This maxim has come to mean that the burden
of production and persuasion falls on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. An
accused remains legally innocent until or unless such proof is introduced. See McCormick on
Evidence § 342 (3d ed. 1984). Of course, it may be argued that a presumption of legal innocence
must have as its foundation certain factual assumptions. For a sizable number of cases this argument
is strong. Evidence of factual innocence, as part of the accused's theory of the case, for example,
may provide the basis for an acquittal. This argument is weak, however, for a majority of cases
where tactical and strategic considerations having far less to do with an accused's factual culpability
reduce the need for raising factual innocence. Evidence of factual innocence has fallen prey to
defense strategies, employed at trial, that address the failure of the prosecution to prove guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt.
27. See infra notes 238-41 and accompanying text.
28. See, e.g., Kuhimann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454 (1986) (noting that "[i]n the light of the
historic purpose of habeas corpus and the interests implicated by successive petitions for federal
habeas relief from a state conviction, we conclude that the ends of justice require federal courts to
entertain such petitions only where the prisoner supplements his constitutional claim with a colorable
showing of factual innocence"). See also Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993). For an excellent
review of the genesis of this requirement, see Henry . Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral
Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142 (1970).
29. See infra notes 272-79 and accompanying text. A federal statute relating to unjust conviction
is found in 28 U.S.C. § 2513 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
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normative models of the criminal process, as well as statutory and
decisional law, reveals the contrary.30
Part I of this Article argues that an accused's factual innocence plays
an insubstantial role following arrest and that the vast majority of
presumptions, findings, verdicts, or requirements suggesting otherwise
are no more than rhetorical devices. Part II explores some concerns
with the effects of these rhetorical devices and mischaracterizations,
suggesting that: (1) innocence plays a primary role as a burden allocation
and gatekeeping device, and (2) the absence of meaningful inquiry into
factual innocence increases the risk of juror partiality, as well as
erroneous convictions and incarcerations. Part [II calls for a
reconstruction of the presumption of innocence, arguing that legislatures
should consider, and that courts should adopt, an assumption of factual
innocence. The proposed revision revives the construct of factual
innocence, and attempts to give meaning to the empty rhetoric that has
surrounded this time-honored principle of Anglo-Saxon law.32
I. THE IRRELEVANCE OF INNOCENCE
Existing legal procedures and practices, such as the presumption of
innocence and the collateral attack of convictions, suggest a strong
consideration of an accused's factual innocence, if not a systemic
allegiance to the notion. But these procedures and practices do no more
than gull the unsuspecting into believing that factual innocence has a
prominent legal meaning.33 As each successive stage of the criminal
30. See infra notes 100-47 and accompanying text.
31. This is not to suggest that the notion of factual innocence has been abamdoned throughout the
criminal process. As will be explored in part I.C, factual innocence plays a role as a gatekeeper of
habeas petitions and as a standard of proof in criminal malpractice cases.
32. The primary argument running through parts I to HI is that a consideration of an accused's
factual innocence is most often lost in the criminal process. In spite of rhetoric to the contrary,
functionaries do not presume factual innocence at trial. In fact, a body of empirical evidence reveals
that both reasonable doubt and presumption of innocence instructions are most often misunderstood
by jurors. Defense strategies reflect the allocation of burdens and therefore stress the disproving of
legal guilt. Further, where actual and factual innocence is considered on appeal or with a collateral
attack on conviction, it serves a limited gatekceping function. Courts have err-eted steep barriers that
make claims of actual innocence difficult if rot impossible to successfully maintain. Finally, in the
rare case where factual innocence is successfully claimed, federal and st:ate law offers limited
compensation to the wrongfully convicted and imprisoned. In part mI, instruztions are designed that
address jurors' predispositions of factual and legal guilt.
33. Though obvious, it should be noted that claims of innocence are aotoriously difficult to
determine in law, as well as in fact. Commentators have documented what practitioners have
observed for centuries: "[C]riminal defendants, unlike clients in almost all other settings, have
essentially nothing to lose by making false claims." Robert E. Scott and William 3. Stuntz, A Reply:
Vol. 70:329, 1995
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process is carefully considered, there is only slight interest in and
consideration of an accused's factual innocence.34 Part I reveals that the
law is often far more concerned with demonstrating the appearance of an
interest in innocence.
A. Presuming Innocence
1. Interpretations of the Presumption of Innocence
In reviewing his experiences on the bench in the middle to late 1800s,
Justice Darling noted that: "It is greatly to be feared that the so-called
presumption of innocence in favor of the prisoner at the bar is a pretence,
a delusion, and empty sound. It ought not to be, but-it is."35 More than
a century later, critics of the importance of the presumption of innocence
are nearly impossible to find.36 The presumption of innocence has been
Imperfect Bargains, Imperfect Trials, and Innocent Defendants, 101 Yale LJ. 2011, 2012 (1992).
But there is much more to the notion of innocence. After a number of procedural "screens" that
impose increasingly difficult standards of proof, such as arrest, preliminary hearings, possible grand
jury action, and bail determinations, an inference of guilt seems natural. Factual innocence, as well
as the presumption of innocence, appear counterfactual by the time an accused appears for trial.
There is little doubt that this inference contributes to the likelihood of convicting innocents. See,
e.g., Arye Rattner, Convicted but Innocent. Wrongful Conviction and the Criminal Justice System,
12 Law and Hum. Behav. 283, 291 (1988) (finding that the following types of errors and factors
contributing to wrongful convictions in his sample of cases: (a) eyewitness errors, (b) pejury by
witnesses, (c) negligence by criminal justice officials, (d) "pure error," (e) coerced confessions, (f)
pejury by criminal justice officials, (g) "frame up," (h) identification by police due to prior criminal
record, and (I) forensic errors). See also C. Ronald Huff et al., Guilty Until Proven Innocent:
Wrongful Conviction and Public Policy, 32 Crim. & Delinq. 518 (1986); R. Brandon and C. Davies,
Wrongful Imprisonment: Mistaken Convictions and Their Consequences (1973); Donald E.L
MacNamara, Convicting the Innocent, 15 Crim. & Delinq. 57 (1969); E.M. Borchard, Convicting the
Innocent: Errors of Criminal Justice (1932).
34. See infra note 152 and accompanying text.
35. Anonymous, Ten Years a Police Judge 207 (1884) (quoted in Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at
Common Law 531 (1981)).
36. As Professor George P. Fletcher notes, the presumption of innocence may be found in state
and federal statutes, standard jury instructions, as well as clauses in international declarations and
covenants on human rights, e.g., The European Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 4, 1950, Art.
6(2); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, Art. 11(2), U.N. Doc. A/811. George
P. Fletcher, Two Kinds of Legal Rules: A Comparative Study of Burden-of-Persuasion Practices in
Criminal Cases, 77 Yale L.L 880 (1968). It is not an overstatement that "Good men everywhere
praise the presumption of innocence." Id. at 880. The rhetoric supporting the presumption of
innocence is vast. See, e.g., Deutch v. United States, 367 U.S. 456, 471(1961) (explaining that
"[o]ne of the rightful boasts of Western civilization is that the [prosecution] has the burden of
establishing guilt solely on the basis of evidence produced in court and under circumstances assuring
an accused all the safeguards of a fair procedure. Among these is the presumption of the defendant's
innocence").
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called a "general principle of our political morality," 31 "as irresistible as
the heavens till overcome," 38 "a guardian angel,"3 9 "a cornerstone of
Anglo-Saxon justice,"'4  "a touchstone of American criminal
jurisprudence,"' and a "bedrock 'axiomatic and elem-,ntary' principle
whose 'enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our
criminal law."'42  Commentators and courts extol the virtues of the
presumption of innocence, some going so far as to consider it, in itself,
probative evidence of factual innocence.43
37. William Twining, Rethinking Evidence: Exploratory Essays 208 (1990).
38. Thayer, supra note 12, at 553 (quoting Bradner, Evidence 460).
39. Id
40. Henry J. Abraham, The Judicial Process 96 (1993). See also United states v. Millan-Colon,
834 F. Supp. 78, 82 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (noting that the presumption of innocerLce is "a cornerstone of
our criminal justice system").
41. People v. Layhew, 548 N.E.2d 25, 27 (ill. App. 1989) (citing Ill. Pattern Jury Instructions,
Criminal, No. 2.03 (2d Ed. 1981)), rev'd, 564 N.E.2d 1232 (11. 1990).
42. Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432,453 (1895).
43. See, e.g., Simon Greenleaf, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence 42-43 (1876). Professor
Greenleaf is credited in a series of Supreme Court cases at the turn of the century that upheld and
then questioned the notion that the presumption of innocence was probative evidence. See Coffin,
156 U.S. at 453 (holding that the presumption of innocence, which is "axiomatic," "elementary," and
a "foundation" of the administration of criminal law, is also evidence in favor of the accused); Allen
v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896); Agnew v. United States, 165 U.S. 36 (1897); Holt v. United
States, 218 U.S. 245, 253 (1910). In perhaps the most eloquent of all tribute; to the presumption of
innocence, Laurence H. Tribe, An Ounce of Detention: Preventive Justice in the World of John
Mitchell, 56 Va. L. Rev. 371, 404 (1970), suggests that it "represents far more than a rule of
evidence. It represents a commitment to the proposition that a man who stands accused of crime is
no less entitled than his accuser to freedom and respect as an innocent member of the community."
Judges in federal and state courts also refer to the presumption of innocence with a rhetorical
respect, reverence, and adoration. See, e.g., United States v. Simms, 18 F.3d 588, 593 (8th Cir.
1994) (noting that "[a]ll of the presumptions of the law are in favor of innoc.ence and the defendant
is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty"); Heiser v. Ryan, 15 F.3d 299, 305 (3d Cir. 1994)
(stating that "the presumption of innocence, which underlies the societal concerns expressed in the
Speedy Trial Clause, can no longer apply once the defendant has been fonad, or pleads, guilty');
United States v. Nickens, 955 F.2d 112, 118 (1st Cir. 1992) (stating that the presumption of
innocence "is a basic premise of our criminal legal system!); Spain v. Rust.en, 883 F.2d 712, 721
(9th Cir. 1989) (opining that "[ilt is axiomatic that our criminal justice system affords every accused
individual a presumption of innocence"); United States v. Fleishman, 684 F.2d 1329, 1342 (9th Cir.
1982) (noting that standing alone, the presumption of innocence "is sufficient to acquit a
defendant"), overruled by U.S. v. bara-Alcarez, 830 F.2d 968 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 291 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (noting that the presumption of innocence "that cloaks
the accused cannot be stripped by a conviction obtained in something less than a constitutionally
adequate trial"); United States v. Cassiere, 4 F.3d 1006, 1025 (1st Cir. 1993) (stating that a failure to
instruct on the reasonable doubt rule strikes at the very heart of the presumption of innocence);
Hunt v. Roth, 648 F.2d 1148, 1162 (8th Cir. 1981) (noting that "[rielease upoa reasonable conditions
of bail thus serves to preserve the presumption of innocence by preventing infliction of punishment
before trial"); Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053, 1057 (5th Cir. 1978) (stating that the presumption
of innocence would lose meaning if the right to bail before trial is not presered); In re Extradition
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In recent years courts have ruled that even though the presumption of
innocence is not found explicitly in the Constitution, its articulation is an
essential component of a fair trial.' An accused may not be tried and
convicted on suspicion and implication. There is a constitutional right
that an accused may be convicted only upon proof adduced at trial.45 As
Chief Justice Burger noted in Estelle v. Williams,46 courts must be on
guard not to frustrate the reasonable doubt rule or presumption of
innocence. Any effort or practice at trial that undermines this rule or
presumption, such as the appearance of the defendant in court dressed in
jail or prison clothes, compromises the fairness of the factfinding
process.47 Armed with this strong admonition, courts have ruled with
of Nacif-Borge, 829 F. Supp. 1210 (D. Nev. 1993) (noting that the presumption of innocence
"guarantees that defendants pending trial are entitled to a concomitant presumption in favor of bail in
this country"); Augustus v. Roemer, 771 F. Supp. 1458, 1464 (E.D. La. 1991) (noting that the
presumption of innocence represents "a commitment to the proposition that a man who stands
accused of crime is no less entitled than his accuser to freedom and respect as an innocent member of
the community"); People v. Pena, 609 N.Y.S.2d 827 (1994) (stating that the presumption of
innocence as a fundamental safeguard); Stem v. State, 827 P.2d 442, 448 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992)
(stating that the presumption of innocence should not be relaxed by having the accused appear
before the jury with the "badges" of custody); People v. Hardy, 825 P.2d 781 (Cal. 1992) (noting
that reliance on the presumption of innocence means never having to take the witness stand),
modified, 2 Cal. 4th 758 (1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 987 (1993); Commonwealth v. Angiulo, 615
N.E.2d 155 (Mass. 1993) (stating that empaneling an anonymous jury likely taints a juror's
perception of the defendant, burdening the presumption of innocence); Summerville v. Warden State
Prison, 641 A.2d 1356 (Conn. 1994) (stating that "[i]fthe presumption of innocence means anything,
it means that one who is clothed with it does not bear the burden of establishing his innocence");
Roundtree v. United States, 581 A.2d 315, 342 (App. D.C. 1990) (noting that the presumption of
innocence is supported by the absence of motive); People v. Layhew, 548 N.E.2d 25, 27 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1989) (noting that the presumption of innocence and the reasonable doubt rule are cherished by
Americans), rev'd, 566 N.E.2d 1232 (1L1. 1990); People v. Goss, 503 N.W.2d 682 (Mich. Ct.
App.1993) (noting that the presumption of innocence is not merely a due process right, but is
intertwined with the right to trial by jury), aftd, 521 N.W.2d 312 (Mich. 1994) People v. Carpenter,
428 N.E.2d 983, 985 (Il1. App. Ct. 1981) (stating that when the presumption of innocence is not on
the minds of the jurors "the trial could become a mere formality in which the jury presumes guilt and
its function would thus deteriorate into one simply ratifying the criminal investigation"); Lanes v.
State, 767 S.W.2d 789, 796 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (stating that "implicit in the probable cause
requirement is the presumption of innocence"); United States v. Daniels, 770 F.2d 1111, 1118 (D.C.
Cir. 1985) (noting that the presumption of innocence is a central precept of criminal justice).
44. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501,503 (1976).
45. Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478,485 (1978) (stating that "[tihis Court has declared that one
accused of a crime is entitled to have his guilt or innocence determined solely on the basis of the
evidence introduced at trial, and not on grounds of official suspicion, indictment, continued custody,
or other circumstances not adduced as proof at trial").
46. 425 U.S. 501.
47. As the court observed, "Courts have, with few exceptions, determined that an accused should
not be compelled to go to trial in prison or jail clothing because of the possible impairment of the
presumption so basic to the adversary system." Estelle, 425 U.S. at 505. Defendants are generally
entitled to the "physical indicia of innocence." United States v. Samuel, 431 F.2d 610, 614 (4th Cir.
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some consistency that jury instructions on the presumption of innocence
are required to ensure that extra-legal considerations are not
determinative. 8 The presumption of innocence has a definite "purging
effect" that is essential to a fair tial.4 9
a. Proxy for Reasonable Doubt
Even with near universal support and endorsement of the presumption
of innocence, there has been a longstanding scholarly controversy over
its exact meaning. At least two sides may be distinguished. First, there
are scholars, like Thayer and Cross, who see the presumption of
innocence and reasonable doubt rule as proxies for the same rule that
there must be proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the burden of
proof remains with the state throughout the trial." The presumption of
1970). See also Kennedy v. Cardwell, 487 F.2d 101, 105 (6th Cir. 1973) (stating that "[w]hen the
court allows a prisoner to be brought before a jury with his hands chained hi irons, and refuses, on
his application, or that of his counsel, to order their removal, the jury must necessarily conceive a
prejudice against the accused, as being in the opinion of the judge a dangerous man, and one not to
be trusted, even under the surveillance of officers") (citing State v. Kring, 64 Mo. 591, 593 (1877)),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 959 (1974). See United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 273 n.56 (D.C. Cir.
1976) (stating that "[florcing the accused to appear in jail clothes not only iolates his due process
right to the presumption of innocence, but also implicates the equal protection guarantee because it
generally operates only against those who cainot post bail prior to trial") (citations omitted). See
also United States v. Harris, 703 F.2d 508 (1Ith Cir. 1983); Mitchell v. Engle, 634 F.2d 353 (6th Cir.
1980); Boswell v. Alabama, 537 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1976); Fernandez v. United States, 375 A.2d 484
(D.C. 1977).
48. See Estelle, 425 U.S. at 501; United States v. Thaxton, 483 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Dilg, 700 F.2d 620 (1lth Cir. 1983). Cf United States v. Payne, 944 F.2d 1458 (9th Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1598 (1992); United States v. Walker, 861 F.2d 810 (5th Cir. 1988);
Taylor, 436 U.S. at 486. Notably, there are clear limits to the requirement that a trial court instruct
jurors on the presumption of innocence. In Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786, 789 (1979), the
Court retreated to the position that a failure to instruct on the presumptiori of innocence must be
evaluated in light of the totality of the circumstances. All instructions given to jurors, the weight of
the evidence, and the arguments of counsel must be considered in the context of such an omission.
Ultimately, courts must ask whether, given the totality of the circumstancts, there was a genuine
danger that the jury made a determination of guilt on something other thar lawful evidence. The
totality of circumstances test was upheld recently in Delo v. Lashley, 113 S. Ct. 1222 (1993).
49. For a discussion of the reasonable doubt rule and presumption of ianocence in relation to
constitutional law, see Scott E. Sundby, The Reasonable Doubt Rule and the Meaning of Innocence,
40 Hastings L.J. 457 (1989).
50. Thayer, supra note 12, at 565. See also Sir Rupert Cross, Evidence 122 (1979) (stating that
"[w]hen it is said that an accused person is presumed to be innocent, all that is meant is that the
prosecution is obliged to prove the case against him beyond reasonable doubt"). For example, the
California Penal Code states:
Presumption of innocence; Acquittal in case of reasonable doubt; Effect of presumption;
Definition. A defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be innocen: until the contrary is
proved, and in case of a reasonable doubt whether his guilt is satisfactorily shown, he is entitled
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innocence, accordingly, is a rule that allows the accused to stand silent
during trial." With this interpretation, the presumption of innocence is
not considered a proxy for assuming the factual innocence of the
accused. On the contrary, as one treatise noted: "When we speak of the
presumption of innocence, we are not talking about a process of
inference following the establishing of a basic fact. Rather, we are
talking about a fundamental principle of our criminal procedure which
imposes a burden on the prosecution of establishing the accused's guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt."52
Evidence supporting this view of the presumption of innocence may
be found in explicit references by courts and commentators arguing that
the presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt rule are
indistinguishable. 3 Further evidence appears in a number of cases where
courts could have distinguished the presumption of innocence as an
independent construct but chose not to do so. For example, in Cupp v.
Naughten,54 the Supreme Court considered the effects of jury instructions
in an armed robbery case that called for a presumption of truthfulness
regarding the testimony of witnesses.55 The prosecution's case consisted
of the testimony of two eyewitnesses and two police officers. The
to an acquittal, but the effect of this presumption is only to place upon the state the burden of
proving him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Reasonable doubt is defined as follows: "It is
not a mere possible doubt; because everything relating to human affairs, and depending on
moral evidence, is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. It is that state of the case, which,
after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of jurors in
that condition that they can not say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the
truth of the charge."
Cal. Pen. Code § 1096 (1994).
51. See John N. Mitchell, Bail Reform and the Constitutionality of Pretrial Detention, 55 Va. L.
Rev. 1223 (1969); Note, Adverse Inferences From Silence, supra note 19, at 1062-78. Cf. Cal.
Evid. Code § 600 (1994):
(a) A presumption is an assumption of fact that the law requires to be made from another fact or
group of facts found or otherwise established in the action. A presumption is not evidence. (b)
An inference is a deduction of fact that may logically and reasonably be drawn from another fact
or group of facts found or otherwise established in the action.
52. John A. Andrews & Michael Hirst, Criminal Evidence 89 (1986).
53. See, e.g., Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 491 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that
"[the function of the instruction is to make it clear that the burden of persuasion rests entirely on the
prosecutor. The same function is performed by the instruction requiring proof beyond a reasonable
doubt"). For earlier support, see Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 531 (1979).
54. 414 U.S. 141 (1973).
55. An Oregon state court had instructed the jury that "every witness is presumed to speak the
truth. This presumption may be overcome by the manner in which the witness testifies, by the nature
of his or her testimony, by evidence affecting his or her character, interest, or motives, by
contradictory evidence or by a presumption." Id. at 142.
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defense did not call any witnesses and the accused did not testify. If
jurors are instructed to presume the truth of witnesses for the
prosecution, how can they also presume the innocence of the accused?
Putting aside abstruse analyses of due process and what constitutes a fair
trial, the most reasonable answer is that a true presumption of
truthfulness would conflict with a true presumption of inocence. 6 This
conflict would lead most rational jurors to choose between
presumptions.5 7 As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal.s had noted, the
instruction may have had the effect of shifting the burden to the accused
to prove innocence. 8 The Supreme Court, in reviewing the entire
proceeding, ruled that the truthfulness instruction neither shifted the
burden of proof nor violated the presumption of innocence. That the jury
had been properly instructed on both the reasonable doubt rule and
presumption of innocence ensured the due process righis of the accused.
In considering the role that the reasonable doubt rule and presumption of
innocence played at trial, Justice Rehnquist concluded that "[w]hatever
tangential undercutting of these clearly stated propositions may, as a
theoretical matter, have resulted from the giving of the instruction on the
presumption of truthfulness is not of constitutional dimension. 59
Justice Rehnquist, I would argue, neglected to tackle the apparent
conflict between the presumptions of truthfulness and irnocence because
the presumption of innocence is not implemented as a presumption of
factual innocence. Rather, as Thayer and Cross have argued, the
presumption of innocence has become a preliminary proxy for the
reasonable doubt rule. If the presumption of innocence is considered as a
preliminary belief in the accused's legal innocence, there is no conflict
and certainly no violation of a "constitutional dimension."'
56. It is noteworthy that federal courts had in prior cases disapproved of presumption of
truthfulness instructions. See United States v. Birmingham, 447 F.2d 1313 (10th Cir. 1971); United
States v. Stroble, 431 F.2d 1273 (6th Cir. 1970); McMillen v. United State,., 386 F.2d 29 (lst Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1031 (1968); United States v. Dichiarinte, :185 F.2d 333 (7th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 945 (1968); United States v. Johnson, 371 F.2d 800 (3d Cir. 1967);
United States v. Persico, 349 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1965); United States v. Safley, 408 F.2d 603 (4th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 983 (1969).
57. This is not merely a case of evidence from witnesses rebutting an existing presumption. The
presumption of truthfiulness and innocence conflict without any testimonial evidence.
58. Naughten v. Cupp, 476 F.2d 845, 847 (9th Cir. 1972) (stating that 'the clear effect of the
challenged instruction was to place the burden on [the accused] to prove hin innocence. This is so
repugnant to the American concept that it is offensive to any fair notion of due process of law"),
rev'd, 414 U.S. 141 (1973).
59. 414 U.S. at 149.
60. The decision in Naughten is but one case where the real meaning of innocence, I would argue,




Courts and scholars on a second side of the controversy argue that the
presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt rule are in some ways
logically separate and distinct.6 Following Coffin, the Supreme Court
continued to require lower courts to find a conceptually meaningful
distinction. Through this interpretation the presumption of innocence
ensures allegiance and adherence to the reasonable doubt rule by
requiring a certain fairness in the factfinding process.62  This
interpretation also assumes that the presumption of innocence acts as a
conceptual guard against dilution of the reasonable doubt rule.63 But
Justice Stevens dissent in Lakeside v. Oregon. The italicized text contains presumption of innocence
rhetoric with a meaning that appears to differ from the literal text:
Experience teaches us that most people formally charged with crime are guilty; yet we presume
innocence until the trial is over. Experience also justifies the inference that most people who
remain silent in the face of serious accusation have something to hide and are therefore probably
guilty; yet we forbid trial judges or juries to draw that inference. The presumption of
innocence and the protections afforded by the Due Process Clause impose a significant cost on
the prosecutor who must prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt without the aid
of his testimony. That cost is justified by the paramount importance of protecting a small
minority of accused persons those who are actually innocent from wrongful conviction.
Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 342-43 (1978) (emphasis added). Who presumes factual
innocence armed with experience that most charged are guilty? Who fails to draw inferences of guilt
from the silence of a defendant charged with a serious crime, when experience suggests guilt?
61. This view has been restated by Charles E. Torcia, who maintains that the presumption of
innocence and reasonable doubt rule '"must always be kept separate and distinct." Charles E. Torcia,
Wharton's Criminal Evidence 167 (13th ed. 1972). Accordingly, "the defendant is entitled to
instructions upon two separate points: (1) the presumption of innocence, and (2) what constitutes a
reasonable doubt." Id. A similar view was espoused by Spencer A. Gard, Jones on Evidence: Civil
and Criminal 152 (6th ed. 1972) (stating that "[t]he presumption of innocence must not be confused
with the rule which requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt to justify a finding of guilt, although
courts continue to treat them as though they carried the same implication"). The distinction between
the presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt rule was discussed by Scott E. Sundby, The
Reasonable Doubt Rule and the Meaning of Innocence, 40 Hastings LJ. 457 (1989), where it is
concluded that the reasonable doubt rule gives the presumption of innocence constitutional meaning.
62. See Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432,459 (1895).
63. See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501,505 (1976). Evidence of the presumption of innocence
as a distinct and less significant variant of the reasonable doubt rule is found in the Supreme Court's
treatment of presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt rule instructions. The Court has ruled
that failure to instruct the jury on the presumption of innocence may be harmless error. See
Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786 (1979). A harmless error analysis was rejected for a failure to
instruct on the reasonable doubt rule. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 320 (1979); Estelle v.
McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991); Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S. Ct 2078 (1993). For a recent discussion
of the application of harmless error analysis to the presumption of innocence, see Arizona v.
Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991), reh "g denied, 500 U.S. 938.
One commentator has written that there are two conceptually distinct forms of the presumption of
innocence. The first is a rule of evidence that serves to reinforce the reasonable doubt rule at trial. A
second form of the presumption of innocence, in effect before trial, is not a factual presumption, but
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commentators on the second side of the debate have observed that the
presumption of innocence, while a corollary of the reasonable doubt rule,
also conveys powerful symbolic messages to all criminal justice
functionaries and to the community at large. Instructions on the
presumption of innocence do more than just minimize confusion
regarding burdens and standards of proof by reminding jurors not to
disregard that the state bears the burden of establishing every element of
the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.64 For attorneys and judges, the
presumption of innocence serves a special expressive and educative
function. According to Professor Tribe, the presumption of innocence
operates as a refusal to acknowledge prosecutorial omniscience in the
face of the defendant's protest of innocence, and as an affirmation of
respect for the accused-a respect expressed by the trier's willingness to
a normative expression "that there should be no deprivation of liberty without due process of law."
Note, Preventive Detention Before Trial, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1489, 1501 (1966).
64. See Wigmore, supra note 35, at 530; Delo v. Lashley, 113 S. Ct. 1222, 1225 (1993). See also
Federal Judicial Center, Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions 6 (1988) (stating that "the committee
believes that it is important to plant the presumption in the jurors' minds se that there will be no
confusion during the course of the trial"). The Committee Comment to Seventh Circuit Pattern
Instruction No. 2.06 states: "Regardless of what may be constitutionally required ... , it is well-
established that juries in federal criminal trials should be instructed on boih the presumption of
innocence and the government's burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." The language
used in the Model Federal Jury Instruction on the presumption of innocencet. and burden of proof
supports this view. In fact, all five paragraphs focus on legal guilt, legal innocence, and relevant
burdens of proof. Unfortunately, presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt rule instructions
are most often joined so that they become difficult for jurors to distinguish. See infra note 181 and
accompanying text.
Although the defendant has been indicted, you must remember that an irtdictment is only an
accusation. It is not evidence. The defendant has not plead not guilty to that indictment.
As a result of the defendant's plea of not g-ailty the burden is on the prosecution to prove guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. This burden never shifts to a defendant for the simple reason that
the law never imposes upon a defendant in a criminal case the burden of railling any witness or
producing any evidence.
The law presumes the defendant to be innocent of all the charges against him. I therefore
instruct you that the defendant is to be presumed by you to be innoc.ant throughout your
deliberations until such time, if ever, you as a jury are satisfied that the government has proven
him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
The defendant begins the trial here with a clean slate. This presumption of innocence alone is
sufficient to acquit a defendant unless you as jurors are unanimously convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt of his guilt, after a careful and impartial consideration of all of the evidence in
this case. If the government fails to sustain its burden, you must find the defendant not guilty.
This presumption was with the defendant when the trial began and remains with him even now
as I speak to you and will continue with the defendant into your deliberalions unless and until
you convinced that the government has proven his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Federal Judicial Center, Pattern Jury Instructions 6 (1988).
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listen to all the accused has to say before reaching any judgment, even a
tentative one, as to his probable guilt.65 The presumption of innocence,
accordingly, stalls any predetermination of guilt by protecting the
credibility of the accused's representations of innocence, in addition to
guarding against an unjust imbalance in the burden of proof.66
Additional support for the notion that the presumption of innocence
and reasonable doubt rule are conceptually distinct comes from empirical
researchers who have proposed theoretical models of juror
decisionmaking grounded in cognitive algebra, Bayesian probability
theory, and stochastic processes.' In an algebraic sequential averaging
model, which is a weighted average equation, the reasoning of jurors is
continually recalculated in the form of subjective probabilities of guilt as
new evidence is presented.68 The presumption of innocence is tied to
65. See Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84
Harv. L. Rev. 1329, 1370 (1971).
66. Researchers such as Hastie and Saks conceive of the presumption of innocence as an initial
belief state and the reasonable doubt rule as a decision criterion. See Inside the Juror: The
Psychology of Juror Decision Making (Reid Hastie ed., 1993).
67. For an outstanding review of these models see Inside the Juror: The Psychology of Juror
Decision Making (Reid Hastie ed., 1993); Valerie P. Hans, Jury Decision Making in Handbook of
Psychol. & Law 56-76 (Dorothy Kagehiro & William S. Laufer eds., 1992).
68. Hastie, supra note 66, at 96. At the core of an algebraic weighted sequencing or average
model is an equation that calculates a juror's final decision on the basis of the weighted average of
her initial opinion and the evidence presented at trial. An averaging model of juror information
integration is represented by the equation:
Wo So E Si Wi
J =
Wo 2 Wi
where J equals a final evaluation of the probability or likelihood of guilt; so is the juror's initial
disposition; wo is the initial weight given to the disposition; si Wi equals the perceived probative
value of evidence presented at trial, i.e., the importance, credibility or relevance of any given piece
of evidence. According to this model, as evidence is presented the importance of a juror's initial
opinion decreases.. Thus, any increase in Zwi si decreases the value of the WO so term. See
Thomas M. Ostrum et al., An Integration Theory Analysis of Jurors' Presumptions of Guilt or
Innocence, 36 J. Personality & Soc. Psych. 436 (1978). For a discussion of the genesis of this
decision making model, see Ewart A.C. Thomas and Anthony Hogue, Apparent Weight of Evidence,
Decision Criteria, and Confidence Ratings in Juror Decision Making, 83 Psychol. Rev. 442 (1976).
A simplified depiction of this model, borrowed from Hastie, Inside the Jury, supra note 66, at 12,
appears below:
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jurors' initial belief states or "anchors" at the beginning of the model
where preliminary instructions are given.' This differs from the
reasonable doubt rule, which is a decision criterion to convict or acquit.70
The reasonable doubt rule and presumption of innocence are on opposite
ends of the Bayesian probability updating model t and the Stochastic
Poisson process model.7' The presumption of innocence, once translated,
Algebraic Sequential
0 50 100 Averaging Model 0 100
POI Instructions (Belief State) RDR Instructions Decisio Rule)
All jurors are instructed on the presumption of innocence and begin with an initial belief or
opinion regarding the accused. The opinion meter that appears in the top 'eft hand comer of the
model changes as evidence is presented. This change reflects a weight attached to the importance,
reliability and relevance of the evidence. After the process of weighting is complete, charging
instructions are used as decision rules to guide jurors in rendering a verdict. See, eg., Martin F.
Kaplan, Discussion Polarization Effects in a Modified Jury Decision Paradigm: Informational
Influences, 40 Sociometry 262 (1977); Martin F. Kaplan and G.D. Kemmerick, Juror Judgment as
Information Integration: Combining Evidential and Nonevidential Informatgn 30 J. Personality &
Soc. Psychol. 493 (1974).
69. Hastie, supra note 66.
70. It should be noted that juries are most often given a charging instruction on the reasonable
doubt rule after the close of evidence or summation. However, given the interdependence of
presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt nile, it is quite common for jrxies to be instructed on
the presumption and reasonable doubt rule in preliminary instructions.
71. The presumption of innocence is at issue with prior probability judgments made at the start of
a Bayesian probability updating model. Jury instructions on standards of proof are considered much
later, once again in relation to a decision criterion to convict. Cf Terry Comiolly, Decision Theory,
Reasonable Doubt, and the Utility of Erroneous Acquittals, 11 Law & Hum. Elehav. 101 (1987)
72. Just like the algebraic model, the presumption of innocence is considered with an initial
opinion in a Stochastic process model, with reasonable doubt rule instntctions evaluated as i
criterion of conviction. It should be noted that the presumption of innocence. and reasonable doubt
rule are not distinguished in the recently developed explanations-based Cogaitive Story model. In
fact, it is difficult to determine what role, if any, the presumption of innocence plays during the story
and match process. See Nancy Pennington and Reid Hastie, The Story Model for Juror Decision
Making, in Inside the Jury, supra note 66; Nancy Pennington and Reid Hastie. A Cognitive Theory of
Juror Decision Making: The Story Model, 13 Cardozo L. Rev. 519 (1991). The Story Model
suggests that jurors impose a narrative story organization on all evidence presented at trial,
transforming the evidence into a plausible account of "what happened." Id. The imposition of such
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is an initial opinion or belief in the accused's innocence that, upon
presentation of the state's evidence, is verified or disaffirmed. The
reasonable doubt rule is a decision rule that takes revised opinions and
beliefs regarding the accused's innocence and calculates a verdict.73
There is a wealth of support for both sides of the controversy over the
presumption of innocence's meaning. In theory and in mathematical
models the presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt rule may be
distinct, but in the practice of law the two are often indistinguishable.74
In case after case, the legal term "innocence" stands in for the idea that
the state has not met its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and
that the accused, therefore, lacks criminal culpability or responsibility.75
Both preliminary and charging instructions further obscure the
distinction by intermingling presumption of innocence and reasonable
doubt rule provisions.76 Moreover, judges do little to explain any
conceptual differences between the two. 77
It would be naive to say that the presumption of innocence has
achieved such prominence as a mere reminder of an accused's legal
an organization facilitates juror comprehension and allows for predeliberation determinations of
guilt. See Nancy Pennington and Reid Hastie, Explaining the Evidence: Tests of the Story Model for
Juror Decision Making, 62 L Personality & Soc. Psychol. 189 (1992). According to some
researchers, algebraic models and the story model are not necessarily incompatible. The story model
is a pattern matching model that may take place in conjunction with the movement of opinion
meters. See Lola Lopes, Two Conceptions of the Juror, in Inside the Jury, supra note 66. Due to the
ill-defined nature of preliminary presumption of innocence instructions and juror predispositions in
the story model, references are limited to information integration models throughout the balance of
this article. It is likely, however, that the arguments and points made are equally applicable to a
story model.
73. The temporal placement of the presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt rule in these
models is not an artifact of the timing of the instructions. Instead, it reflects a distinction between
the presumption of innocence as a guardian of initial beliefs, and the reasonable doubt rule as a
decision rule.
Notably, there are several assumptions of decision making models that place definite limits on
their external validity. For instance, with regard to algebraic weighted models, researchers have
noted the limitation of estimating the probability of guilt on an interval scale. Many attributes and
dimensions in an actual trial do not lend themselves to such quantification. In addition, the way in
which algebraic models require information items to be specified is equally unrealistic given the
complexity of evidence presented at trial. See Hastie, supra note 66, at 90-91.
74. See infra notes 280-92 and accompanying text.
75. See Sundby, supra note 49, at 493 (explaining that "[i]t may be helpful to think of innocence
in this context as more of a question of criminal responsibility than an issue of culpability. The term
responsibility perhaps better reflects the idea that once the focus is on the criminal trial, the issue is
no longer one of abstract moral right and wrong, but specifically whether society views the
individual as responsible for violating the criminal law.')
76. See infra notes 399-401 and accompanying text.
77. Id.
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innocence, or as a symbolic message to criminal justice functionaries.
Reminders and symbolic messages do not rise to the level of
fundamental due process rights. Reminders and symbolic messages are
not axiomatic, elementary, and basic premises of a legal system. The
rhetoric that supports the presumption of innocence has given a simple
maxim the appearance and sound of a fundamental legal doctrine. 8
Presuming anything but the factual innocence of an accused would, if the
rhetoric is taken seriously, compromise the impartiality and accusatorial
nature of guilt determination. 79  Neglect factual innocence, and the
fundamental fairness of a trial is called into question. The vast
difference between the actual operation and the rhetoricEl commitment of
the presumption is nothing short of remarkable. This difference is
explored below in a discussion of the history and evolution of the
presumption of innocence, the normative environment within which it is
maintained, and mounting empirical evidence of juror miscomprehension
of basic legal doctrines.
2. Historical Basis
Thayer's careful tracing of legal history finds only fleeting references
to the presumption of innocence from the thirteenth century through the
seventeenth century. 0 From Bracton to Menochius, the presumption of
innocence was found to be no more than a symbolic reference or
"synonym " for the evidentiary burdens of a criminal case." Issues
78. A discussion of the tension between legal innocence and factual guilt will appear in part II.A.
A proposal that is designed to return meaning to be the presumption of innocence is discussed in part
IM.
79. See infra notes 357-61 and accompanying text.
80. The Court in Coffin finds early references to the presumption of innocence in Deuteronomy,
as well as in Roman law and the laws of ancient Greece. Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 454
(1895). Thayer, supra note 12.
81. As Thayer noted-
And I think it will be found that, in English practice, down to our time, the presumption of
innocence-except as a synonym for the general principle incorporated in that total phrase
which expresses the rule about a reasonable doubt, namely, that the ace ased must be proved
guilty, and that beyond a reasonable doubt-plays a very small part indeed.
Supra note 12, at 554. See also Fletcher, supra note 9, at 533-34 (explainting that "(r]elating the
presumption of innocence to the process of proof and conviction was a relatively new development.
The doctrine appears in some early nineteenth-century civil disputes, but it was apparently not until
mid-century that judges and commentators began to use the presumption of innocence as a rationale
for the prosecutor's burden of persuasion.'). Fletcher provides a different listorical account of the
presumption of innocence, tracing it to private disputes in the early 1800s, "as a rationale for




relating to weight of evidence, questions about shifting burdens of
persuasion, and debates over standards of proof were common. The
history of the presumption of innocence, by contrast, is a sparse account
of trial strategy and tactics. Throughout the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries, practitioners used the presumption of innocence as
advocates now use rhetorical devices.8" Jurists employed the
presumption of innocence as an educational tool to inform naive,
doubtful, and questioning jurors.83 The presumption of innocence
became a seemingly important reminder from the bench that all jurors are
admonished to assume no guilt until and unless there is proof of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. There is scant historical evidence that the
presumption of innocence, at any time, stood alone as a presumption of
factual innocence."
The historical record of the presumption of innocence stands in sharp
contrast to the evolution of the reasonable doubt rule in seventeenth
century English courts. By the middle 1600s jurors were factfinders and
evaluators, judging the credibility of testimony and evidence against
standards of proof that had emerged from religious and philosophical
sources." From this time through the middle 1700s, English juries were
asked to base verdicts on their "belief" in the evidence, being "satisfied"
with the evidence, or having a "satisfied conscience." 6 Concerned with
the effect of residual doubts on the minds of trial jurors, courts over the
next century moved away from "satisfaction" standards and instructed
juries to acquit if there was a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt.87
In some courts this meant that guilt must be established to a moral
certainty.88
Rules: A Comparative Study of Burden-of-Persuasion Practices in Criminal Cases, 77 Yale L.J. 880
(1968).
82. Thayer, supra note 12, at 554-59.
83. According to Thayer, the presumption of innocence "has, in our inherited system, a peculiarly
important function, that of warning our untrained tribunal, the jury, against being misted by
suspicion, conjecture, and mere appearances." Id. at 559.
84. Professor Tribe concludes that the presumption of innocence "retains force not as a factual
judgment, but as a normative one-as a judgment that society ought to speak of accused men as
innocent, and treat them as innocent, until they have been properly convicted after all they have to
offer in their defense has been carefully weighed." Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics:
Precision andRitual in the Legal Process, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1329, 1371 (1971).
85. See Shapiro, supra note 8, at 13.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Today, the standard of moral certainty is generally not considered to be an acceptable proxy,
standing alone, for the reasonable doubt rule. See Victor v. Nebraska, 114 S. Ct. 1239 (1994);
Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990), overruled inpart by Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991).
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By the end of the well documented genesis of the reasonable doubt
rule, the presumption of innocence was still no more than an often used
maxim having little, if anything, to do with presuming factual innocence.
By presuming innocence, courts were merely reminding jurors to observe
the reasonable doubt rule. While judges increasingly referred to the
presumption of innocence, legal theorists were noticeably frustrated by
the divergence between presumption of innocence in rhetoric and its
appearance in the criminal process. Bentham, for example, highlighted
the apparent contradiction of the presumption of innocence that one is
presumed innocent while assumed to be guilty.9 This simple yet
powerful observation has been echoed throughout the legal and academic
community for years. Jurists and lay observers alike have noted that the
criminal process, from beginning to end, defeats presumptions of
innocence and invites presumptions of guilt. 0
To some it is of little consequence that an accused is presumed guilty
in fact. The presumption of innocence is a normative conclusion and a
Currently, only California, Idaho, Massachusetts, North Dakota, and Tennes3ee use moral certainty
language in pattern instructions. The Court in Victor noted that the meaning of moral certainty has
evolved. 114 S. Ct. at 1245-48. For example, reference is made to Commonwealth v. Costley, 118
Mass. 1, 24 (1875) where it was held that: "Proof 'beyond a reasonable doubt'.., is proof 'to a
moral certainty,' as distinguished from absolute certainty. As applied to a judicial trial for crime, the
two phrases are synonymous and equivalent... " 114 S. Ct. at 1246. For a listorical account of the
moral certainty standard, see Barbara J. Shapiro, "To A Moral Certainty:" Theories of Knowledge
andAnglo-American Juries: 1600-1850,38 Hastings L.. 153 (1986).
89. Bentham considered the presumption of innocence in his treatise:
In all cases of penal procedure, the declared supposition is, that the party accused is innocent;
and for this supposition, mighty is the laud bestowed upon one another by judges and law-
writers. This supposition is at once contrary to fact, and belied by their onra practice ... The
defendant is not in fact treated as if he were innocent, and it would be absurd to deal by him as if
he were. The state he is in is a dubious one, betwixt non-delinquency and delinquency:
supposing him non-delinquent, the immediately should that procedure, against him drop;
everything that follows is oppression and injustice.
Bentham, supra note 17, at 169.
90. Wigmore, supra note 35 (quoting Darling). Darling casts a wide net, making reference to
each and every step of the criminal process:
The secrecy of complaint-making at the magistrate's office, the mysterious inquisition of the
grand-jury room, the publicity of the arrest, the commitment to the lock-up, the demand of bail,
the delay of trial, the enforced silence of defence till prosecution has done its worst, are all so
many steps and strokes to blacken the accused before he is to open his mouth with a syllable of
evidence to break the force of the damaging array of circumstances. To suppose that the
presumption of innocence, with unbiased nature prompts, is not before this time choked and
strangled to death is an absurdity too gross to dispute.
Id. at 531.
Rhetoric of Innocence
symbolic expression, not a statement of fact.91 On the contrary, juror
predisposition toward factual guilt raises an issue of presumptive
partiality. It invites cognitive biases that frame jurors' subsequent
evaluations of evidence. And, the use of rhetoric supporting the
presumption of innocence in the face of such predispositions only adds
legitimacy to a normative environment that tolerates or willingly accepts
guilt presumptions. 2 To appreciate the real meaning of this presumption
in the context of the criminal process, it is necessary to consider both
normative models of the criminal process and empirical models of juror
decisionmaking.
3. Normative Process and Decisionmaking Models
Normative process and decisionmaking models, such as those
constructed by Herbert Packer, Hyman Gross, and Malcolm Feeley,
reveal the value antinomy of criminal justice.93 From the due process
and crime control models to the pretrial and plea bargain models, legal
theorists have noted the complex relation between presuming innocence
and the structural, procedural, and substantive characteristics of the
criminal process. The crime control model, for example, emphasizes
efficiency, speed, and finality to maximize apprehension and conviction
rates. All stages of the criminal process belong to an administrative,
routinized machine that has as its sole task the screening and processing
91. See Tribe, supra note 84, at 1371 (noting that "[tihe suspicion that many are in fact guilty
need not undermine either this normative conclusion or its symbolic expression through trial
procedure, so long as jurors are not compelled to articulate their prior suspicions of guilt in an
explicit and precise way'). Thayer concurs in arguing that the presumption of innocence as a legal
presumption is wholly independent of facts that may or may not support it. Thayer, supra note 12, at
560.
92. In parts H and IU, I conclude that the presumption of innocence is needed as a factual
presumption-one that is conceptually distinct from the reasonable doubt rule. See infra notes 282-
356 and accompanying text.
93. See, e.g., Herbert L Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (1968); Malcolm M. Feeley,
The Process is the Punishment: Handling Cases in a Lower Criminal Court (1992); Hyman Gross, A
Theory of Criminal Justice (1979). Normative theories that explain the criminal process may be
distinguished from the more narrowly focused theories of criminal trials. Theories of adversary
criminal trials, such as the fight theory, truth-finding theory; fair decision theory, rights theory, and
bargaining incentive theory, seek to explain the complex adversarial dynamic created by such
proceedings. The focus is squarely on the criminal trial as a separate and distinct stage of the
criminal process. See Gary Goodpaster, On the Theory ofAmerican Adversary Criminal Trial, 78 J.
Crim. L. & Criminology 118 (1987); Gordon Van Kessel, Adversary Excesses in the American
Criminal Trial, 67 Notre Dame L. Rev. 403 (1992); Jerome Frank, Courts on Trial: Myth and
Reality in American Justice (1973).
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of suspects and defendants.94 Crime control theorists rely on the proof
determinations that take place at the time of arrest, arraignment, bail, and
trial as indicators of probable guilt. As standards of proof move from
reasonable suspicion to proof beyond a reasonable doubt, an assumption
of factual guilt replaces any earlier presumption of innocence.95
According to Packer, defendants who are most likely innocent are
screened out of the system.96 Relying heavily on the early stages of the
administrative and adjudicatory factfinding, crime control theorists
implicitly use a presumption of factual guilt to create: efficiency, e.g.,
plea negotiation and bargaining.97
The due process model, in contrast, honors the presumption of legal
innocence by erecting an obstacle course of legal protections and
safeguards. In doing so, all the qualifying and disabling doctrines that
serve to restrict the reach of the criminal law are raised and considered.98
An accused is legally innocent, and therefore not criminally culpable,
where procedural rules are not strictly observed or where viable defenses
and excuses are relevant. Once more, factual innocence is unimportant.
The presumption of innocence has only functional relevance, ensuring
94. Packer captures the essence of this machine:
The image that comes to mind is an assembly-line conveyor belt down which moves an endless
stream of cases, never stopping, carrying the cases to workers who stand at fixed stations and
who perform on each case as it comes by the same small but essential operation that brings it
one step closer to being a finished product, or, to exchange the metaphor for the reality, a closed
file.
Packer, supra note 93, at 159. There is, however, much more to the ..rime control position.
Theorists, legal scholars, and jurists who are committed to strong, swift, and efficient criminal justice
claim that criminal procedure is overly concerned with rights and safeguards. As Judge Learned
Hand noted in United States v. Garsson,
Our dangers do not lie in too little tenderness to the accused. Our procedure has always been
haunted by the ghost of the innocent man convicted. It is an unreal drean. What we need to
fear is the archaic formalism and the watery sentiments that obstructs, delays, and defeats the
prosecution of crime.
291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
95. This is a central theme of all due process theorists. Simply stated, the standards of proof
required before trial are far more lax than the reasonable doubt rule. For an excellent discussion of
these standards in relation to a series of pretrial screens, see Abraham S. Goldstein, The State and the
Accused: Balance of.Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 Yale L.J. 1149 (1960).
96. Packer, supra note 93, at 159-60.
97. Goldstein argues that crime control ideology, as reflected in exitting laws of criminal
procedure, constitute "an inarticulate, albeit clearly operative, rejection of the presumption of
innocence in favor of a presumption of guilt." Goldstein, supra note 95, at 1152.
98. Accordingly, Packer acknowledges that "The possibility of legal innocence is expanded
enormously when the criminal process is viewed as the appropriate forum for correcting its own
abuses." Packer, supra note 93, at 167.
352
Rhetoric of Innocence
that the state fulfills its burden to prove legal guilt. The focus here is
squarely on the primacy of individual liberty, judicial reliability, formal
adversarial fact-finding, and minimization of stigma. The due process
model reveres equality and fairness, rather than rountinization and
efficiency.
Packer, Feeley, and other legal theorists acknowledge that the crime
control and due process models are polarities and illustrate normative
extremes." These extremes reflect, more broadly, what Jerome Hall has
called "the basic dilemma of criminal procedure."'" Criminal procedure,
Hall maintains, is "designed from inception to end, to acquit the innocent
as readily, at least, as to convict the guilty."'0 ' The easier it is to
establish guilt, the more difficult it becomes to prove innocence.' 2 Thus,
it is not surprising that normative models, viewed in isolation, often
appear as zero sum games.'0 3 In the early to middle 1970s variants of
99. Id.
100. Jerome Hall, Objectives of Federal Criminal Procedural Revision, 51 Yale L.J. 723 (1942).
Professor Hall's discussion of the inherent conflict of competing normative goals is a landmark
study in procedural theory.
101. Id. at 728. The object, Hall might argue, is to find some middle ground. Mr. Justice Day
made this argument over eighty years ago:
The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as
they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of
endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the
law.
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914).
102. Hall argues that legal commentators fail to appreciate the dual character (crime control/due
process) of the criminal process. There is no such thing as an assumption of guilt-it is a notion
maintained by well-intentioned but naive reformers who mischaracterize the realities of the criminal
process. And polemic arguments that those accused of crimes are afforded too many procedural
safeguards also miss the point. Our system of criminal procedure, Hall writes, seeks to determine
guilt with the basic hypothesis of innocence. The criminal process is designed with this tension as
its central feature-a feature that safeguards constitutional rights and resists oppression. Hall
concludes that "the most important single generalization that can be made about American criminal
procedure or for that matter about any civilized criminal procedure is that its ultimate ends are dual
and conflicting." Hall, supra note 100, at 728.
Professor Hall is successful in portraying the illogic of adopting either a strict crime control or
strict due process position. See Freda Adler et al., Criminal Justice 233 (1994). The immanent
conflicting nature of the criminal process is acknowledged. Unfortunately, Hall does little to suggest
that this dual and conflicting character evolves over time. Conflict in the criminal process is not
immune to increasing ideological consensus, or escalating sociopolitical and socioeconomic
division. It will be argued below that over the last decade there has been a diminution in goal
conflict.
Further, Hall's characterization of the criminal process makes a critical assumption that the
tradeoff in conflict is proof of guilt for innocence, or the inverse. This, it will be argued, overstates
the importance of proof of innocence in our current criminal justice system.
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both crime control and due process models, operating simultaneously,
were seen in state and federal trial courts around the United States."°
Legal and political culture, judicial ideology, caseload constraints, court
delay, and available financial resources often determined the quality and
character of the interaction between these two models. °5 At that time,
the criminal process was defined by the simultaneous expressions of
crime control and due process goals and values."°  Such conflict,
reflecting deeply held beliefs about the value of efficient prosecution and
the importance of public safety on one side, versus the value of due
process and the primacy of liberty interests on the other, created
alternating states of equilibrium and disequilibrium.
10 7
Over the last decade, value and goal conflict has significantly
diminished, resulting in a criminal process with an overriding ideology
103. There have been surprisingly few geme theoretical analyses of the criminal process. See,
e.g., Robert L. Birmingham, A Model Of Criminal Process: Game Theory and Law, 56 Cornell L.
Rev. 57 (1970). Feeley suggests that the plea bargaining model is a mixed st-ategy game where both
the defense and prosecution share gains and losses. See Feeley, supra note 93. Unfortunately, this
model says little, if anything, about the complex normative environment in which compromises and
deals are made. And, finally, Feeley's Pretrial Process model justifiably shifts the focus on
functionaries who make preliminary decisions concerning arraignment, release, and charging.
However, it too fails to capture the complex equilibrium that results from adversarial functionaries
who share divergent values.
104. See, e.g., Peter Amelia, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and
Burger Courts' Competing Ideologies, 72 Geo. L.J. 185, 230-31 (1983); Rudolph Alexender, Jr.
The Mapp, Escobedo, and Miranda Decisiows: Do They Serve a Liberal or a Conservative Agenda?,
4 Crim. Just. Pol'y Rev. 39 (1990); C. K. Rowland et al., Judges' Policy Choices and the Value
Basis of Judicial Appointments: A Comparison of Support for Criminal Defendants Among Nixon,
Johnson, and Kennedy Appointees to the Federal District Courts, 46 J. Pol. 886 (1984). Cf Craig
M. Bradley, The Failure of the Criminal Justice Revolution (1993).
105. For a fascinating thesis on the cyclical nature of this equilibrium, see Thomas J. Bernard, The
Cycle ofJuvenile Justice (1992).
106. See, e.g., Kevin N. Wright, The DeIrability of Goal Conflict within the Criminal Justice
System, 9 L Crim. Just. 209 (1981). Wright argues that such goal conflict is advantageous.
Disequilibrium encourages the representation and protection of mincrity interests; ensures
appropriate procedural checks and balances; and promotes an efficiency in criminal processing.
Diversity allows for conflict resolution. Acknowledging the work of Hall, Wright decries the effort
of some reformers to create a monolithic and unified system for the admainistration of criminal
justice.
Another perspective, perhaps more consistent with recent experience, would find that where value
and goal divergence are primary forces in each stage of law enforcement anc. adjudication, the result
is a dynamic that ensures only minimal observance of procedural and substantive rights, mediocre to
inferior representation, and dispassionate prosecution. And with significant goal divergence, no
assumptions may be made concerning an accused's guilt or innocence becatse of strong ideological
partisanship. It will be argued that current ideological consensus approaches a crime control model.
107. See David J. Bodenhamer, Fair Trial: The Rights of the Accused in American History (1992).
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often approaching that found in crime control models."' 8 This ideology
reflects an emphasis on judicial restraint, strict statutory construction, a
strong commitment to the rule of law, and a wholesale acceptance of
retributive justice."° A retributive formalism, reflecting ever-increasing
public conservatism toward issues of crime and justice, has replaced
much of the due process/crime control conflict found in the 1970s." °
Examples of a diminution in normative conflict, with a move toward
efficiency in prosecution, retributive sentencing philosophies, and
incapacitative strategies, are more than revealing. Consider, for instance,
the role of the presumption of innocence before trial. Eight years ago, in
United States v. Salerno,"' the Court upheld the constitutionality of
pretrial detention of arrestees under the Bail Reform Act of 1984.12 In
doing so, Justice Rehnquist weighed the public safety interests of the
Government against the liberty interests of the detainee."' The Court
clearly followed a crime control vision of the criminal process in
deciding that there was no violation of substantive due process and no
imposition of impermissible punishment. As the Court had concluded
some years prior in Bell v. Wolfish,"4 pretrial detention is regulatory, not
108. See, e.g., Alida V. Merlo & Peter J. Benekos, Adapting Conservative Correctional Policies
to the Economic Realities of the 1990s, 6 Crim. Just. Pol'y Rev. 1 (1992); Criminal Justice Policy
and Politics in the 1990s (Robert Reiner and Malcolm Cross eds., 1991); C. K. Rowland et al.,
Presidential Effects on Criminal Justice Policy in the Lower Federal Courts: The Reagan Judges, 22
Law & Soc'y Rev. 191 (1988); Jon Gottschall, Reagan's Appointments to the U.S. Courts of
Appeals: The Continuation ofa Judicial Revolution, 70 Judicature 48 (1986); Gordon Van Kessel,
Adversary Excesses in the American Criminal Trial, 67 Notre Dame L. Rev. 403, 441 (1992) (stating
that "[i]n today's world of criminal practice, prosecutors are not in the business of trying to convince
a jury to convict someone whom they believe to be innocent. Our courts are crammed with enough
guilty defendants and our prosecutors armed with enough weapons to pressure plea bargains from
the 'marginally guilty.") For two interesting critical reviews, see Tony Platt, U.S. Criminal Justice
in the Reagan Era: An Assessment, 29 Crim. & Soc. Just. 58 (1987); Susan Caringella Macdonald,
State Crisis and the Crackdown on Crime under Reagan, 14 Cont. Crises 91 (1990).
109. Charles Fried, Order and Law: Arguing the Reagan Revolution-A Firsthand Account
(1991); David Karys, Conservative Legal Thought Revisited, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 1847 (1991) (book
review). David Savage, Turning Right, the Making of the Rehnquist Supreme Court (1992).
110. David Kairys, With Liberty and Justice for Some: A Critique of the Conservative Supreme
Court (1993).
11. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
112. 18 U.S.C. § 3141 (1988 & Supp. 1993). Before Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), the
presumption of innocence protected the rights of pretrial detainees. Infringements on such rights
were measured against a compelling necessity test. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951) (stating
that the "traditional right to freedom before conviction permits the unhampered preparation of a
defense, and serves to prevent the infliction of punishment prior to conviction") See also Block v.
Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576 (1984); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
113. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745 (1987).
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punitive, and is one solution among many to the pressing social problem
of ever-increasing crime rates in America's inner cities."' Further,
pretrial detention is carefully limited, and is imposed in the context of a
host of constitutional safeguards." 6
Any consideration by the Salerno majority of legal or factual
innocence was lost in the rhetoric of public safety and community
protection. 17 Justice Marshall, in dissent, zealously upheld the due
process vision.' The majority, argued Marshall, disregarded principles
of justice that are enshrined in the Bill of Rights, far beyond the reach of
governmental interference." 9 The Court, accordingly, had renounced the
role of the Bail Clause and the Due Process Clause in protecting the
presumption of innocence. 2 The Court had turned an untried indictment
into evidence.' The Court had overlooked the Bail Reform Act's
admonition that "[n]othing in this section shall be construed as
modifying or limiting the presumption of innocence."'" Finally, the
Court had somehow forgotten that an accused is as innacent before trial
as he is during trial and after acquittal. Marshall pressed on, borrowing
114. 441 U.S. 520, 533 (1979) (finding that the presumption of innocence has to have "no
application to a determination of the rights of a pretrial detainee during confinement before his trial
has even begun").
115. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747. See Marc Miller & Martin Guggenheim, Pretrial Detention and
Punishment, 75 Minn. L. Rev. 335 (1990).
116. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 742.
117. See Cathy Bosworth, Note, United States v. Salerno: Destruction of the Presumption of
Innocence?, 32 St. Louis U. L.L 573 (1987); Craig Ethan Allen, Note, Pretrial Detention and the
Loss of Innocence: United States v. Salerno, 11 Hamline L. Rev. 331 (1988); John A. Washington,
Note, Preventive Detention: Dangerous Until Proven Innocent, 38 Cath. U. L. Rev. 271 (1988);
David Jeff, Note, The Loss of Innocence: Preventive Detention Under the Bail Reform Act of 1984,
22 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 707 (1985).
118. Salerno, 481 U.S.739, 755 (1987).
119. Id. at 755-56.
120. Id.
121. It is interesting that the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801, triggers a rebuttable
presumption under the Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3141, that there are no conditions that
will assure the court that the accused will appear for trial, or that the commufity would be safe if the
accused is placed on his or her recognizance. In short, those accused of drug offenses must rebut
the presumption that they pose an increased risk of dangerousness and flight by coming forward with
some evidence that they will not flee or pose a danger to the public if released. See, e.g., United
States v. Rueben, 974 F.2d 580, 586 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1336 (1993); United
States v. Hinote, 789 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir. 1986); United States v. Perry, 788 F.2d 100 (3d Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 864 (1986).
122. 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (J) (1988 & Supp. 1993).
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dramatic language from the court in Coffin: "If it suffices to accuse, what
will become of the innocent?"1
Due process theorists recognize that the perception of an accused's
innocence, whether factual or legal, is overcome by standards of proof
associated with search and seizure of evidence, arrest, indictment,
detention, and plea bargaining.124 The result of the criminal process is a
presumption of guilt and a status degradation." Certain warrantless
searches that involve minimal intrusion require a reasonable suspicion
123. Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 455 (1895). The court in Coffin had borrowed an
anecdote from the Emperor Julian, the full text of which is: "[O]h, illustrious Caesar! If it is
sufficient to deny, what hereafter will become of the guilty?" To which Julian replied, "[I]f it
suffices to accuse, what will become of the innocent?" Id.
124. See Thaler, supra note 13, at 442-50. Thaler argues that a presumption of guilt attaches
immediately following arrest. The presumption is underscored by the confidence that is bestowed in
the "low-visibility" decisions and determinations made by police, prosecutors, witnesses, and
victims. Formal proceedings where probable cause and bail determinations are made, including
initial appearances and preliminary hearings, use standards of proof that denigrate the reasonable
doubt rule. Add to this the practice of plea bargaining and, according to Thaler, the result is that a
siguificant percentage of convictions are "obtained by a standard of proof below the trial's proof
beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 458-59. See also Patricia M. Wald, Guilt Beyond a Reasonable
Doubt: A Norm Gives Way to the Numbers, 1993 U. Chi. Legal J. 101. Judge Wald makes a similar
argument by noting that the importance of the reasonable doubt rule in the criminal process has been
overstated. The reasonable doubt rule, according to Wald,
may be a household phrase thanks to Perry Mason and Scott Turow, but it does not define how
most important decisions are made in the criminal justice system. This growing irrelevance of
the reasonable doubt standard is demonstrated at every phase of a criminal prosecution, from the
initial encounter with a law enforcement officer, to plea bargaining, through the jury trial, and
even into sentencing.
Id. at 102. In place of the reasonable doubt rule, Wald makes reference to a series of different
measures of suspicion (e.g., articulable or reasonable suspicion by police) and evidence (e.g.,
probable cause) that play a role in casting a shadow of guilt on the accused. For a contrasting views
on an accused's innocence in relation to plea bargaining, see Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining
as Disaster, 101 Yale LJ. 1979 (1992); Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as
Contract, 101 Yale LJ. 1909 (1992). See also Alissa P. Worden, Policymaldng by Prosecutors: The
Uses of Discretion in Regulating Plea Bargaining, 73 Judicature 335 (1990); David Brereton &
Jonathan D. Casper, Does it Pay to Plead Guilty? Differential Sentencing and the Functioning of
Criminal Courts, 16 Law & Soc'y Rev. 45 (1981). For an excellent overview of all decision
making events in relation to standards of proof, see Michael R. Gottfredson & Don M. Gottfredson,
Decislonmaking in Criminal Justice: Toward the Rational Exercise of Discretion (1980).
125. See Joseph Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low Visibility
Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 Yale L.J. 543, 545 (1960) (stating that "[b]efore
verdict, and despite the presumption of innocence which halos every person, the state deprives the
suspect of life, liberty, dignity, or property through the imposition of deadly force, search and
seizure of persons and possessions, accusation, imprisonment, and bail, and thus seeks to facilitate
the enforcement of the criminal law") See also Abraham S. Goldstein, The State and the Accused:
Balance ofAdvantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 Yale L.J. 1149 (1960).
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that a crime has been committed or is being committed." 6 Seizure of
contraband implicitly confirms police suspicion of guilt.127 Arrest
decisions by law enforcement officers, requiring probable cause to
believe that a crime has been or is being committed, lead to an
assumption of guilt." 8 Further evidence of guilt is elicited, and then
presumed, during an arraignment, preliminary examination, or
preliminary hearing where it is determined whether probable cause exists
that an offense has been committed by the accused. 9 Grand jury and
126. Reasonable suspicion suffices for warrantless searches. In order to obtain a search warrant,
however, state and federal rules of criminal procedure require probable cause. Specifically, probable
cause had been demonstrated where facts and circumstances within the ageats' "knowledge, and of
which they had reasonably trustworthy information... [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a
man of reasonable caution in the belief that.. ." a crime has been committed or is being committed.
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925). Proof of criminal activity is not required. United
States v. Tasto, 586 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 928 (1978). However, there must be
more than "mere good faith and suspicion." Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176-77 (1949)
(holding that probable cause exists if the facts and circumstances known to the officer warrant a
prudent person to believe that the offense has been committed).
127. For a discussion of this effect, see the following tvo classic studies: Jerome Skolnick, Justice
Without Trial: Law Enforcement in Democratic Society 197 (1964); Paul G. Chevigny, Police
Power: Police Abuses in New York City (1969).
128. See Goldstein, supra note 15. Professor Goldstein discusses the :hct that police are in a
unique position to determine whether or not to enforce a criminal law. Decisions not to enforce, or
to enforce, involve strong perceptions and presumptions concerning a suspect's culpability. See also
Thaler, supra note 13, at 443. As noted earlier, Thaler concludes that the presumption of innocence
disappears immediately after arrest. This point is discussed in detail by Jonathan D. Casper,
American Criminal Justice: The Defendant's Perspective 36-37 (1972).
129. The quantum of proof required for probable cause to arrest may or may not differ from
probable cause to bind over for trial. Cf. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975); Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949). For arrest, the standard is whether or not there are facts and
circumstances "sufficient to warrant a prudent [person] in believing that the [suspect) had committed
or was committing an offense." Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). The minimum quantum of
legally competent evidence has often been raised at a preliminary hearing. According to Justice
Powell, "[tihe standard of proof required of the prosecution is usually referred to as 'probable
cause,' but in some jurisdictions it may approach a prima facie case of guilt." Gerstein, 420 U.S. at
119. See also Myers v. Commonwealth, 298 N.E.2d 819 (Mass. 1973). A clear view of the
difference in procedural safeguards during a preliminary examination as compared with a trial may
be seen in Fed. R. of Crim. P. 5.1:
(a) Probable Cause Finding. If from the evidence it appears that there is probable cause to
believe that an offense had been committed and that the defendant cormitted it, the federal
magistrate shall forthwith hold the defendant to answer in district court. The finding of probable
cause may be based on hearsay evidence in whole or in part. The defendant may cross-examine
adverse witnesses and may introduce evidence. Objections to evidence on the ground that it was
acquired by unlawful means are not properly made at the preliminary exrmination. Motions to
suppress must be made to the trial court as provided in Rule 12.
See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970); Feeley, supra note 93. Acording to Feeley, those
accused of crime bear significant costs from time of arrest until such hearings. The costs associated
with exercising due process guarantees from this point on well exceed the benefits. Id. at 30-31.
Rhetoric of Innocence
charging decisions by prosecutors require presumptive judgments
concerning a defendant's legal culpability, without the benefits of some
pivotal constitutional safeguards, further undermining the presumption of
innocence. 3  Bail proceedings also weaken the presumption of
innocence by making release decisions contingent on the severity of
unproved allegations of wrongdoing and subjective judicial predictions
of behavior pending trial.' Pretrial detention in jail is decisive evidence
of guilt.' Plea bargaining practices lure legally innocent and risk-
adverse defendants into pleading guilty to lesser charges to avoid the
significant costs of further detention and criminal processing."3 Plea
bargain contracts increase the likelihood of convicting innocents as
compared with fully adjudicated cases that are decided after testimony of
witnesses to the particular event has been heard and all of the truth-
checking devices of a vigorous adversary procedure have been used.
3 4
The sum of all the evidence, suspicions, beliefs, presumptions, and
130. See United States v. Williams, 112 S. Ct. 1735 (1992) (holding that government's failure to
disclose to the grand jury "substantial exculpatory evidence" is not error). See also United States v.
Miller, 471 U.S. 130 (1985); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349 (1974) (stating that "[i]n
deciding whether to extend the exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings, we must weigh the
potential injury to the historic role and functions of the grand jury against the potential benefits of
the rule as applied in this context. It is evident that this extension of the exclusionary rule would
seriously impede the grand jury.") For a critical and somewhat dated review of the grand jury
function as a pretrial screen, see Melvin P. Antell, The Modern Grand Jury: Benighted
Supergovernment, 51 A.B.A. L 153 (1965). Case law and scholarly literature on prosecutorial
discretion and decision making have grown significantly. See Freda Adler et al., Criminal Justice
288-89, 292-93 (1994). Discretion still remains, with few limitations, in the hands of prosecutors.
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (stating that "so long as the prosecutor has
probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision
whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests
entirely in his discretion!). See also Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985); United States v.
Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368 (1982).
131. See supra notes 118-30 and accompanying text.
132. Id.
133. For an outstanding discussion of the future of plea bargaining, while considering innocence
in relation to bargaining theory and classical contract theory, see Robert E. Scott & William J.
Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 Yale L.L 1909, 1948 (1992) (noting that plea bargaining
"contract is inefficient because it fails to exploit the risk reduction potential of defendants' private
knowledge [of his innocence]") For a powerful rejoinder to Scott & Stuntz, see Stephen L
Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 Yale L. 1979 (1992) (stating that "[c]onstitutional
and doctrinal objections aside, plea bargaining seriously impairs the public interest in effective
punishment of crime and in accurate separation of the guilty from the innocent") See also Frank H.
Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 Yale L. 1969 (1992). For a discussion of the
effects of vertical and horizontal overcharging in order to "encourage" a defendant to bargain, see
Michael P. Cox, Discretion: A Twentieth Century Mutation, 28 Okla. L. Rev. 331 (1975).
134. Schulhofer, supra note 133, at 2008. Schulhofer concludes that "[p]lea bargaining is a
disaster. It can be, and should be, abolished." Id. at 2009.
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judgments of guilt before trial can do nothing other than weaken, if not
disable, the presumption of innocence.
131
There is also a reduction in normative conflict over the scope and
application of the presumption of innocence after trial. Even though
courts have not extended the presumption of innocence beyond the stage
of conviction, a defendant's presumed innocence may still be at issue at
sentencing. 13  Over forty-five years ago the Supreme Court, in
Williams v. New York,137 upheld the use of unadjudicated offenses in
capital jury determinations. The Due Process clause does not prohibit
the consideration of prior unadjudicated crimes. This il so even if such
evidence comes from a pre-sentence investigation report, relying on
sources who were neither confronted nor cross-examined by the
defendant. This type of evidence, in large part, would have been
inadmissible in court. 131 Since Williams, many federal and state courts
have admitted extraneous unadjudicated offenses as aggravating
evidence in the penalty phases of capital trials.13  While federal circuits
are at odds and there is little consensus in state courts,140 such evidence is
135. One fine example of the emasculation of the presumption of innocence is the enforcement of
asset forfeiture laws, allowing for governmental seizure and taking of private property from those
accused of federal narcotics law violations under the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984.
See 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988 & Supp. 1993); Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil
Remedies to Achieve Criminal Objectives: Understanding and Transcending ihe Criminal-Civil Law
Distinction, 42 Hastings LU. 1325 (1991). Cdime control theorists, and others, would maintain that
presuming innocence after all of the procedural screens is ingenuine and counterfactual. Most of
those defendants who opt for trial for a determination of guilt are convicted. See H.F.M. Crombag,
Law as a Branch ofApplied Psychology, 1 Psychol., Crime & Law 1 (1994).
136. The Supreme Court has often stated that the presumption of innocence disappears once a
defendant has been tried and convicted. As the Court noted in Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610
(1974), "[tjhe purpose of the trial stage from the State's point of view is to convert a criminal
defendant from a person presumed innocent to one found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."
Following conviction, a petitioner comes to the Court legally guilty, withcut the presumption of
innocence. Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 860 (1993); Murray v. Giatratmo, 492 U.S. 1, 11-12
(1989). While this is true, one narrow exception may exist with the use of unadjudicated extraneous
offenses in sentencing deliberations. In Delo, the court left the door open to the application of the
presumption of innocence at sentencing if "the circumstances created a genuine risk that the jury
would conclude, from factors other than the State's evidence, that the defendant had committed other
crimes." Delo v. Lashley, 113 S. Ct. 1222, 1226 (1993).
137. 337U.S. 241 (1949).
138. The court noted: "We cannot say that the due process clause renders a sentence void merely
because a judge gets additional out-of-court information to assist him in the e:ercise of this awesome
power of imposing the death sentence." Id. at 252.
139. For a thorough review of this practice, see Steven Paul Smith, Note, Unreliable and
Prejudicial: The Use of Extraneous Unadjudi:ated Offenses in the Penalty Pases of Capital Trials,
93 Colum. L. Rev. 1249 (1993).
140. See, e.g., Williams v. Lynaugh, 814 F.2d 205 (5th Cir), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 935 (1987);
Coleman v. McCormick, 874 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989).
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used without any significant restriction in six states,141 and another ten
states allow extraneous offenses to be admitted with limitations.142 Only
eight jurisdictions of the thirty seven that have death penalty statutes
disallow evidence of unproved crimes.43 Courts in the jurisdictions
where evidence of unadjudicated crimes is used in penalty
determinations have denied, ignored, or minimized the fact that all
unadjudicated crimes carry a presumption of innocence.'"
In spite of all the legal rhetoric supporting the presumption of
innocence before, during, and after trial, the prevailing normative
environment, underwritten by a reactive formalism, does little to support
a presumption of innocence.145  Early critics of the presumption of
innocence would not be surprised that innocence plays an insignificant
role in the normative environment of the criminal process-no matter
which ideology prevails and no matter how much value or goal conflict
exists. The sweeping rhetoric that serves as the justification for the
presumption of innocence simply continues in the face of practices that
are inconsistent with its premises and promises. Critics would be
dismayed, however, by a growing body of empirical evidence suggesting
that jurors might not even understand the presumption of innocence as a
caution or admonition to follow the reasonable doubt rule. No doubt
some would feel frustrated that the presumption of innocence may fail to
encourage compliance with existing burdens of proof.
4. Empirical Evidence of Juror Comprehension
Playing on the apparent innocence of their client and the naive
predispositions of prospective jurors, seasoned trial lawyers find it all too
141. See, e.g., Va. Code Ann. §19.2-264.4 (B) (1990); Stockton v. Commonwealth, 402 S.E. 2d
196 (Va. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 902 (1991).
142. See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. §17-10-30 (1990); Fair v. State, 268 S.E. 2d 316 (Ga. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 986 (1980). Georgia law differs from California law which requires that all crimes
that are referred to in sentencing deliberations be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v.
Balderas, 711 P.2d 480 (Cal. 1985). California is certainly the exception-Louisiana and Delaware,
for example, require only clear and convincing evidence. State v. Wright, 541 So. 2d 891 (La.
1989).
143. For an excellent discussion of extraneous offenses from a state currently prohibiting its use,
see State v. Bartholomew, 101 Wash.2d 631, 683 P.2d 1079 (1984).
144. See Harris v. State, 827 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 381
(1992); Motley v. Collins, 18 F.3d 1223 (5th Cir), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 418 (1994). See also
Smith, supra note 139.
145. Depending on the extent and quality of goal and value conflict, no assumptions or
presumptions are made when the normative balance approaches a state of equilibrium.
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easy to have at least one juror excused for cause by asking deceptively
simple questions: "If you ask the accused, a police officer, and a stranger
what the weather forecast is for tomorrow-which one would you
believe most?" "If you had to vote right now, before the trial had started,
would you vote to acquit or to convict my client?"'" During voir dire
such tricks of the defense trade reinforce the notion that the presumption
of innocence has significant meaning and value.47 UnFortmately, they
also tend to reveal the conspicuous lack of juror comp:rehension of the
presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt rule. 48
Last term, in Victor v. Nebraska,'49 the Supreme Cort confronted the
constitutionality of pattern jury instructions that defined the reasonable
doubt rule as involving "not a mere possible doubt," but rather as
"depending on moral evidence" that prompts jurors to develop an
abiding conviction "to a moral certainty" of the truth of he charge.5 In
considering whether such a standard of proof was a suitable proxy for the
reasonable doubt rule, the Court struggled with the question of juror
misinterpretation of instructions.' The petitioner argued that it was
reasonably likely that jurors interpreted the words "moral certainty" to
mean a lesser standard of proof. The Court disagreed, end held that the
Constitution does not prescribe any particular words or combination of
words so long as the instructions, taken as a whole, convey the concept
of reasonable doubt.'52 In the process of disagreeing, however, members
of the Court revealed their profound ambivalence over certain legal
146. Ann Fagan Ginger, Jury Selection in Civil and Criminal Trials 702 (1984).
147. James J. Gobert & Walter E. Jordan, Jury Selection: The Law, Art, and Science of Selecting a
Jury 410 (1990). See also Mullis v. Commonwealth, 351 S.E. 2d 919 (Vt. Ct. App. 1987).
148. Voir dire elicits juror miscomprehension and, less frequently, an unmillingness to abide by
the presumption of innocence. See, e.g., United States v. Blount, 479 F.2d 650 (6th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Hill, 738 F.2d 152 (6th Cir. 1984); Hammond v. Brown, 33 F. Supjp. 326 (N.D.
Ohio 1971), af'd, 450 F.2d 480 (6th Cir. 1971).
149. 114 S. Ct. 1239 (1994).
150. The following instructions on the state's burden of proof were given to the jury:
Reasonable doubt is defined as follows: It is not mere possible doubt; because everything
relating to human affairs, and depending on moral evidence, is open t) some possible or
imaginary doubt. It is that state of the case which, after the entire comparison and consideration
of all the evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in that condition that they feel an abiding
conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge.
App. In No. 92-9049, p. 4 9 .
151. Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 1243.
152. Justice O'Connor advised that "so long as the court instructs the jury on the necessity that
the defendant's guilt be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the Constitution does not require any





terms. The majority opinion did not condone the use of the "moral
evidence" and "moral certainty" language as a standard of proof. Justice
Kennedy, in a concurring opinion, called the reference to moral evidence
"indefensible," and the term moral certainty "a puzzle." ' He concluded
that jurors would be baffled by by the meaning of such legal jargon.'"
Justices Ginsburg, Blackmun, and Souter, in concurring and dissenting
opinions, went even further in condemning such evidence and
standards. 55
The Court in Victor also confronted a more difficult question: Do
jurors generally understand instructions on the reasonable doubt rule?156
The answer to this question is significant, as Justice Blackmun
acknowledged, because for the reasonable doubt rule to be a meaningful
safeguard, it must be understood by those who apply it. Given the
extraordinarily high stakes in criminal trials, Blackmun concluded, "[ilt
is critical that the moral force of the criminal law not be diluted by a
standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are
being condemned."'5 7 The reasonable doubt rule, like other standards of
proof, is a reflection of the value society places on individual liberty.'
Jurors' misunderstanding of standards of proof can have devastating
effects on the outcomes of criminal cases and, if miscomprehension is
prevalent, may undermine the confidence that has been placed in the jury
system. 5 9 Juror comprehension of the reasonable doubt rule has
153. Id. at 1251.
154. Id.
155. Justice Ginsburg found certain parts of the instructions to be "unhelpful," "less
enlightening," "confused," and "no real aid" Justices Blackmun and Souter continued, finding some
of the provisions of the instructions to be "misleading," "no help," "offensive to due process,"
"potentially misleading," "overstating the degree of doubt required to acquit," and "understanding
the degree of certainty required to convict" See id. at 1252-59.
156. In a concurring opinion, Justice Ginsburg noted that reasonable doubt rule is not "self-
defining" for jurors. She also wrote that courts have questioned the effectiveness of reasonable
doubt rule instructions. Justice Ginsburg observed that: "At least two of the Federal Courts of
Appeals have admonished their District Judges not to attempt a definition. This Court, too, has
suggested on occasion that prevailing definitions of "reasonable doubt" afford no real aid." Id. at
1252-53. See, eg., Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121 (1954); United States v. Adkins, 937
F.2d 947 (4th Cir. 1991); United States v. Hall, 854 F.2d 1036 (7th Cir. 1988). This point is not
new. Justice Woods noted over one hundred years ago that: "Attempts to explain the term
'reasonable doubt' do not usually result in making it any clearer to the minds of the jury." Miles v.
United States, 103 U.S. 304,312 (1880).
157. Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 1254 (quotingIn re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,364 (1970).
158. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424-25 (1979)
159. As one court observed:
Nothing is more basic to the criminal process than the right of an accused to a trial by an
impartial jury. The presumption of innocence, the prosecutor's heavy burden of proving guilt
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significant consequences for the presumption of innocence as well. If the
presumption of innocence is really no more than an admonition for jurors
to abide by the reasonable doubt rule, then for this presumption to have
any value, jurors must understand the notion of reasonable doubt."
a. Instructions on Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
A growing body of empirical evidence from both laboratory and field
research suggests that jurors often misunderstand basic legal standards in
both preliminary and charging instructions. 161  Instructed jurors often
beyond a reasonable doubt, and the other protections afforded the accused at trial, are of little
value unless those who are called to decide the defendant's guilt or innocence are free of bias.
People v. Thomas, 601 N.Y.S.2d 608, 614 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993). This is not to say, of course, that
all criminal cases must have a totally impartial jury with complete neutraity, detachment, open-
mindedness, evenhandedness, objectivity, and comprehension of instruction:. See James J. Gobert,
In Search of the Impartial Jury, 79 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 269 (1988).
160. This presupposition was given legal force in Taylor v. Kentucky where the Court observed:
"While the legal scholar may understand that the presumption of innocence and the prosecution's
burden of proof are logically similar, the ordinary citizen well may draw significant additional
guidance from an instruction on the presumption of innocence." 436 U.S. 478, 485 (1978). The
goal is to make instructions, at the very least, more than "a string of meaningless legal abstractions."
Luther C. Hames, Jr., Pattern Jury Instructions, 27 Mercer L. Rev. 291 (1975).
161. The problem of jury instruction misunderstanding was identified ovr sixty years ago by I.
M. Hunter, Law in the Jury Room, 2 Ohio St. L.J 1 (1935); Walter. B. Wanaraaker, Trial By Jury, I I
U. Cin. L. Rev. 191 (1937); John G. Hervey. The Jurors Look at our Judger, 18 Okla. Bar J. 1508
(1947); H. M. Hoffman & Joseph Brodley, Jurors on Trial, 17 Mo. L. Rev. 235 (1952). See Harry
Kalven, Jr. & Hans Zeisel, The American Jury (1966). Empirical research on juror comprehension
of instructions, however, was initiated in the early 1970s. See, e.g., Rita J. Simon, "Beyond a
Reasonable Doubt"--An Experimental Attempt at Quantification, 6 J. Appl. Behav. Sci. 203 (1970);
David U. Strawn & Raymond W. Buchanan, Jury Confusion: A Threat to Justice, 59 Judicature 478
(1976); Amiram Elwork et al., Juridic Decisions: In Ignorance of the Law or in Light of It?, 1 Law
& Hum. Behav. 163 (1977); Robert P. Charow & Veda. R. Charow, Making Legal Language
Understandable: A Psycholinguistic Study of Jury Instructions, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 1306, 1359
(1979) (stating that "[tihe inability of jurors to comprehend the charge 2,dequately has obvious
implications concerning the soundness of the jury system: if many jurors do not properly understand
the laws that they are required to use in reaching their verdicts, it is possible that many verdicts are
reached either without regard to the law or by using improper law") In one study of the
Pennsylvania Proposed Standard Jury Instructions conducted in 1977, researchers found that jurors
were overwhelmingly confident of their comprehension of eight differentjudcial charges. Objective
evaluation showed significant misunderstanding, leading researchers to the conclusion that "there
was more actual misunderstanding of the meaning of the instructions as ra:ed by the investigators
than the jurors believed to be the case." Joseph J. O'Mara & Rolf von Eckartsberg, Proposed
Standard Jury Instructions-Evaluation of Usage and Understanding, 48 Penn. Bar Ass'n Q. 542,
550 (1977). Cf Norbert L. Kerr et al., Guilt Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: Effects of Concept
Definition and Assigned Decision Rule on the Judgments of Mock Jurors, 34 J. Personality & Soc.
Psychol. 282, 291 (1976) (stating that "the reasonable-doubt instructions have the intended effect of
setting the juror's criterion for conviction"); and Robin Reed, Jury Simulation: The Impact of
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perform no better than uninstructed jurors on comprehension surveys. 6
Studies dating back to the early 1970s have consistently revealed
comprehension levels at or below fifty percent for samples of actual and
mock jurors for a wide range of instructions including instructions on the
reasonable doubt rule. 63 For example, researchers found a fifty percent
comprehension rate of reasonable doubt instructions in a study of the
Florida Standard Jury Instructions."6 Less than a third of a sample of
Michigan jurors understood that the prosecution had the burden of
proof.6 Other studies considering reasonable doubt rule instructions in
a host of jurisdictions find comprehension error rates ranging between
twenty percent and fifty percent.'66 Efforts on the part of researchers to
Judge's Instructions and Attorney Tactics on Decisionmaking, 71 J. Crirn. L. & Criminology 68
(1980).
162. See Vicld L. Smith, When Prior Knowledge and Law Collide: Helping Jurors Use the Law,
17 Law & Hum. Behav. 507 (1993). Cf. Reed, supra note 161.
163. For a superior review of these studies, see Dorothy K. Kagehiro, Defining the Standards of
Proof in Jury Instructions, I Psych. Sci. 194 (1990) (stating that "[c]omprehension levels of 50% or
less have been found for mock jurors and representative samples of jurors from jurisdictions such as
Arizona, California, Florida, Michigan, Nevada, and Washington ) (Citations omitted). See also
Alan Reifinan et al., Real Jurors' Understanding of the Law in Real Cases, 16 Law & Hum. Behav.
539 (1992) who found a sample of Michigan jurors understood fewer than half of all jury
instructions. A similar finding was obtained by Jane Goodman & Edith Greene, The Use of
Paraphrase Analysis in the Simplification of Jury Instructions, 4 J. Soc. Behav. & Personality 237
(1989). See also Laurence J. Severance & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Improving Criminal Justice: Making
Jury Instructions Understandable for American Jurors, 33 Int'l Rev. Appl. Psychol. 97 (1984);
Laurence J. Severance & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Improving the Ability of Jurors to Comprehend and
Apply Criminal Jury Instructions, 17 Law & Soc'y Rev. 153 (1982). For an excellent summary of
this intractable problem, see J. Alexander Tanford, The Law and Psychology of Jury Instructions, 69
Neb. L. Rev. 71 (1990).
164. See Strawn & Buchanan, supra note 161, at 481. According to these researchers: "After
seeing and hearing the video instructions, only 50 percent of the instructed jurors understood that the
defendant did not have to present any evidence of his innocence, and that the state had to establish
his guilt, with evidence beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 481.
165. See Reifinan, supra note 163, at 553 (concluding that "the fact that jurors are unable to
understand half the instructions they are supposed to apply is a serious cause for concern regardless
of what a realistic base line might b6) See also Geoffrey P. Kramer & Dorean M. Koenig, Do
Jurors Understand Criminal Jury Instructions? Analyzing the Results of the Michigan Juror
Comprehension Project, 23 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 401 (1990).
166. For a discussion of these studies, see Amiram Elwork & Bruce D. Sales, Jury Instructions in
The Psychology of Evidence and Trial Procedure 280 (Saul M. Kassin & Lawrence S. Wrightsman
eds., 1985), and Valerie P. Hans & Neil Vidmar, Judging the Jury 113-29 (1989). An excellent
review of both the criminal and civil jury comprehension literature is also found in Verdict:
Assessing the Civil Jury System (Robert E. Litan ed.1993). See also Severance & Loftus, Improving
Criminal Justice, supra note 163, at 106, who found a 34% error rate with general instructions. An
identical rate was obtained in Laurence J. Severance et al., Toward Criminal Jury Instructions that
Jurors Can Understand, 74 J. Crim. L. & Criminology, 198, 206 (1984). Comparable rates were
found with Raymond W. Buchanan et al., Legal Communication: An Investigation of Juror
Comprehension of Pattern Jury Instructions, 26 Comm. Q. 31 (1978); Amiram Elwork et al.,
365
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reduce comprehension error in mock jurors include modifying the
linguistic features and construction in jury instructions,167 quantifying
reasonable doubt rule instructions, 65 presenting jurors with a preliminary
instruction at the beginning of the trial and with a final set of instructions
(in the form of a charge) at the conclusion of evidence, 69 rewriting
pattern instructions, 70 allowing jurors to take notes,"' and giving jurors
Making Jury Instructions Understandable (1982); Edward J. Imwinkehied & Lloyd R. Schwed,
Guidelines for Drafting Understandable Jury Instructions: An Introduction to the Use of
Psycholinguistics, 23 Crim. L. Bull. 135 (1987). Robert F. Forston, Justice, Jurors and Judge's
Instructions, 12 Judges J. 68 (1973) notes that approximately 80% of subjecis who were given two
chances at answering an instruction comprehension test failed to undersiand the allocation of
burdens and reasonable doubt.
167. See, e.g., Charow & Charow, supra note 161. Psycholinguists have addressed the choice of
legalistic jargon, use of complex phrases and structure, and organization of jury instructions. See
Elwork et al., supra note 161.
168. Beginning with the work of Rita J. Simon, supra note 161, subsequently reinforced by the
research of Francis C. Dane, In Search of Reasonable Doubt: A Systematic Eramination of Selected
Quantification Approaches, 9 Law and Hum. Behav. 141 (1985); and Dorothy K. Kagehiro & W.
Clark Stanton, Legal vs. Quantified Definitions of Standards of Proof, 9 Law & Hum. Behav. 159
(1985), there has been a call for the consideration of quantified definitions of ,tandards of proof, i.e.,
standards of proof that are expressed in probability terms. See Kagehiro, .apra note 163. While
quantified definitions of the reasonable doubt rule, for example, appear far more effective in
communicating precise levels of proof, a number of legal commentators argue that they would
increase the likelihood of juries convicting innocents, and would unwisely and unfairly reduce the
level of subjectivity necessary for jurors to effectively decide cases. See Lawrence H. Tribe, supra
note 84. See also C.M.A. McCauiff, Burdens of Proof. Degrees of Belief Quanta of Evidence, or
Constitutional Guarantees?, 35 Vand. L. Rev. 1293 (1982).
169. See Saul M. Kassin & Lawrence S. Wrightsman, On the Requirement; ofProof The Timing
of Judicial Instruction and Mock Juror Verdicts, 37 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 1877 (1979);
Elwork et al., supra note 161; Vicki L. Smith, The Feasibility and Utility of Pretrial Instruction in
the Substantive Law: A Survey of Judges, 14 Law & Hum. Behav. 235 (1990); Vicki L. Smith,
Impact of Pretrial Instructions on Jurors' Information Processing and Decision Making, 76 J. Appl.
Psychol. 220 (1991); Vicki L. Smith, Prototypes in the Courtroom: Lay Reoresentations of Legal
Concepts, 61 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 857 (1991). For a recent extention of this research to
civil cases, see Lynne Forster Lee et al., Juror Competence in Civil Trials: Effects of Preinstruction
and Evidence Technicality, 78 J. Appl. Psychol. 14 (1993); Donna Cruse & Beverly A. Browne,
Reasoning in a Jury Trial: The Influence oflnstructions, 114 J. Gen. Psychol. 129 (1987); Charles L.
Weltner, Why The Jury Doesn't Understand the Judge's Instructions, 18 Judges' J. 18 (1979);
Walter W. Steele & Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Jury Instructions: A Persistent Failure to
Communicate, 67 N.C. L. Rev. (1988).
170. An overview of the revision of pattern instructions may be found in Tinford, supra note 163.
Rewritten pattern instructions reduced comprehension error rates in Severance & Loftus, Improving
the Ability, supra note 163, at 190-91.
171. See David L Rosenhan et al., Notetaking Can Aid Juror Recall, 18 Law & Hum. Behav. 53
(1994); Leonard B. Sand & Steven Alan Reiss, A Report on Seven Expeiments Conducted by
District Court Judges in the Second Circuit, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 423 (1985). For cases that consider
the practice of jury note taking, see United States v. MacLean, 578 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1978); United
States v. Rhodes, 631 F.2d 43, 45 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Bertolotti, 529 F.2d 149 (2d Cir.
1975).
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written or tape-recorded instructions.17 Most of these recommendations
have been well received by law commissions, largely disregarded by
legislatures, and rejected by courts. 3
b. Presumption ofInnocence Instructions
Unfortunately, empirical research on jury instructions most often
combines reasonable doubt rule and presumption of innocence
provisions. 4  Even though mock jurors have been given both
presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt rule instructions,
researchers rarely distinguished rates of comprehension error in separate
analyses. Early work by Thomas M. Ostrom, Carol Werner, and Michael
J. Saks suggests that mock jurors initially assume innocence, and then
revise this initial assumption in the direction of the evidence presented." 5
This is especially true with jurors who begin the trial with an "anti-
defendant" predisposition. 6 Anti-defendant jurors quickly abandon a
presumption of innocence when presented with any incriminating
evidence.177 More recent investigations suggests that the presumption of
innocence is not well understood by jurors, with comprehension error
rates that mirror those for the reasonable doubt rule. Juror presumption
of innocence also appears to be subject to a host of nonevidentiary and
extra-legal biases. 7 '
172. Larry Heuer & Steven D. Penrod, Instructing Jurors: A Field Experiment with Written and
Preliminary Instructions, 13 Law & Hum. Behav. 409 (1989); Larry Heuer & Steven D. Penrod,
Increasing Jurors' Participation in Trial: A Field Experiment with Jury Notetaking and Question
Asking, 12 Law & Hum. Behav. 231 (1988); Sand & Reis, supra note 171.
173. See J. Alexander Tanford, Law Reform by Courts, Legislatures, and Commissions Following
Empirical Research on Jury Instructions, 25 Law & Soc'y Rev. 155 (1991). See also Carter v.
Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288 (1981).
174. See, e.g., Strawn & Buchanan, supra note 161, at 481; Severance & Loftus, supra note 163.
175. See Thomas M. Ostrom et al., An Integration Theory Analysis of Jurors' Presumptions of
Guilt or Innocence, 36 J. Personality & Soo. Psychol. 436 (1978).
176. Id.
177. Id. at446.
178. See Vicki S. Helgeson & Kelly G. Shaver, Presumption of Innocence: Congruence Bias
Induced and Overcome, 20 J. Appl. Soc. Psychol. 276 (1990). Reifman found that slightly less than
50% of the Michigan jurors surveyed misunderstood the prohibition against inferring guilt in cases
where the accused did not testify. See Reifinan et al., supra note 163, at 547. For a research on
biases and jury instructions, more generally, see Shed Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the White
Jury, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1611 (1985); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Racial Imagery in Criminal Cases, 67 Tul.
L. Rev. 1739 (1993). For empirical evidence of bias and discrimination, see Dolores A. Perez et al.,
Ethnicity of Defendants and Jurors as Influences on Jury Decisions, 23 J. Appl. Soc. Psychol. 1249
(1993); Jeffrey E. Pfeifer & James R.P. Ogloff, Ambiguity and Guilt Determinations: A Modern
Racism Perspective, 21 J. AppL. Soc. Psychol. 1713 (1991); Ronald L. Poulson, Mock Juror
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In general, research over the last decade that simultaaeously examines
reasonable doubt rule and presumption of innocence instructions paints a
bleak portrait of juror comprehension of these bedrock legal principles.
Nothing, however, is more damning than the responses of state courts to
prospective jurors who demonstrate a misunderstanding of the
presumption of innocence, hesitate to abide by its strictures, or are
clearly predisposed toward guilt due to pretrial publicity.179 In one recent
case, for example, the Supreme Court of Arizona ruled that there was no
fundamental error in allowing a juror to sit for trial who indicated that
he: (1) would treat the testimony of police officers differently from that
of other witnesses, (2) did not understand which side had the burden of
proof, and (3) did not agree with the presumption of inrnocence.8' Jurors
have remained on panels after demonstrating miscomprehension of the
presumption of innocence, 8' preconceived notions or "fixed opinions" of
the accused's guilt,'82 and a hesitancy to apply the presumption of
innocence.'83
Attribution of Criminal Responsibility: Effects of Race and Guilty But Mentally Ill (GBMI) Verdict
Option, 20 J. Appl. Soc. Psychol. 1596 (1990); Christy A. Visher, Juror Decision Making: The
Importance of Evidence, 11 Law & Hum. Behav. 1 (1987); Barbara F. Reskin & Christy A. Visher,
The Impacts of Evidence and Extralegal Factors in Jurors'Decision, 20 &.w & Soc'y 423 (1986);
Robert J. MacCoun, The Emergence of Extralegal Bias During Jury Deliberation, 17 Crim. Just. &
Behav. 303 (1990); Saul M. Kassin & Lawrence S. Wrightsman, The Constnction and Validation of
a Juror Bias Scale, 17 J. Res. Personality 423 (1983).
179. See Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370 (1990); State v. Cunningham, 429 S.E. 2d 718 (N.C.
1993); State v. Martin, 558 So. 2d 654 (La. Ct. App), cert. denied, 564 So. 2d 318 (La. 1990); State
v. Kelly, 367 So. 2d 832 (La. 1979); State v. Monroe, 329 So. 2d 193 (La. 1976); State v. Liddell,
318 So. 2d 1 (La. 1975); State v. Leichman, 286 So. 2d 649 (La. 1973), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 907
(1975).
180. State v. Bible, 858 P.2d 1152 (Ariz. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1578 (1994).
181. See People v. Adams, 867 P.2d 54 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993), cert. denied, 1994 LEXIS 76
(Colo. Jan. 24, 1994).
182. See People v. Jefferson, 628 N.E.2d 925 (111. Ct. App. 1993), appeal denied, 633 N.E. 2d 10
(11. 1994); High v. Zant, 300 S.E. 2d 654 (Ga. 1983), rehearing denied, 468 U.S. 1224, cert. denied,
467 U.S. 1220.
183. See Jefferson, 628 N.E.2d at 273. In this case, the First District A;pellate Court of Illinois
upheld a lower court's decision to empanel a prospective juror who said that even though it was her
guess that their was a presumption of innocence, she would "like to hear something to prove
innocence too." This prompted the following dialogue between the court and the prospective juror:
[THE COURT]: Q: The State has the burden of proving all defendants guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. Do you have any problem with that?
A: No. I know that's the procedure, yes.
Q: Can you abide by that principle?
A: I would certainly try.
Q: You don't have any opinion?
368
Rhetoric of Innocence
Add to this the fact that prosecutors often make statements to
prospective and sitting jurors that significantly confuse the notion of a
presumption of innocence, and it is hardly surprising that
miscomprehension rates are high." The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal of
Louisiana recently upheld the denial of a motion for a mistrial in a
manslaughter case where a district attorney informed a panel of
prospective jurors that the presumption of innocence is a "judicial
fiction" created to level the playing field. 18 Neither victims nor police,
A: No.
Q: Well if you were to go back and vote on this case right now, having heard no evidence what
would your verdict be?
A: I don't think that I could do it one way or the other.
Q: Well that's what I'm trying to tell you. The presumption of innocence means that if you
heard no evidence against him you must acquit him because you would have heard nothing that
says he committed any crime? That's what would have to be done. I mean does that make
sense to you.
A: Yes
Q: Do you think you could follow that?
A: I'd have to.
Id. A very similar exchange was alleged to have taken place during the voir dire of a Washington
case twenty years prior. See State v. Johnson, 79 Wash.2d 173,483 P.2d 1261, 1267 (1971).
184. See People v. Hartness, 358 N.E.2d 954 (I1. App. Ct. 1977) (noting that the prosecutor
likened the trial process to a set of scales, so that when one side goes down the presumption of
innocence disappears); People v. Patino, 156 Cal. Rptr. 815, 825 (1979) (upholding convictions but
nevertheless condemns actions of a prosecutor who tells the jury in summation that the following
quote from a famous judge sums up their side of the case: "Under our procedure, the accused has
every advantage. While the prosecution is held rigidly to the charge, he need not disclose even the
barest outline of his defense. [j] He may not be convicted when there is the least fair doubt in the
mind of even one juror. Our procedure has always been haunted by the ghost of the innocent man
convicted. It is an unreal dream. [1] What we really need to fear is the archaic formalism and watery
sentiment that obstruct, delay, and defeat the prosecution of crime."). The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania recently upheld an "inartful" closing statement by the prosecutor in a murder case:
"Good morning, Ladies and Gentlemen of the jury: Before I start my remarks to you I think it would
be noteworthy to note that alongside our system of justice it is the type of system that we have-a
person is presumed innocent until he is proven guilty." Commonwealth v. Brown, 414 A.2d 70, 77
(Pa. 1980). See, e.g., Scott v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 923 (1987) (convicting and sentencing petitioner to
death by ajury that heard the trial judge say that, based on the newspaper accounts he had read, he
believed petitioner was involved in the crime). See also Hutcherson v. State, 558 S.W.2d 156 (Ark.
1977). Judges have also made comments concerning the presumption of innocence that obscure the
basis of the presumption.
185. The entire reference to the presumption of innocence was as follows:
As I explained yesterday, there are many principles in law that apply to the jury, and one of the
things I want to do is go over those with you so I know that we all understand them and that
we're all working from the same page, as they say, but that we also all understand what those
principles are. Now, one of those principles is that you need to understand, is that a defendant is
presumed to be innocent at the start of trial, and that each of you in your own mind must be able
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according to this prosecutor, are required to accept the presumption of
innocence, but jurors are obligated to do so. 86
Finally, courts have allowed jurors to sit in capital and non-capital
cases after exposure to pervasive pretrial publicity that clearly affects the
presumption of innocence." 7 Courts have increasingly relaxed standards
of what constitutes an "impartial jury" in sensatiomLl criminal cases,
while raising the standards required for proving an adverse publicity that
results in a "presumption of prejudice in a community" or a presumption
of a juror's partiality.' 8 In Patton v. Yount,"8 9 for example, 161 of the
to accept that presumption. Now, many times we hear that referred to as a Constitutional right,
to be presumed innocent; and, in a way it is, but you don't find that in the Constitution. It's not
written in there in any place, you just don't find it in there; but Courts have invented that as a
fiction in order to create a level playing field, so to speak. So it is a ,udicial fiction that is
created that you must accept before we begin a trial. The people that are- victims of the crime
don't have to accept it. The police that investigated it don't have to aco.pt it; but we ask that
you do, as jurors, because .. "
State v. Watkins, 625 So. 2d 507, 512 (La. Ct. App. 1993).
186. The trial court judge, it should be noted, tried to cure the effects of these remarks by
providing a brief instruction on the presumption of innocence that, it turns out, was equally
incomprehensible. See id. at 513. Equally confusing remarks have been made by prosecutors at the
close of evidence. For example, the Supreme Court of California decided there was no error in the
following statement of a prosecutor:. "You have two different stories. Ajuy might think this story
showing guilt is reasonable, and the other showing the alibi is reasonable. Then I guess we have to
take the one that shows the innocence. We have to vote innocent. That is not true at all, because
you can see you have to decide what the true facts are at first." People v. Haskett, 801 P.2d 323, 345
(Cal. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 822 (1991). See also Commonwealth v. Thomas, 514 N.E.2d
1309, 1312 (Mass. 1987) where a prosecutor, in a closing argument, stated:
Ladies and gentlemen, the Commonwealth has produced an overwhelming amount of evidence
here for you. Because, in order to find the defendant not guilty, ycu have to disbelieve
Christine; and you have to disbelieve Camille; and you have to disbelieve Debra Blum-Debra
Talley and Mrs. Blum. You have to disbelieve all of those people. And, if you disbelieve those
people, then I am, indeed, a bad person; because I have aided in a conspiracy to convict an
innocent person. And that is not what happened over the last two days.
187. See Scott v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 923, 925 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that "the trial
judge plunged ahead and petitioner was tried by a jury exposed to comments that overwhelmed the
presumption of innocence"). Cf. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961); Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S.
794 (1975).
188. See, e.g., U.S. v. Ford, 19 F.3d 1271 (8th Cir. 1994); U.S. v. Greer, 968 F.2d 433 (5th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1390 (1993); U.S. v. Lehder-Rivas, 955 F.2-1 1510 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 347 (1992); U.S, v. De La Vega, 913 F.2d 861 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111
S. Ct. 2022 (1991); Swindier v. Lockhart, 885 F.2d 1342 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 911
(1990); Bundy v. Dugger, 850 F.2d 1402 (11th Cir. 1988), cert denied, 488 U.S.1034 (1989);
Wells v. Murray, 831 F.2d 468 (4th Cir. 1987); Bell v. Lynaugh, 828 F.2d 1085 (5th Cir. 1987);
King v. Lynaugh, 828 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1987), vacate, en banc 850 F.2d 1055 (5th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 1019 (1989); U.S. v. Moreno Morales, 815 F.2d 725 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 966 (1987). For a discussion of pretrial publicity and juror decision mking, see Daniel Linz &
Steven Penrod, Exploring the First and Sbth Amendments: Pretrial Publicity and Jury Decision
Making, in Handbook ofPsychology and Lav 3 (Dorothy Kagehiro & William S. Laufer eds., 1992).
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163 jurors admitted that they had previously heard publicity regarding
the case. 126 (77%) acknowledged that they were predisposed to a
certain opinion about the accused's guilt.' Even with this evidence, the
Supreme Court ruled that a trial court's findings of impartiality would
not be overturned unless there was "manifest error." Jurors must have
such fixed opinions that they are unable to impartially determine the
accused's guilt.19'
c. Models of Juror Decision Making
Efforts to empirically validate theoretical models of juror
decisionmaking hold out the greatest promise of quantifying juror
comprehension of and adherence to the presumption of innocence. After
considering a host of empirical studies, researchers have identified five
initial predispositions of jurors toward the accused. First, investigators
report that, most commonly, jurors do not assume that the accused is
guilty or innocent. Rather, they assume that guilt and innocence are
189. 467 U.S. 1025, 1029 (1984).
190. See also Irvin v. Dowd, 359 U.S. 394, 398 (1959) (where of the 355 jurors that were called,
233 had formed an opinion of the accused's guilt).
191. Legal standards relating partiality to juror predisposed opinions were first discussed in
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 155 (1878). According to the court, ajuror who has formed
strong and unchangeable impressions cannot be impartial. Yet, the court was quick to note that there
is no agreement as to
the knowledge upon which the opinion must rest in order to render the juror incompetent, or
whether the opinion must be accompanied by malice or ill-will; but all unite in holding that it
must be founded on some evidence, and be more than a mere impression. Some say it must be
positive.., others, that it must be decided and substantial... others, fixed... and still others,
deliberate and settled .... All concede, however, that, if hypothetical only, the partiality is not
so manifest as to necessarily set the juror aside.
Id. Subsequent cases have focused on the likelihood that partiality can be laid aside. See, e.g.
Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794 (1975). Empirical research suggests that juror opinions about guilt
and innocence are affected by pretrial publicity. See Linz and Penrod, supra 188; Edith Greene and
Elizabeth F. Loftus, What's New in the News? The Influence of Well-Publicized News Events on
Psychological Research and Courtroom Trials, 5 Basic and Applied Soc. Psych. 211 (1984); Stanley
Sue et al., Biasing Effect of Pretrial Publicity on Judicial Decisions, 2 J. Crim. Just. 163 (1974).
192. Ostrom et al., supra note 175, at 437 consider four of these "predispositions" as "fair-
mindedness." The authors address the problem of juror objectivity in light of prior opinions
concerning the innocence or guilt of the accused. For a superb discussion of the role of prior
knowledge or beliefs, see Vicki L. Smith, supra note 162. For two interesting twists on the notion of
prior knowledge, consider the role of prior jury experience and the use of prior conviction evidence
on jury decision making. See Ronald C. Dillehay & Michael T. Nietzel, Juror Experience and Jury
Verdicts, 9 Law and Hum. Behav. 179 (1985); Roselle L. Wissler and Michael J. Saks, On the
Inefficacy of Limiting Instructions: When Jurors Use Prior Conviction Evidence to Decide on Guilt,
9 Law and Hum. Behav. 37 (1985).
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equally likely. 93 A series of studies report evidence that jurors distribute
their uncertainty equally. 94 Jurors simply await the presentation of
inculpatory or exculpatory evidence that alters their perception of an
equal probability of innocence or guilt. 95 A second initial disposition
model suggests that jurors bring along preconceived notions or fixed
opinions of the likelihood of guilt. They immediately refer to outcomes
of prior trials with comparable fects that have resulted in guilty verdicts.
Given the popular perception that most trials result in guilty verdicts, a
general presumption of guilt is often found with base rate probability
models. A third initial belief is the complete disregard. of any opinions
concerning the accused's culpability until relevant inculpatory or
exculpatory evidence is introduced.'96 A fourth initial opinion conforms
to jurors' base-rate estimate of guilt. 97 All jurors who have had some
prior experience with the criminal justice system have developed
intuitive estimates of the likelihood of guilt. 9 A final predisposition,
infrequently observed in empirical research, places the subjective
probability of guilt at zero or near zero. Here jurors actually presume
legal innocence, and abide by the meaning of presumption of innocence
instructions. 99
As discussed later in parts H and Ill, initial beliefs support
assumptions of innocence or guilt at the initiation of a ease. Most often
193. Hastie, supra note 66, at 98. A perfect illustration of this initial belief state is found in
High v. Zant, 300 S.E. 2d 654, 658 (Ga. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1220 (1984), where the
petitioner contended that the trial court should have excused a number ofjurors for cause due to their
perceptions of the presumption of innocence. Consider the voir dire of one prospective juror.
[Defense Counsel]Q: You would require tle defendant to put up some eiidence to prove he's
innocent?
A: I'd want to hear both sides.
Q: And you'd have to hear both sides before you could return a verdict ofrot guilty?
A: Yes.
Id.
194. Anne. W. Martin and David A. Schum, Quantifying Burdens of Proof: A Likelihood Ratio
Approach, 27 Jurimetrics J. 383 (1987); M. F. Kaplan, Discussion Polarization Effects in a Modified
Jury Decision Paradigm: Informational Influences, 40 Sociometry 262 (1977).
195. Hastie, supra note 66, at 98-99.
196. See Ostrum et al., supra note 175, at 437. These models have beert embellished in Hastie,
supra note 66, at 98-100.
197. See Hastie, supra note 66, at 98-99.
198. Id.
199. Id; Cf Note, Juror Bias-A Procedural Screening Device and the Case For Permitting Its
Use, 64 Minn. L. Rev. 987 (1980); David A. Kravitzet et al., Reliability and Validity of the Original
and Revised Legal Attitudes Questionnaire, 17 Law and Hum. Behav. 661 (1993).
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these assumptions are supported by uninformed, hypothetical
impressions or beliefs. Thus, they are not "fixed opinions" or
prejudgments that necessarily close the factfinder's mind to new
evidence.2" As evidence is presented, a juror's belief in guilt or
innocence, as reflected in an opinion meter, should be updated. In
algebraic models, for example, the opinion adjustment process provides
new weighted data to the meter. In Bayesian models, evidence feeds the
probability updating process and is reflected in the opinion meter. In
stochastic poisson process models, a phase of evidence weighting reports
to the meter. At least in theory, the presumption of innocence should be
in operation throughout these processes. It is only at the close of the
evidence and after summation that jurors should have fixed opinions,
passing conclusive judgments as to guilt or "no guilt."201 Unfortunately,
this view may be far more naive than accurate. A vast body of empirical
research suggests that the weighing of evidence and updating of opinion
meters are often constrained by initial predispositions toward guilt.
Primacy and framing effects appear to limit juror consideration of
disconfirming evidence. °2
After considering the sparse history of the presumption of innocence,
the progress toward conservative retributive ideologies, and the
significant comprehension error of jurors, it is difficult, if not impossible,
to embrace the rhetoric that surrounds this time-honored presumption.
As the consensus for a retributive formalism grows, presumption of
innocence rhetoric seems increasingly foreign. The presumption of
innocence is a "foundation" of the criminal process, but a court's failure
200. See infra notes 364-84 and accompanying text. Fixed opinions are often defined by state
statutes, as well as case law. See, e.g., Challenges of Jurors, Ala. Code § 12-16-150(7) (1993);
Nobis v. State, 401 So. 2d 191 (Ala. App.), cert. denied, 401 So. 2d 204 (Ala. 1981); Black v. State,
596 So. 2d 40 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991). Courts have made it clear that the mere formation of an
opinion founded on intuition, light impressions, rumor, bias or hearsay does not amount to a fixed
opinion. Thus, even in cases where a prospective juror, during a voir dire examination, admits that
she thinks that the accused is guilty and that the defense would have to prove the accused not guilty,
it is not a fixed opinion if the prospective juror expresses a willingness to set aside these
impressions, beliefs, and opinions. Thomas v. State, 539 So. 2d 375 (Ala. App. 1988), affd, 539 So.
2d 399 (Ala. 1988); Pierce v. State, 576 So. 2d 236 (Ala. App. 1990), cert. denied, 576 So. 2d 258
(Ala. 1991).
201. Most courts and commentators acknowledge that "[o]ne is cloaked with the presumption of
innocence until that person is proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Department of Transp.
Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Perruso, 634 A.2d 692,696 n. 9 (Pa. Comm. Ct. 1993), appeal denied,
647 A.2d 904 (Pa. 1994). Some, however, lose sight of the fact that the presumption of innocence
applies until and unless there is there is evidence from which a juror can conclude, "there is no
reasonable doubt of guilt." In the ideal, opinion meters should be constrained by the presumption of
innocence until and unless this point is reached.
202. For a discussion of these cognitive effects, see infra notes 377-87 and accompanying text.
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to properly instruct the jury on the presumption of innocence is harmless
error.2 3 The presumption of innocence is "axiomatic" and "elementary,"
but there is no need to ensure that jurors have even a bat;ic understanding
of the presumption of innocence.2' Western civilization can boast about
the presumption of innocence, even though jurors often consider it more
likely than not that the accused is guilty, have initial predispositions that
distribute their uncertainty equally between guilt and innocence, or have
fixed opinions that result in a presumptive judgment of guilt.05 Without
substance, this axiomatic and elementary due process right is a hollow
symbol of our collective commitment to an impartial accusatory system
of criminal justice.2"
There is value in maintaining the appearance and legitimacy of an
accusatorial system of justice. There are tangible: costs as well.
Reducing the presumption of innocence to burden allocation means one
less consideration of innocence. This loss will seem far more significant
after an examination of the slight role that factual innocence plays in the
defendant's case, as well as in collateral attacks and appeals. The failure
to consider innocence will be seen as critical after the connection is made
between the consideration of innocence and the risk ofjuror partiality, as
well as erroneous conviction.2'
B. Theories, Evidence, and Verdicts of Factual Innocence
Two observations provide a context within which the role of factual
innocence in criminal law may be understood. First, only a very small
percentage of all felony arrests result in conviction at trial." 8 On
average, for every one hundred adult felony arrests, there are fifty-four
convictions.2' Fifty-two of these convictions result from guilty pleas.
Only two convictions follow trial. Across the United States, the
percentage of felony arrests that are adjudicated at trial ranges from one
percent (Riverside County, California) to ten percent (Multnomah
203. See infra notes 314-44 and accompanying text.
204. See supra note 186.
205. See supra note 202.
206. See Abraham S. Goldstein, Reflections on Two Models: Inquisitorial Themes in American
Criminal Procedure, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 1009 (1974).
207. See infra notes 288-310 and accompanying text.
208. Barbara Boland et al., The Prosecution of Felony Arrests, 1988 3-4 (1992). For an earlier





County, Oregon)."' The national average is three percent. 1 State and
county-wide court statistics confirm the conventional wisdom that
criminal trials are rare events."' The prevalence of pre-indictment or
bind-over dispositions, as well as a system-wide reliance on guilty pleas
for purposes of caseload management, make the consideration of factual
innocence in the criminal process that much more of a rare event."3
Second, our accusatorial system of justice places the entire burden of
proving the ultimate issue of guilt on the state.21 4 Evidence must be
produced by the prosecution without compelling the accused to assume
any portion of this burden.2" Even so, it is a common mistake, made by
those with and without training in law, to suggest that the adjudicatory
210. Id. at 6.
211. Id Game theoretical analyses of the criminal process often assume, for example, that




The threshold to convict represents a hypothetical cutoff criterion determined in relation to the
strength of evidence for innocence and guilt See, e.g., Ehud Kalai, A Rational Game Theory
Frameworkfor the Analysis of Legal and Criminal Decision Making, in Inside the Juror 236 (Reid
Hastie ed., 1993). Few would argue that there is often a strong association between fi and fg. For
example, evidence of guilt that is unopposed by contrary evidence increases in weight See Glanville
Williams, Criminal Law 878-79 (1961). The point is, however, that an association between
evidence of innocence and guilt need not be present. Conviction is not contingent on the strength or
weakness of fi, unless it rises to the point where fg is affected. The same may be said of a motion for
acquittal or motion for directed verdict at the close of the prosecution's case or at the close of all the
evidence. The success of this motion is determined entirely by the strength offg.
212. Freda Adler et al., Criminal Justice 324(1993).
213. Id.
214. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); Mullaney v. Wilbur 421 U.S. 684 (1975);
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977); Holland v. U.S., 348 U.S. 121,138-39 (1954).
215. See Williams, supra note 211, at 871. Affirmative defenses pose one of the most
controversial exceptions to this general statement of law. For discussion of burden shifting with
affirmative defenses, see John Calvin Jeffries, Jr. & Paul B. Stephan 1H, Defenses, Presumptions and
Burden of Proof in the Criminal Law, 88 Yale LJ. 1325, 1380-87 (1979). For a consideration of
burden shifting generally, see Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
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process carefully weighs evidence of both innocence and guilt.216 With
existing burdens of production and persuasion, this conception of the
criminal trial is often inaccurate. Depending on the strategy and tactics
of defense counsel, an accused's factual innocence may never be at issue
during trial. Both judges and jurors focus squarely on a determination of
guilt. The central issue is the reasonableness of any doubt concerning
the accused's guilt. In the balance of this section, the slight role of
factual innocence at trial will be considered.
Many observers of adversarial trials have abandoned truth-finding and
fair decision theories.2 17 Such theories paint idealized portraits of
adversarial contests that bear little resemblance to th.als in the large,
congested courts of Los Angeles, New York, Chicago, Boston, and
Philadelphia.1 8 An alternate conception views the criminal trial as a
proceeding in which proof of an accused's factual innocence is incidental
to conflicting adversarial strategies: the state's strategy to prove guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, and a series of defense strategies designed to
raise a reasonable doubt.219 Accordingly, advocates shape and reshape
evidence to fit their strategies znd theories of the case." Courts and
juries focus on evidence of guilt admitted in court, ani decide whether
this evidence, in the aggregate, sustains the accusation."'
This is not to say that evidence of innocence is irrelevant or
inconsequential before trial, or after the prosecution's case-in-chief.2m
216. For example, it is not unusual to see the most revered treatises in criminal law and procedure
refer to the adversary system as a determination of guilt and innocence. See Wayne R. Lafave &
Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure 35-37 (1992).
217. See, e.g., Goodpaster, supra note 93, at 118.; Gordon Van Kessel, Adversary Excesses in the
American Criminal Trial, 67 Notre Dame L. Rev. 403 (1992).
218. See Jonathan D. Casper, American Criminal Justice: The Defendant'" Perspective (1972).
219. This strategy may include raising excuses or defenses. See Stephen J. Morse, Culpability
and Control, 142 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1587 (1994).
220. Goodpaster, supra note 93, at 132. See also Jerome Frank, Courts on Trial: Myth and
Reality in American Justice (1973).
221. After all, with infrequent exceptions, state and federal courts allow for only two dispositions:
guilty or not guilty. See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 1016 (1994) (allowing for six kinds of pleas: guilty;
not guilty; nolo contendere; a former judgment of conviction or acquittal of the offense charged;
once in jeopardy; and not guilty by reason of insanity). It is not uncommon, however, for both legal
scholars and courts to blur the distinction between those found "not guilty" after trial, and those who
are factually innocent. The disposition of'not guilty" confounds two qualitatively different classes
of defendants: (1) those factually innocent and thus wrongly charged or pr-osecuted, and (2) those
factually guilty of a crime for whom evidence sufficient for conviction is inssing. For many, this
distinction is lost.
222. It is fair to say that innocence plays a role in both legal and factual theories of the case. This
role, however, is limited by the burdens of production and persuasion. See Marilyn J. Berger et al.,
Trial Advocacy: Planning, Analysis, and Strategy 24 (1989) (stating that "[s]ather than telling 'what
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The state has a duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense.'
While not a constitutional right, most states allow the accused to engage
in limited pretrial discovery. 4  After the close of the state's case,
defense witnesses are called. On occasion, defendants do testify. Alibis
are explored. In most circuits, courts must instruct the jury on the
defense theory if it is legally sufficient and if there is evidence to support
it.' But with all the opportunities to explore the accused's innocence,
the defense need only disprove guilt.226 To do so, it employs strategies
that challenge or redefine a key element of the prosecution's case.'
Where the prosecution has not constructed a complete or internally
consistent case, the defense often uses a "challenge strategy" to show
how key evidence or testimony does not support a finding of guilt. The
defense may identify elements or inconsistencies in the state's case." A
happened,' therefore, the defense will generally attack portions of the prosecution's story as
unreliable or as not making sense 'reasonable doubt"'); Jeffrey L. Kestler, Questioning Techniques
and Tactics 4-5 (1992). There are a number of practitioners who consider such attacks to be a sign
of inadequate lawyering. Consider, for example, the strong sentiments of Herbert J. Stem, Trying
Cases to Win 151 (1991) (stating that "[m]ost defense attorneys believe that the proper way to open
is to harp on the prosecution's burden to prove everything-beyond a reasonable doubt-and the
presumption of innocence, which means the defendant does not have to do anything. And, of course,
there is the usual litany about the insignificance of the indictment. As a prosecutor, nothing pleases
me more than to hear this palaver... It tells the jury nothing but that your defendant is likely
guilty-although the prosecution may have its difficulties proving it.')
223. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) ( holding that the state is required disclose
evidence that is favorable to accused and "material to either guilt or to punishment"); U.S. v. Agurs,
427 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (stating that "[a] fair analysis of the holding in Brady indicates that implicit
in the requirement of materiality is a concern that the suppressed evidence might have affected the
outcome of the trial"); U.S. v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) (holding that "[t]he evidence is material
only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the
result of the proceeding would have been different").
224. Cf. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977); Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 (1972);
Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958), overruled by, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
225. See, e.g., United States v. Regan, 937 F.2d 823, 826-27, amended, 946 F.2d 188 (2d Cir.
1991); United States v. Goss, 650F.2d 1336, 1344 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Casperson, 773
F.2d 216, 222-24 (8th Cir. 1985); United States v. Hopkins, 744 F.2d 716 (10th Cir. 1984); United
States v. Opdahl, 930 F.2d 1530, 1535-36 (11th Cir. 1991).
226. At first glance it appears that the need to introduce evidence of innocence is a simple
function of the strength of the defense's case or the weakness of the state's case. But the reasonable
doubt rule in concert with certain defense strategies often precludethe need for resort to proof of
innocence. Instead of relying on evidence of factual innocence, the defense focuses on proof of
legal innocence. For an interesting comparison of the American criminal trial with the Continental
trial, see Van Kessel, supra note 93, at 480-82.
227. W. Lance Bennett and Martha S. Feldman, Reconstructing Reality in the Courtroom: Justice
and Judgment in American Culture 93-115 (1981). See also Janine Warsaw, Masters of Trial
Practice: Techniques of22 Nationally Recognized Advocates (1988).
228. Bennett & Feldman, supra note 227, at 98. This is considered the weakest defense strategy,
used only when the prosecution's case is inconsistent or inadequate standing alone. Id. at 101.
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"redefinition strategy" gives different meanings to incriminating
evidence that is central to the state's case, and yet also appears
ambiguous. 9  Finally, a "reconstruction strategy" is adopted when it is
difficult to challenge or reinterpret the prosecution's case. Here the
defense may present its version and interpretation of the facts. All three
strategies are designed to raise reasonable doubt in -the prosecution's
case.' 0 As Professor Amsterdam cautions, "[a]though the prosecution
must prove all the elements of its case, the defense needs to destroy only
one. It is seldom profitable to take on more than one or, at most, a
couple." '
While the role of factual innocence in many criminal trials is slight,
the perception of this role is affected by the language and conventions
that courts use to describe the absence of legal guilt. [his is more than
apparent with verdicts of innocence. 2 In case after case, judges have
229. Bennett & Feldman, supra note 227.
230. See, e.g., State v. Ward, 374 A.2d 168, 171 (Conn. 1976) (noting that "[ilt was crucial to the
defense strategy to attack those figures in the hope of instilling a reasonaole doubt in the jurors'
minds that any money actually had been taken from the toll lanes"); State v. Thomas, 570 So. 2d
1023, 1026 (Fla. Ct. App. 1990) (noting that "[c]onsistent with the defense strategy to create a
reasonable doubt of guilt by featuring the absence of the available scientific evidence, the defendant,
while on the witness stand, made a point of the fact that the State could have, but failed to conduct a
DNA test on the bedsheet sample'), dismissed, 577 So. 2d 1330 (Fla. 1991); People v. Monet, 282
N.W.2d 391, 392 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979) (observing that "[t]he defense strategy in each of the
defendant's trials was to create a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury by contesting the
voluntariness of defendant's confession and by presenting alternative theories explaining the
decedent's death").
231. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Trial Manual 5 for the Defense of Crimiaal Cases: Proceedings
Through Arraignment 182 (1988).
232. See, e.g., Wells v. Murray, 831 F.2d 468, 479 (4th Cir. 1987) (Mrxnaghan, J., dissenting)
(stating that "[a]t least five jurors who served on petitioner's jury had been sharply criticized by
another judge for returning a verdict of innocent in the last criminal case in which they had
participated"); United States v. Bissell, 772 F.2d 896 (3d Cir. 1985) (stating that "your verdict
should be guilty", but "[i]f you don't believe it, your verdict should be innocent" ); United States v.
Young Bros., Inc., 728 F.2d 682, 686 (5th Cir.) (stating that "[tihe jury returned verdicts of innocent
on all counts with respect to defendants Miller and Young, and guilty on all counts with respect to
appellant, Young Brothers"), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 881 (1984); United States v. Hart, 640 F.2d 856,
860 (6th Cir. 1981) (stating "that the government had the burden of proving each element of the
offense beyond a reasonable doubt, that Hart had no burden of producing any evidence and that if
two conclusions could be reached the jury should reach a verdict of innocent"), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 992 (1981); United States v. Jones, 597 F.2d 485, 489 n.3 (5th Cir. 1979) (stating that "[t]he
policies behind both rules fully encompass any knowledge possessed by Cie defendant before the
verdict whether it be innocent or not), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1043 (1980); United States v.
Patterson, 510 F.2d 967, 967 (4th Cir. 1975) (stating that "[s]ince we find that the evidence
presented at trial was sufficient to support verdict of guilty, our conclusion is inescapable that it was
not so deficient as to have required the court to direct a verdict of innoient"); United States v.
Simpson, 460 F.2d 515, 519 n.12 (9th Cir. 1972) (stating that "lj]urors are not computers; sometimes
they do come in with a verdict of innocent when a computer would say that the facts add up to guilt
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found defendants "innocent" when no such disposition exists. Courts
have simply blurred the distinction between factual innocence and the
absence of guilt-or legal innocence. Commentators have not done
much better. 3 And, predictably, the media have been nothing short of
notorious."3 Unfortunately, the role of factual innocence is also affected
by language and conventions after conviction, where innocence assumes
an entirely different meaning and form.
C. Innocence and Guilt in Collateral Attacks and Appeals
At first glance it appears both surprising and ironic that one of the first
positive considerations of factual or actual innocence occurs after trial
and conviction, in hearings on petitions for habeas corpus relief. 5 Such
and that the defendant should be punished'); United States v. Markman, 193 F.2d 574, 577 (2d Cir.
1952) (stating that "[flinally, both appellants cite as reversible error a portion of the trial judge's
charge to the jury to the effect that a verdict of innocent must follow "if the scales in which you
weigh the evidence in this case are equally balanced"), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 979 (1952); Santoli v.
New York, 612 F. Supp. 938, 939 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (stating that "[i]t was urged that Santoli's
reversal amounted to a verdict of innocent"); Neville v. United States, 462 F. Supp. 614, 618 (E.D.
Mo. 1978) (stating that "[h]owever, the Court has carefully considered his allegations and
determines that even if true they would not have likely resulted in a verdict of innocent"); Dorman
v. State, 622 P.2d 448, 462 n.22 (Alaska 1981) (stating that "[this instruction suffers the same
defect Dorman ascribes to that given to the jury-there is no statement that a verdict of innocent is
appropriate even where an interpretation points more to guilt than to innocence, if a reasonable doubt
remains about guile'); Gonzalez v. State, 455 So. 2d 1131, 1132 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (stating
that "(the jury returned a verdict of innocent as to the trafficking charge against the defendant, but
guilty of the charge of conspiring to traffic in cocaine").
233. See, e.g., Joseph G. Casaccio, Illegally Acquired Information, Consent Searches, and Tainted
Fruit, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 842, 855 n.101 (1987) (stating that "[t]he district court suppressed the
testimony of Hennessy as 'fruit of the poisonous tree' and granted a directed verdict of innocence");
Note, Criminal Procedure: Minnesota Adopts the Larrison Standard for Granting a New Trial
Because of Newly Discovered Evidence: State v. Caldwell, 67 Minn. L. Rev. 1314, 1327 (1983)
(stating that "the court should grant a new trial only when it appears probable that a verdict of
innocent would be rendered on retrial'); Peter David Blanck, What Empirical Research Tells Us:
Studying Judges' and Juries'Behavior, 40 Am. U. L. Rev. 775, 795 (1991) (stating that "the initial
findings seem to suggest that those judges expecting a guilty verdict prior to trial outcome are more
likely to agree with ajury verdict of guilt than with a verdict of innocence").
234. See, e.g., George Varga, Jackson's Actions Won't Buy Back the Public's Trust, San Diego
Union-Tribune, Jan. 30, 1994, at E-3 (stating that "[o]nly by receiving a verdict of innocent could
this self-acknowledged drug abuser have fully vindicated himself and silenced the easily titillated
tabloid media!); Tom Demoreteky, Man Guilty in Death During Auto Incident, Newsday, Mar. 23,
1994, at A31 (stating that "Ray's attorney Martin Efinan said he felt the jury's verdict-innocent of
manslaughter and guilty of assault-indicated that the jury felt Ray perceived the danger of serious
injury"); Tim Bryant, Jurors Agonized Over Killing At Fish Fry, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Mar. 5,
1994, at 1B (stating that "he sobbed after returning the verdicts of innocent").
235. The irony is not only that factual innocence is at issue after conviction, but that those calling
for a consideration of factual innocence as a prerequisite to federal review hope to use a pervasive
and conclusive presumption of petitioner guilt to limit constitutional challenge to confinement. The
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hearings pose legal tests that require, to varying degrees, inquiry into the
innocence of the petitioner or appellant. 6 Once again, however, the
inquiry into innocence is less substantive than it first appears. In fact, it
seems as if inquiry into innocence after conviction is most always limited
to a gatekeeping function.
In 1970 Judge Henry J. Friendly called for a restoration of the great
writ of habeas corpus from its inevitable collapse un~der the strain of
"current excesses." 7  Concerns over an inundation Df frivolous and
repetitious petitions from state prisoners moved Judge Friendly to argue
that a petitioner's innocence must be established in order for a federal
court to engage in habeas review." 8 Judge Friendly referred to the
"proverbial man from Mars" to prove his point that there is something
terribly wrong with a system of criminal justice that allows repeated
attacks on judgments of conviction. 9  With all the constitutional
safeguards, from the provision of counsel to the right to remain silent
throughout trial, those subsequently convicted try repeatedly to undo the
source of this presumption of guilt is familiar. It is not conviction alone that leads to this
presumption; conviction merely confirms earlier predilections of culpability. As evidence, Judge
Friendly refers to the frustrations of two Justices who dread to entertain petitions from the obviously
guilty. Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 142, 145 (1970). Consider Chief Justice Burger's comments ii an address before the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York on a case that necessitated five trials: "The tragic
aspect was the waste and futility, since every lawyer, every judge and every juror was fully
convinced of the defendant's guilt from the beginning to the end." N.Y. L.J., Feb. 19, 1970, at 1;
Record of N.Y.C.B.A. 14, 15-16 (Supp. 1970). Justice Schaefer of Illinois in a speech before the
Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions in June, 1968, noted: "'What bothers me is that
almost never do we have a genuine issue of guilt or innocence today... You know very well that
the man is guilty; there is no doubt about the proof. But you must always ask, for example. Was
there something technically wrong with the arrest? You're always trying something irrelevant."
Friendly, supra at 143.
236. It must be noted that factual innocence is not grounds for relief on federal habeas corpus, but
rather a required gateway to review. Successful review in such hearings require an independent
constitutional violation that occurred at trial. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 317 (1963),
overruled in part, Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992); Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853,
860 (1993). For criminal malpractice cases, evidence of factual innocence serves a similar function.
237. Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 142, 143 (1970).
238. Id. at 145. Judge Friendly referred to earlier calls for such a consideration by Mr. Justice
Black in Kauftman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 242 (1969) (Black, J., dissonting) (stating that "the
defendant's guilt or innocence is at least one of the vital considerations in determining whether
collateral relief should be available to a convicted defendant ... In collateral attacks... I would
always require that the convicted defendant raise the kind of constitutional claim that casts some
shadow of a doubt on his guilt."); and Mr. Justice Jackson, who in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443,
532 (1953), raised the specter of "floods of stale, frivolous and repetitiots petitions [for federal
habeas corpus by state prisoners which] inundate the docket of the lower couts and swell our own.
239. Friendly, supra note 235, at 145.
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efforts of judges and juries without regard to their guilt or innocence.
The astonishment of the man from Mars, Judge Friendly wrote, "would
grow when we told him that the one thing almost never suggested on
collateral attack is that the prisoner was innocent of the crime."'24
Judge Friendly makes the case that there is a serious burden associated
with collateral attack of a criminal conviction. This burden has to be
balanced against a prisoner's interest in gaining access to a forum to
challenge the constitutionality of confinement.24' Thus, a petitioner's
interests must be weighed against the fact that: (1) successive collateral
attacks postpone the initiation of correctional rehabilitation;242 (2) time
delays create problems with the reliability of factual determinations in
court;243 (3) repeated petitions drain judicial and community resources;2'
(4) meritless petitions tend to cast doubt over those with merit;24 and (5)
the sense of certainty and finality typically associated with criminal
conviction is defeated.246 The solution is to require a colorable showing
of innocence. Prisoners must "show a fair probability that, in light of all
the evidence, including that alleged to have been illegally admitted (but
with due regard to any unreliability of it) and evidence tenably claimed
to have been wrongly excluded or to have become available only after
the trial, the trier of the facts would have entertained a reasonable doubt
of his guilt. '247 This very test was adopted by the court in Kuhlmann v.
Wilson,24 where Justice Powell wrote that the "ends of justice" require
that successive federal habeas review should be rarely granted, and only
240. Id.
241. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 491-92 (1976). Empirical evidence of the burdening of
federal courts by state prisoner petitions should be found in filing statistics. From 1980 to 1991
filings increased from 7031 to 10,325. This increase in state prisoner petitions, however, must be
considered along with a 246% increase in state correctional population during the same period (from
305,400 to 707,500). In fact, when the rise in state prison population is taken into account, it
becomes apparent that the rate of habeas petition filing actually decreased over the eleven year
period. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 524 (1993).
242. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1963).
243. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 127-28 (1982).
244. Friendly, supra note 28, at 148. See, e.g, Spalding v. Aiken, 460 U.S. 1093 (1983) (noting
that successive petitions impose significant burdens on the criminal justice system).
245. Friendly, supra note 28, at 149.
246. Id. at 147-49. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991) (stating that successive habeas
petitions compromise finality and deprive the law of its deterrent effect). See also Paul M. Bator,
Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 441
(1963).
247. Friendly, supra note 28, at 160.
248. 477 U.S. 436,454 (1986).
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in cases where there are colorable claims of innocence.249 Failure to hear
such claims must amount to a miscarriage ofjustice.' °
Courts have extended the analysis in Kuhlmann to cases involving
death sentenced inmates, who are required to show "actaal innocence" of
the death penalty prior to the court hearing the merits of any claim." In
capital cases, proof of innocence requires "clear and convincing evidence
that but for a constitutional error, no reasonable juror would have found
the petitioner eligible for the death penalty under the applicable state
law. ' 2 The Supreme Court has narrowly construed the meaning of
actual innocence, ruling in a host of cases that petitioners' alleged
constitutional error: (1) failed to preclude the development of true facts
or the admission of false facts;"s (2) may have impeached a witness for
the prosecution and changed the jury's determination of'guilt, but did not
mean that "no reasonable juror" would have found the petitioner
guilty; 4 (3) might have affected the accuracy of the capital sentence, but
did not amount to a showing of actual innocence;z" or (4) resulted in an
admission of inculpatory evidence that did nothiag to alter the
determination of guilt.256
249. The court in Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 15 (1963), had announced that successive
habeas petitions would be reviewed only if "the ends of justice" were served by relitigation. This is
an exception to the requirement that a petitioner show cause and prejudice before hearing the merits
of a habeas petition. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). Notably, the language used in the
court's "ends of justice" test (or exception) was borrowed from the federd statute that governed
habeas review in 1963. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244. (1988 & Supp. 1993) for ident cal wording concerning
successive petitions. The burden of proof for this test was with the prisoner, but until Kuhlmann,
there was little guidance as to the kind of proof required to meet such a test. The court in Kuhlman
provided the first definition. For earlier efforts to restrict the reach of habeas review, see Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976) (holding that the goal of furthering a petitioner's Fourth
Amendment's rights is "outweighed by the acknowledged costs to other values vital to a rational
system of criminal justice") See also Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986); Rose v.
Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); Dallin H. Oaks, Legal
History in the High Court-Habeas Corpus, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 451 (1966).
250. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527,537 (1986).
251. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514 (1992); Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853
(1993). The court in Sawyer acknowledged that the notion of a prisoner being "innocent of death"
stretches the natural meaning of the words. The phrase, however, seeks to capture the narrow
meaning of actual innocence in the context of a capital case. In essence, the court is trying to find
intuitively simple terms that reflect a wrongful conviction. As Justice Blac-kmun noted in Sawyer.
"A prototypical example of 'actual innocence' in a colloquial sense is the case where the State has
convicted the wrong person of the crime." Sawyer, 112 S. Ct. at 2519.
252. 112 S.Ct. at 2517.
253. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986).
254. Sawyer, 112 S. Ct. at 2524.
255. Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401,410 n.6 (1989).
256. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991).
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In concurring and dissenting opinions, Justices Blackmun, Brennan,
and Stevens have questioned the application of the actual innocence or
miscarriage of justice standard in such cases as Smith v. Murray,
Dugger v. Adams, McCleskey v. Zant, and, most recently, in Coleman v.
Thompson, Herrera v. Collins, and Delo v. Blair. 7 Their attempt to find
consistency and logic in the application of this evolving standard has led
to nothing less than outright frustration." Focusing on factual
innocence, they argue, is inconsistent with the grant of habeas corpus
jurisdiction. Focusing on factual innocence, they maintain,
overemphasizes the place of ensuring the accuracy of guilt
determinations through federal habeas review. Why, asks Justice
Blackmun, did the court shift the focus of federal habeas review from
"the preservation of constitutional rights to a fact-based inquiry into the
petitioner's innocence or guilt[?] '" 9  Finally, in Sawyer v. Whitley,
Justice Blackmun questions why Warren McCleskey and Roger Keith
Coleman had to be the first victims of this "new habeas."26°
Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Stevens have interpreted the words
of their colleagues too literally. Actual innocence, rhetoric aside, does
not serve as a proxy for factual innocence in habeas cases. The
miscarriage of justice exception, like the innocence of death standard,
also fails as a proxy for factual innocence. These standards of proof and
their application in a host of cases following Kuhlmann reflect an
increasingly strict standard of legal innocence: 61 In light of all the
257. 113 S. Ct. 2922, 2924 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating that "[ijn this case, Blair has
submitted seven affidavits tending to show that he is innocent of the crime for which he has been
sentenced to death"). See also Schlup v. Delo, 11 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 1994), vacated, 115 S. Ct. 851
(1995)
258. Signs of frustration and resignation appeared in the words written by Justice Blackmun in
Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1138 (1994) (stating that "[tihe Court's refusal last term to afford
Leonel Torres Herrera an evidentiary hearing, despite his colorable showing of actual innocence,
demonstrates just how far afield the Court has strayed from its statutorily and constitutionally
imposed obligations').
259. Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2526 (1992) (Blackmun, 3., concurring). The point is
made again by Blackmun in Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 880 (1993) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
260. Sawyer, 112 S. Ct. at 2529 (Blackmun, ., concurring). See also Eric D. Scher, Sawyer v.
Whitley " Stretching the Boundaries of a Constitutional Death Penalty, 59 Brooklyn L. Rev. 237
(1993).
261. The State of Texas has increased its standards of proof to a point that may make a successful
claim impossible. Petitioners must meet two distinct standards. As a threshold barrier to obtain a
hearing, there must be newly discovered evidence that, "if true would create a doubt as to the
efficacy of the verdict to the extent that it undermines confidence in the verdict and that it is
probable that the verdict would be different." State ex rel. Holmes v. 3d Court of Appeals, 885
S.W.2d 389, 398 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). At a hearing, the petitioner must show that, considering
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evidence, is there a fair probability that the trier of fact would have
entertained a reasonable doubt of guilt? Is there clear and convincing
evidence that but for a constitutional error, no reasonable juror would
have found the accused eligible for the death penalty? Actual innocence,
in this context, is a misnomer. What is meant is simply legally
inadequate or insufficient evidence of guilt.
The failure of the Court to distinguish between legal innocence and
innocence in fact is important. On occasion the Cort has taken its
rhetoric too seriously by suggesting that innocence is more than a just a
gateway to habeas review.262 This tendency should not be mistaken as an
interest in or concern for the petitioner's innocence in fact. Federal
habeas review seeks to ensure that prisoners are not deprived of their
liberty in violation of the Constitution. It does not review alleged errors
of fact even in cases of impending execution where the petitioner brings
forth significant evidence of factual innocence.263 As Justice Holmes
noted over seventy years ago, "what we have to deal with [on habeas
review] is not the petitioners' innocence or guilt but solely the question
whether their constitutional rights have been preserved." 64 The court
has ingeniously used the rhetoric of innocence to reduce judicial
discretion in habeas review, further closing the door to federal review of
successive state prisoner claims. Inquiry into innocence is nothing more
than gatekeeping.265
the new and existing evidence "no rational trier of fact could find proof of gutilt beyond a reasonable
doubt." Id. (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,324 (1979)).
262 See, e.g., Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 271 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (finding that
habeas review must be a "kind of 'safety valve' for the 'extraordinary case"' of a defendant who is
factually innocent); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 545 (stating that "[tle miscarriage of justice
exception to cause serves as 'an additional safeguard against compelling an innocent man to suffer
an unconstitutional loss of liberty,").
263. Nowhere is this made more clear than in Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993), where a
petitioner made a respectable showing of factual innocence with newly discovered evidence. The
court held that absent an independent constitutional claim, alleging factual innocence, no matter how
convincing, is insufficient for the purposes of habeas review. According to Justice Rehnquist,
"[h]istory shows that the traditional remedy for claims of innocence based on new evidence,
discovered too late in the day to file a new trial motion, has been executive clemency." Id. at 869.
264. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 87-88 (1923). Justice Scalia vas equally eloquent in
writing: "There is no basis in text, tradition, or even contemporary practice (if that were enough), for
finding in the Constitution a right to demand judicial consideration of newly discovered evidence of
innocence brought forward after conviction." Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 874.
265. Innocence is also raised in claims of criminal malpractice, where former clients allege that
the actions or inactions of their lawyers failed to meet the standards of a reasonably competent
attorney. For a general overview of this cause of action see, e.g., O.M. Kaus and Ronald. E. Mallen,
The Misguiding Hand of Counsel-Reflections on "Criminal Malpractice", 21 UCLA L. Rev. 1191,
1201-03 (1974); Susan M. Treyz, Criminal Malpractice: Privilege of the Innocent Plaintiff,
Vol. 70:329, 1995
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D. Innocence Compensation Schemes
The search for a genuine consideration of factual innocence in the
criminal process ends with state and federal statutes that are devised to
compensate the wrongfully convicted and imprisoned.266 State and
federal legislation are similar in requiring both the reversal of a
conviction based on the result of a new trial, successful appeal, or
pardon, as well as proof that the petitioner did not commit any of the acts
charged.267 When successful, proceedings brought pursuant to these
59 Fordham L. Rev. 719 (1991); David H. Potel, Note, Criminal Malpractice: Threshold Barriers to
Recovery Against Negligent Criminal Counsel, 1981 Duke LJ. 542; John M. Burkoff, Criminal
Defense Ethics § 3.1(c) (1992); Ronald. E Mallen and Jeffrey M. Smith, Legal Malpractice § 21.3
(3d ed. 1992). In a growing number of jurisdictions, plaintiffs must satisfy two requirements in
addition to evidence of a breach of a duty of reasonable care, and proof of causation. To bring a
criminal malpractice action, a plaintiff'must demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel in order to
show damages and, in some states, must prove actual innocence as an element of the malpractice
claim. Failure to prove actual innocence breaks the causal connection between the attorney's alleged
breach and the plaintiff's purported injuries. According to one court, this chain also may be broken
by the defendant attorney proving "by a preponderance of the evidence that, even though he may
have been negligent, the plaintiff, his former client, would have lost the underlying case anyway."
Glenn v. Aiken, 569 N.E.2d 783, 787 (Mass. 1991). Requiring the element of actual innocence in
malpractice cases is justified as a bar against the possibility of guilty parties profiting from their
commission of a crime. Bailey v. Tucker, 621 A.2d 108, 113. (Pa. 1993) (stating that "[i]f a person
is convicted of a crime because of the inadequacy of counsel's representation, justice is satisfied by
the grant of a new trial. However, if an innocent person is wrongfully convicted due to the
attorney's dereliction, justice requires that he be compensated for the wrong which has occurred")
(emphasis added). Courts have defined actual innocence using at least two variants of the same
standard of proof: (1) proof by a preponderance of evidence that the plaintiff did not commit any of
the unlawful acts with which he was charged, as well as any lesser offenses, and (2) proof by a
preponderance of the evidence that but for the attorney's negligence the verdict would have been not
guilty. Again, innocence has been used by courts as gatekeeping, neglecting its other meaning as
well as restricting its value to the criminal process.
266. Innocence compensation statutes are designed to provide citizens a remedy from the state or
government for loss of liberty due to wrongful prosecution and/or wrongful imprisonment. As the
Fifth Circuit noted some years ago: "This Act is a remedial act designed by a fair-minded
government as a means of at least partially righting an irreparable wrong done to one of its citizens."
Osborn v. United States, 322 F.2d 835, 839 (5th Cir. 1963) (quoting McLean v. United States, 73 F.
Supp. 775, 778 (W.D.S.C. 1947). The legislative history of the federal compensation act is reviewed
in United States v. Keegan, 71 F. Supp. 623, 627-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1947). The forerunner of the present
statute was the Borchard Bill introduced in the U.S. Senate in 1912. This bill allowed for
indemnification of those wrongly convicted and imprisoned. The burden was placed on the claimant
to affirmatively prove innocence by showing "that the crime was not committed at all, or, if
committed, was not committed by the accused." Id. at 628 (quoting S. Doc. No. 947, 63rd Cong., 3d
Sess. 31) (1912).
267. Congress first enacted unjust conviction legislation in 1933. For the most recent codification
of this law, see 28 U.S.C. § 2513 (1988 & Supp. 1993):
Unjust conviction and imprisonment:
(a) Any person suing under section 1495 of this title must allege and prove that:
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statutes result in a certificate of innocence, or like determination, that
allows for the payment of damages from the state or federal
government.
268
Unjust conviction and. imprisonment compensation statutes are
remarkable in three respects.0 9 First they are the only direct judicial
determinations of factual innocence in the entire criminal process.27
(1) His conviction has been reversed or set aside on the ground that he is not guilty of the
offense of which he was convicted, or on new trial or rehearing he was fouad not guilty of such
offense, as appears from the record or certificate of the court setting aside or reversing such
conviction, or that he has been pardoned upon the stated ground of innocence and unjust
conviction and
(2) He did not commit any of the acts charged or his acts, deeds, or omissions in connection
with such charge constituted no offense against the United States, or any State, Territory or the
District of Columbia, and he did not by misconduct or neglect cause or bring about his own
prosecution.
(b) Proof of the requisite facts shall be by a certificate of the court or pardon wherein such facts
are alleged to appear, and other evidence thereof shall not be received.
(c) No pardon or certified copy of a pardon shall be considered by the United States Court of
Federal Claims unless it contains recitals that the pardon was granted after applicant had
exhausted all recourse to the courts and that the time for any court to exercise its jurisdiction had
expired.
(d) The Court may permit the plaintiffto prosecute such action in forma pauperis.
(e) The amount of damages awarded shall not exceed the sum of $ 5,000.
Id.
268. State statutes do vary considerably in defining innocence, and in the amount of damages
available. See N.Y. Ct. Cl. Act § 8-b (Mckinney 1994) (requiring "innocent persons who can
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that they were unjustly convicted and imprisoned").
See also Reed v. State 574 N.E.2d 433 (N.Y. 1991); Ivey v. State, 606 N.E.2d 1360 (N.Y. 1992).
For other state statutes with differing provisions see W. Va. Code § 14-2-13a (1993); D.C. Code
Ann. § 1-1222 (1993); 14 Me. Rev. Stat. § 8241-44 (1994); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2743A8.
Courts in Ohio have been particularly generous in awarding damagos based on wrongful
imprisonment. In O'Neil v. State, 469 N.E.2d 1010 (Ohio CL App. 1984), the court overruled a
court of claims judgment of $6967 for an "erroneous incarceration" of three and one half years. The
court remanded the case for consideration of attorneys' fees, court costs, rdated legal fees, loss of
liberty and separation from family and frienls, damage to reputation, and costs associated with his
adjustment to incarceration. The Ohio Court of Claims in Cox v. State, 552 N.E.2d 970 (Ohio Ct.
1988), awarded a wrongfully imprisoned individual $10,000 for the costs as:;ociated with a one year
and 267 day period of incarceration. See also Gover v. State, 616 N.E. 2d 207 (Ohio 1993); Walden
v. State, 547 N.E.2d 962 (1989); Wright v. State, 591 N.E.2d 1279 (Ohio CL App.1990); Dragon v.
State, 548 N.E.2d 246 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988).
269. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2513(b) (1988 & Supp. 1993).
270. A certificate of innocence is granted when a petitioner demonstrates that she was innocent in
fact of all criminal charges. A determination of what constitutes innocenc;e is deliberately placed
within the sound discretion of the court. Certainly, evidence of innocence in the form of a reversal
of conviction based on Fourth or Fifth Amendment violations at time of amst or seizure of property
goes to a determination of legal innocence and is thus irrelevant. Innocence based on procedural or
technical grounds is insufficient. United States v. Keegan, 71 F. Supp. 623, 633-34 (D.N.Y. 1947)
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Unlike more orthodox guilt determinations, where the inquiry centers on
the sufficiency or insufficiency of culpability, compensation statutes
provide for the determination and often the certification of innocence.27'
Unlike in habeas review and other appellate proceedings, factual
innocence plays a central role and serves a primary function. Second, the
federal compensation statute allows for the recovery of a very small
award of damages . 22  Even so, meeting the statutory requirements for
recovery is difficult, indeed, and few petitioners are successful. Finally,
most statutes require that the misconduct or neglect of the petitioner must
not have brought about the prosecution. Legislators have tried to avoid
compensating those whose inadvertence was a direct cause of the unjust
conviction.273
II. INNOCENCE RHETORIC
Blackstonian maxims suggesting that society places greater value on
freeing the guilty over convicting the blameless underscore the disutility
of erroneous convictions.2 ' Given the reverence for this disutility it is
not surprising that rhetoric has developed around those stages of the
criminal process where guilt determinations are made.275 Courts have
made it clear that the presumption of innocence not only reflects broad
societal concerns of justice and fairness, but is the fundamental premise
(citing H. Rep. No. 2299, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess.); United States v. Brunner, 200 F.2d 276, 279-80
(6th Cir. 1952) (stating that "[e]ven though proofs in a criminal case failed to establish guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt, it did not preclude the court from finding that the petitioner had failed to
establish that he did not commit the offense charged in the indictment. ... Innocence of the
petitioner must be affirmatively established and neither a dismissal nor a judgment of not guilty on
technical grounds is enough.') See also Betts v. United States, 770 F. Supp. 457, 460 (C.D. Ill.
1991), rev'd and remanded, 10 F.3d 1278 (7th Cir. 1993). Most statutes require a judicial
determination of factual innocence which is limited to a decision by the judge that she is convinced
that the petitioner is innocent in fact. See supra note 268.
271. See, eg., Rigsbee v. United States, 204 F.2d 70 (1953). A not guilty verdict is insufficient
for the purposes of a certificate of innocence. The trial judge must certify that he is convinced that
the petitioner did not commit the acts charged. Id. at 71 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2513).
272. The federal statute allows for awards of no more than $5000. 28 U.S.C. § 2513 (e) (1988 &
Supp. 1993).
273. See, e.g., Betts v. United States, 770 F. Supp. 457 (C.D. Ill. 1991) (holding that petitioner
was at least partially responsible for bringing about his own prosecution and was therefore not
entitled to a certificate of innocence).
274. See Connolly, supra note 71 and accompanying text. Justice Harlan discussed this disutility
in his concurring opinion in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,372 (1970) (noting that "in a criminal case,
on the other hand, we do not view the social disutility of convicting an innocent man as equivalent to
the disutility of acquitting someone who is guilty").
275. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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of our legal system.276 As Justice Stewart once noted, "No principle is
more firmly established in our system of criminal justice than the
presumption of innocence that is accorded to the defendant in every
criminal trial.
277
Innocence plays a central role in post-convicticn and appellate
proceedings, as well as in compensation claims.27 Again, a body of
rhetoric has emerged. It is surprising how disconnected this rhetoric is
from a true presumption of factual innocence. Rhetoric of innocence has
been stretched mercilessly in post-conviction and appellate proceedings.
279 Beneath the surface of the rhetoric appears an ever-growing
frustration with the speed, efficiency, and institutional constraints of the
accusatory system of justice-a frustration that seems to be tempered or
cured by borrowing and reinterpreting the notion of irtnocence. Courts
and commentators alike have acknowledged limits to their interest in
pursuing the rights of the accused.8
A. Innocence as Burden Allocation and Gatekeeping
As discussed in part I, courts are increasingly using innocence as a
device for burden allocation and gatekeeping. Innocence, as a burden-
allocating presumption, serves what some consider to be a
complementary role with the reasonable doubt rule. Innocence, in this
context, is an assumption of legal innocence or a reasonable doubt of
guilt. Innocence has also taken on a gatekeeping function after
conviction where both actual and factual innocence control the number
of reviewable post-conviction petitions and appeals. At least seven tests
of innocence for these three qualitatively different types of innocence
may be found in state and federal law. Comparable tests have been
developed for legal, actual, and factual guilt (see Table One).
The rhetoric of legal innocence is deceptively simple. At first glance,
the idea of presuming innocence appears to require a preliminary factual
assumption. Jurors first hear the instruction, "You are required to pre-
276. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
277. Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786, 790 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
278. See supra notes 235-73 and accompanying text.
279. In an ironic twist, when innocence becomes relevant after convicticn, it is used by courts to
restrict the rights of petitioners to have a claim reviewed. See supra notes 235-73 and accompanying
text.
280. See, e.g., Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 208 (1977) (holding that "[d]ue process does
not require that every conceivable step be taken, at whatever cost, to eliminate the possibility of




Types of Innocence Standards of Proof Utilization
Legal Innocence A reasonable doubt of guilt Presumption of
innocence; Trial
Actual Innocence Clear and convincing evidence that
but for a constitutional error, no
reasonable juror would have found
the petitioner eligible for the death
penalty under state law; or
No rational trier of fact could find
proof of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt; or
A fair probability that, in light of
all the evidence, the trier of fact
would have entertained a
reasonable doubt of guilt; or
A constitutional violation has
probably resulted in the conviction
of one who is actually innocent; or
Probative evidence reveals a
colorable claim of factual
innocence.
Standard of proof
required to have court
review habeas













Factual Innocence The accused did not, in fact, Wrongful prosecution
commit the criminal offense as (28 U.S.C. §2513
charged. (1994))
Types of Guilt Standards of Proof Utilization
Legal Guilt Proof beyond a reasonable doubt Trial
Actual Guilt Proof by a preponderance of the Legal malpractice
evidence that the plaintiff actions
committed the criminal conduct
that was the subject of a prior
criminal proceeding
Factual Guilt The accused did in fact commit the None
offense as charged.
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sume innocence," or "The law presumes every person charged with a
crime to be innocent." But in most state and federal instructions, the
venire are then told to: (1) abandon this belief when and if there is
evidence of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and (2) find the accused not
guilty if evidence is insufficient.2"' The presumption of innocence has a
definite duration that expires when offset by evidence. But the notion of
the presumption of innocence as an "adequate substitute for affirmative
evidence"2 '2 and the intermingling of burden allocative instructions
narrow the meaning of the presumption of innocence. How should jurors
interpret an instruction that it is the presumption of innocence that
"places upon the State the burden of proving him guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt"?283 Courts are suggesting that the presumption of
innocence means an accused is not guilty, or is legally innocent, unless
or until the state satisfies its burden. If the state fails to carry its burden,
the defendant is acquitted. Where the state is successfIl, the accused is
found guilty.
284
If there is doubt that this obscures any distinction between the
presumption of innocence and the reasonable doubt nle, one must ask
whether a criminal trial would be different without a presumption of
innocence.2 8' Let us suppose that jurors were not instructed to presume
innocence. Rather, they would be told that it is the slate that bears the
burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the accused is not
guilty unless or until the government presents proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. Here jurors would be required to forestall any fixed belief in guilt
or innocence in much the same manner as they do now, pending proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. A defendant would be acquitted if the state
failed in its burden of proof. h short, there would be no appreciable
difference if the presumption of innocence were omitted. Even courts
have acknowledged the insignificance of a legally based presumption of
281. "This presumption of innocence requires a verdict of not guilty unless you are convinced by
the evidence that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Delaware Pattern Jury
Instructions.
282. Delo v. Lashley, 113 S. Ct. 1222, 1228 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
283. California Jury Instructions, CALJIC § 2.90.
284. Justice Stewart, in Kentucky v. whorton, 441 U.S. 786, 790 (1979) (dissenting), tried to
prove this very point: "In In re Winship, the Court held that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment requires proof beycnd a reasonable doubt of a defendant's guilt. I believe
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment equally requires the presumption that a
defendant is innocent until he has been proved guilty." This latter presumption, of course, is implicit
in the reasonable doubt rule.
285. This question assumes a legally based presumption of innocence.
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innocence by ruling that due process guarantees do not require a
presumption of innocence instruction, and that a failure to instruct a jury
on the presumption of innocence is harmless, so long as a reasonable
doubt rule instruction has been given.2
6
The rhetoric surrounding actual and factual innocence represents the
notion of deservedness of review. After conviction, when the
presumption of innocence has expired, courts rightly presume guilt. 87
This presumption makes it difficult for many to justify the expenditure of
diminishing resources on what appear to be frivolous appeals, petitions,
and claims by those whose culpability is generally without question? 8
Some gatekeeping is required, and what better proxy for the
deservedness of review or compensation than innocence? What better
way to support the conservation of scarce judicial resources than to
provide notice that there are definite limits to the review of technical
legal violations, and that federal courts are not going to be converted into
forums for the relitigation of state trials? Due process theorists respond,
predictably, that the only appropriate proxy is a meritorious appeal,
petition, or claim. Standards, rules, and procedures are not devised for
the innocent alone.
The strength of both of these views is undercut by the transparent
meaning of innocence rhetoric throughout the criminal process. The
issue is not one of limited resources, deservedness, or the abandonment
of fundamental due process rights. The critical issue is the difference
between the legal rhetoric that supports the notion of innocence and the
immateriality of innocence in practice. It is ironic that a concept so
axiomatic and fundamental in rhetoric has been reduced to the task of
gatekeeping, ensuring that state prisoners do not abuse the legal system
in their persistent efforts to be reviewed by federal courts. A genuine
sense of loss is associated with this irony. There are few comparable
legal constructs with as much potential for ensuring a fundamental
fairness at trial.
286. See Arizona v. Fuhninante, 499 U.S. 279, 291 (1991) (White, J., dissenting) (stating that
"[w]hile it may be possible to analyze as harmless the omission of a presumption of innocence
instruction when the required reasonable-doubt instruction has been given, it is impossible to assess
the effect on the jury of the omission of the more fundamental instruction on reasonable doubt").
See also Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S. Ct. 2078 (1993).
287. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600,610-11 (1974).
288. Herrerav. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 861 (1993).
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B. Neglecting Factual Innocence and the Risk of Fundamental Error
at Trial
Discussing innocence as rhetoric would be an interesting but largely
academic exercise if the connection between an accused's factual
innocence and the possibility of error were not so strong. At least in
theory, few legal constructs could have more to do with the prevention of
a wrongful conviction than the presumption and consideration of an
accused's innocence. For instance, if the presumption of innocence were
conceptualized as a factual presumption separate and distinct from its
burden-allocative function, courts would have a potentially powerful
weapon against predispositions, impressions, opinions, and beliefs of
jurors that are inconsistent with innocence.8 9 The presumption of
innocence would survive, in large part, to battle juror partiality and
provide a context for the review of evidence as it is presented at trial.
The systematic elimination of juror partiality is impossible to achieve,
and this is surely not a realistic task for a factually based presumption of
innocence.9' Furthermore, a number of impressive empirical studies
suggest that jurors, generally, are competent factfinders .29  The seminal
work of Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel in the University of Chicago Jury
Proj ect and more recent experimental and quasi-experimental studies
suggest that jurors tend to base their decisions on the eidence presented
in court.292  The fact that these decisions tend to turn on the probative
289. Because all jurors will have definite beliefs, strongly held values, and biases, impartiality is
an unattainable ideal, with or without well-crafted efforts to ensure impartiality. It has been noted
that the issue of jury impartiality is made far more complex by the fact that lawyers, as adversaries,
look for jurors who are partial. "Lawyers would do their clients a not easily explained disservice if
they rejected a juror believed to be disposed to their side in favor of one thought to be neutral."
Gobert, supra note 159, at 271. The point is, however, that effective prcsumption of innocence
instructions will target specific opinions, impressions, and beliefs.
290. Any attempt to address juror predispositions must be approached realistically. As Judge
Learned Hand noted in relation to the limits ofvoir dire: "It is of course true that any examination on
the voir dire is a clumsy and imperfect way of detecting suppressed emotional commitments to
which all of us are to some extent subject, unconsciously or subconsciously. It is of the nature of our
deepest antipathies that often we do not admit them even to ourselves; but when that is so, nothing
but an examination, utterly impracticable in a courtroom, will disclose them, an examination
extending at times for months, and even then unsuccessful.... If trial by jia-y is not to break down
by its own weight, it is not feasible to probe more than the upper levels of a juror's mind." United
States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201,226 (2d Cir. 1950).
291. See Valerie P. Hans, Jury Decision Making, in Handbook on Pychology and Law 56
(Dorothy Kagehiro and William S. Laufer, eds., 1991).
292. See Harry Kalven, Jr. & Hans Zeisel, The American Jury (1966); Martha A. Myers, Rule
Departures and Making Law: Juries and Their Verdicts, 13 Law & Soc'y Rev. 781 (1979); John R.
Hepburn, The Objective Reality of Evidence and the Utility of Systematic Jury Selection, 4 Law &
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value and weight of evidence, however, does not diminish the critical
role or immense value of an active presumption of innocence. All jurors
begin their service with impressions, suspicions, beliefs, and opinions
regarding the accused. 293 Evidence is weighed by jurors in the context
of these social cognitions, and with the inevitable assumptions, biases,
prejudgments, and social stereotypes found in all complex social
psychological interactions.294 Thus, the issue is not whether jurors are
swayed by victim or defendant characteristics, or whether jurors with an
authoritarian personality are more punitive.295 Correlates of prejudgment
are academic concerns.296 The task of the presumption of innocence is to
ensure, to the greatest extent possible, that juror predispositions and
subsequent dispositions are consistent with the accused's right to a fair
trial.297 As one court recently noted, jurors "must be as nearly impartial
'as the lot of humanity will admit.' 298 With this task in mind, the
Hum. Behav. 89 (1980); Barbara F. Reskin & Christy A. Visher, The Impacts of Evidence and
Extralegal Factors in Jurors'Decisions, 20 Law & Soc'y Rev. 423 (1986).
293. See Edmond Costantini & Joel King, The Partial Juror: Correlates and Causes of
Prejudgment, 15 Law & Soc'y Rev. 9 (1980-81).
294. An exclusive focus on identifying and describing the content of these orientations, biases,
and prejudgments neglects their existence. The relations between demographic characteristics and
juror decision making, or personality factors and juror verdicts, make for fascinating academic
research, but are seemingly irrelevant in law. See, e.g., Virginia R. Boehm, Mr. Prejudice, Miss
Sympathy, and the Authoritarian Personality: An Application of Psychological Measuring
Techniques to the Problem of Jury Bias, 1968 Wis. L. Rev. 734, 746 (stating that "[t]his study was
designed to demonstrate that certain measurable attitudinal predispositions that have no obvious
legal relevancy can in fact be used to predict how individuals will judge and interpret a criminal
case. The results of this study seem to show that these attitudinal predispositions do in fact affect the
way jurors respond to evidence"); Cf Vicki L. Smith, supra note 162.
295. See Christy A. Visher, Juror Decision Making: The Importance of Evidence, 11 Law &
Hum. Behav. 1 (1987); Freda Adler, Socioeconomic Factors Influencing Jury Verdicts, 3 N.Y.U.
Rev. of L. & Soc. Change 1 (1973).
296. See Costantini & King, supra note 293.
297. King v. Lynaugh, 828 F.2d 257, 259 (5th Cir. 1987) (noting that "the right to an impartial
jury is basic to our system of justice. This right carries with it the concomitant right to take
reasonable steps designed to ensure that a jury is impartial.'), vacated, en banc, 850 F.2d 1055 (5th
Cir. 1988). None of this is to suggest that it is easy to affect juror predispositions. There is more
than enough evidence to the contrary. See, e.g., Advisory Committee On Fair Trial and Free Press,
A.B.A. Standards Relating to Fair Trial and Free Press 62 (1968) (stating that "[a]vailable data also
suggest that once formed, an impression or belief is extremely difficult to change, even when the
individual is confronted with objective facts that tend to refute it... [T]he individual is likely to
select elements of observed phenomena which reinforce his preexisting beliefs and to neglect others
or even distort his perceptions so that they will confirm his beliefs.).
298. See, e.g., State v Lumumba, 601 A.2d 1178, 1187 (NJ. Super. Ct. 1992). The task is not to
rule out partiality, but to ensure an impartiality that reflects certain legal assumptions. See Gobert,
supra note 159, at 313. Thus, impartiality requires an attitudinal indifference and openness to
evidence, coupled with an acceptance of factual assumptions.
Washington Law Review Vol. 70:329, 1995
presumption of innocence should: (1) impress upon jurors the importance
of their initial assumption in the factual innocence of the accused, and (2)
reduce the risk that as evidence is presented, the revision of all
impressions, suspicions, opinions, and beliefs will not be colored by
earlier predispositions that are inconsistent with the presumption of
innocence.2" Courts have concluded that the moral legitimacy of the
criminal law depends on proof that overcomes a presumption of
innocence. °  Without a strong factual assumption, overcoming the
presumption of innocence is a meaningless exercise.3 1'
A reconsideration of the presumption of innocence has much more
meaning given empirical evidence that Type I judicial errors occur in
approximately one half of one percent of all trials resulting in
convictions. 2 There is also a vast amount of impressive empirical and
anecdotal evidence that innocents are sentenced to death, and are
sometimes executed. 03 Most commentators have focused attention on
five sources of error that may lead to a wrongful conviction: (1) witness
299. See King, 828 F.2d at 259 (stating that "fthe right to an impartial trial is basic to our system
ofjustice. This right carries with it the concomitant right to take reasonable steps designed to ensure
that a jury is impartial"); Lumumba, 601 A.2d at 1187 (stating that "[tihe right of a defendant to an
impartial jury is of exceptional significance and the triers of fact must be as nearly impartial 'as the
lot of humanity will admit"') (Citations omitbed).
300. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,319 (1979).
301. The reasonable doubt rule is indispensable, according to the Supreme Court, because it "is a
prime instrument for reducing the risk of convictions resting on factual error." In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358, 363 (1970). Of course, standards of proof are inextricably tied to the risk of erroneous
convictions. The court, however, has underemphasized the active role that could be played by the
presumption of innocence as a separate and distinct guard against juror partiality and, thus,
convictions resting on factual error. The presumption of innocence can and should be more than a
subtle suggestion for jurors to put aside pre--xisting beliefs. Wigmore, sup.ra note 35, at 407. See
also United States v. Thaxton, 483 F.2d 1071-75 (5th Cir. 1973) (holding that the presumption of
innocence serves two purposes: it reminds jurors of the reasonable doubt rule, and "it cautious the
jury to put away from their minds all the suspicion that arises from the arrest the indictment, and the
arraignment, and to reach their conclusion solely from the legal evideno. adduced"). See also
United States v. Dilg, 700 F.2d 620 (1lth Cir. 1983).
302. Huff et al., supra note 33, at 523. Type I errors occur where a factually innocent person is
convicted. No doubt, type H judicial errors, where a guilty party is acquitted, occur with greater
frequency.
303. See, e.g., Committee on the Judici -y, Innocence and the Death Penalty: Assessing the
Danger of Mistaken Executions (1993) (finding that the House Judiciary Committee identified 48
people since 1973 who served time on death row before proving their innoce ace and being released);
Michael L. Radelet et al., In Spite of Innocence (1992); Hugo A. Bedau & Michael L. Radelet,
Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 21 (1987); Hugo A. Bedau,
Murder, Errors of Justice, and Capital Punishment, in The Death Penalty in America 434-52 (H.A.
Bedau ed., 1967) (Eighty-one people were erroneously convicted of capital crime between 1883 and
1962). Cf. Stephen J. Markman and Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent: A Response to the
Bedau-Radelet Study, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 121 (1988).
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error, e.g., eyewitness misidentification or witness perjury; (2) police
error, e.g., coerced confessions, negligence, and perjury; (3) judicial
error, e.g., denying the admissibility of exculpatory evidence; (4) defense
error, e.g., ineffective assistance of counsel; and (5) prosecutorial error,
e.g., suppressing exculpatory evidence.3 4  A discussion of factual
innocence and the normative environment within which innocence is
reviewed is absent in prior research and commentary." 5 This is so
despite the fact that the normative environment within which the
presumption of innocence is maintained does little to support such a
presumption. Add to this the fact that jurors often fail to understand
what the presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt rule mean; that
jurors are often predisposed to distribute their uncertainty of the
accused's factual guilt and innocence equally or to favor guilt; that
predispositions of guilt change the way in which jurors interpret both
inculpatory and exculpatory evidence; and that it is exceedingly difficult
for an accused's innocence to be reviewed once convicted.3°
No one expects a guarantee that only the guilty will be convicted and
the innocent will be acquitted.30 7 The criminal process has ultimate ends
304. See Martin Yant, Presumed Guilty: When Innocent People are Wrongly Convicted (1991);
Huff et al., supra note 33, at 525; Arye Rattner, Convicted but Innocent: Wrongul Conviction and
the Criminal Justice System, 12 Law & Hum. Behav. 283 (1988); Bedau & Radelet, supra note 303,
at 57; Samuel Gross, Loss of Innocence: Eyewitness Identification and Proof of Guilt, 16 J. Legal
Stud. 395 (1987); Elizabeth F. Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony (1979); Edward D. Radin, The
Innocents (1964); Jerome Frank & Barbara Frank, Not Guilty (1957); Edwin M. Borchard,
Convicting the Innocent: Errors of Criminal Justice (1932).
305. Commentators have noted that these sources do not fully capture the role of error in criminal
cases. Police and prosecutorial overzealousness, Rattner argues, as well as a sense of urgency to
solve a case, serve as primary sources of error. Others have suggested that racial prejudice
contributes significantly to error. See House Judiciary Committee, supra note 303, at 8. All
researchers focus on human error and fail to examine those constructs, like innocence, that are
integral to the normative environment of the criminal process. Perhaps the sole exception is
Borchard, who credits juries with certain predispositions: "Juries seem disposed more readily to
credit the veracity and reliability of the victims of an outrage than any amount of contrary evidence
by or on behalf of the accused, whether by way of alibi, character witnesses, or other testimony."
See supra note 304, at 367.
306. Notwithstanding jurors' assurances to the contrary, any predisposition toward guilt will
likely change the way in which a factfinder evaluates information and evidence at trial. See Derek J.
Koehler, Explanation, Imagination, and Confidence in Judgment, 110 Psych. Bull. 499 (1991).
307. As Frank and Frank noted: "Assume the most decent police, the most conscientious
prosecutor, the fairest trial judge and jury. Still an innocent man may be found guilty." Frank &
Frank, supra note 304, at 199. See also Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958) (noting that
"(t]here is always in litigation a margin of error, representing error in factfinding, which both parties
must take into account").
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that are dual and conflicting.30 But what should be done when there
appears to be an imbalance in Blackstone's 10:1 ratio?3' What should
be done when erroneous convictions are no longer treated that much
more seriously than erroneous acquittals?310 What should happen when
the failure to instruct jurors on the presumption of innocence, or the
miscomprehension of instructions on the presumption of innocence, is
considered by state courts to be harmless error?
311
C. Giving Substance to the Rhetoric of Innocence: Trial Error and
Factual Presumptions
The solutions to these problems can be found by giring substance to
the rhetoric of innocence. 2  State courts must restore importance to the
presumption of innocence by reexamining the application of the harmless
error rule to defective and omitted presumption of innocence
instructions. The landmark decision in Chapman v. California31 3 set in
motion a reconsideration of the effect of constitutional error at trial.
Constitutional errors, such as overbroad jury instructions at the
sentencing phase of a capital case," 4 the admission of evidence in
violation of the Sixth Amendment's Right to Counsel,1 - jury instructions
308. A tension exists between the goals of acquitting the innocent and convicting the guilty. See
Hall, supra note 100. While no one expects total impartiality, the law does require that jurors put
aside their initial beliefs if favorable to guilt. While the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution does grant the right to an impartial trial, commentators have noted that courts have been
less than clear as to what is meant by the construct of impartiality. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145 (1968); Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589 (1976). According to Gobert, "[pilatitudes about its
value abound, but giving content to this concept has proven more difficult and challenging. The
difficulty springs from the fact that all adults have beliefs, values, and prejudices which make
impartiality in the tabula rasa sense impossible." Gobert, supra note 159, at 271.
309. See supra note 17.
310. Legal scholarship assumes agreement on preferences for the outcome of a criminal case
(from best to worst): (1) acquitting the innocent, (2) convicting the guilty, (3) acquitting the guilty,
and (4) convicting the innocent. See Connolly, supra note 71.
311. Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786 (1979). Cf. United States v. Fernandez, 496 F.2d 1294
(5th Cir. 1974) (holding that failure of the court to provide a presumption of amocence charge at any
time during the trial amounted to plain error); United States v. Dilg, 700 F.2d 620 (1 lth Cir. 1983)
(requiring a new trial when the court gave the presumption of innocence instruction to the jury
venire, but failed to instruct jury during trial).
312. Any effort to reset this tension necessarily resets the probability meter of guilt or innocence
in algebraic and probability models ofjuror decisionmaking.
313. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
314. Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 (1990).
315. Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249 (1988).
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with an erroneous conclusive presumption,3'6 erroneous exclusion of
exculpatory testimony regarding the accused's confession,317 the denial
of an accused's right to be present at his trial,318 and the improper
comment on accused's silence at trial, 319 are all harmless errors. After
Kentucky v. Whorton,32 a failure to give presumption of innocence
instructions at any time before or during trial is likely harmless error as
well. 21
In the recent decision of Arizona v. Fulminante,31 the Supreme Court
discussed the common thread connecting cases of harmless constitutional
errors. Each involved a "trial error" during the presentation of the case
to the jury that could be quantitatively assessed in the context of the
whole trial.3' This may be contrasted with cases, where there was a
"structural defect" in the constitution of the trial mechanism. In
determining whether there is a trial error or a structural defect, courts
look to the effect that the error had on the guilty verdict. In examining
this effect, the inquiry turns on a consideration of fairness. Modem
harmless error analysis focuses on the underlying fairness of a trial rather
than the presence of immaterial error. It does so by preserving the
316. Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263 (1989).
317. Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986).
318. Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114 (1983).
319. United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499 (1983).
320. 441 U.S. 786, 789 (1979) (stating that "the failure to give a requested instruction on the
presumption of innocence does not in and of itself violate the Constitution. Under Taylor, such a
failure must be evaluated in light of the totality of the circumstances-including all the instructions
to the jury, the arguments of counsel, whether the weight of the evidence was overwhelming, and
other relevant factors-to determine whether the defendant received a constitutionally fair trial.").
See Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 (1978); United States v. Payne, 944 F.2d 1458 (9th Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1598 (1992); United States v. Dilg, 700 F.2d 620 (1 th Cir. 1983).
321. Justice Stevens, in a dissenting opinion, did suggest that while the failure to instruct in state
courts might not violate due process, "[iln a federal court it is reversible error to refuse a request for
a proper instruction on the presumption of innocence." 436 U.S. at 491. See also United States v.
Hill, 738 F.2d 152, 153 (6th Cir. 1984) (holding that "[j]ury instructions concerning the presumption
of innocence and proof beyond reasonable doubt are fundamental rights possessed by every citizen
charged with a crime in these United States").
322. 499 U.S. 279 (1991). See Kenneth R. Kenkel, Arizona v. Fulminante: Where's the Harm in
Harmless Error?, 81 Ky. L.J. 257 (1992-93). For a critical review of Fulminante, see Jill Adler, The
U.S. Supreme Court's "Harmless Error": An Essay on Arizona v. Fulminante, I Tilburg Foreign L.
Rev. 15 (1991).
323. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 307 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The court asked whether the effect
of the error was harmless in terms of the entire fact-finding process. See also Delaware v. Van
Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986).
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principle that the resolution of factual questions of guilt and innocence
are the central purpose of a criminal trial. 24
Neglecting to give presumption of innocence instructions is indeed
harmless if this presumption has nothing to do with factual innocence.
Failure to give an instruction on the presumption of legal innocence is
more than compensated for by an instruction on the reasonable doubt
rule. Failing to instruct jurors on the presumption of innocence is also
harmless if presuming innocence bears no relation to the underlying
fairness of a trial.s The presumption of innocence is insignificant if its
omission is not a structural defect. But if presumption of innocence
rhetoric is to have any meaning, as it should, it must guarantee a
presumption of factual innocence. A presumption of factual innocence is
inextricably tied to the fairness of trial, so that its omission "can never be
treated as harmless error." '26  Once substance of the presumption of
innocence is on par with its rhetoric, as will be proposed in part II, the
omission of a presumption of innocence instruction must be considered
more than trial error.327 Failure to instruct the jury on an assumption of
innocence compromises a basic protection "without which a criminal
trial cannot reliably serve its function." 2'
324. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 307 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The notion of examining the
omission of a presumption of innocence instruction in such a context w&; promoted recently in
Delo v. Lashley which held that: "An instruction is constitutionally required only when, in light of
the totality of the circumstances, there is a "genuine danger" that the jury will convict based on
something other than the State's lawful evidence, proved beyond a reasonable doubt" Delo v.
Lashley, 113 S. Ct. 1222, 1226 (1993). Thus, the decisions in Chapman, Fuiminante, and Delo turn
on two simple but powerful inquiries: Did the error significantly influence the jury in reaching its
judgment? And did the error create a genuine danger that the jury will convict on something other
than lawful evidence?
325. As the Fifth Circuit noted:
We must be confident that the scales of justice are not tilted, are not skewed. The Chapman
harmless error rule was not intended to be a cover-up for every prosecutorial error. It was really
intended as a Band-Aid for what is, under the circumstances, a minor, albeit constitutional, legal
abrasion. The constitution speaks in cosmic concepts or cosmic principle:;, and they are not to
be grudgingly applied nor miniaturized. We must be careful lest the purgatory of the harmless
error doctrine erode our sacred constitutional rights.
United States v. Hammond, 598 F.2d 1008, 1013-14 (5th Cir. 1979)
326. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18,23 (1967).
327. The majority in Fulminante again acknowledged that, in the absence of a presumption of
innocence instruction, a reasonable doubt rule instruction is adequate for due process purposes.
Omission of reasonable doubt rule instructions would distort the trial process by creating an
untenable risk that the jury would convict on proof of less than a reasonable doubt. Omission of the
presumption of innocence merely removes an additional safeguard beyond that provided for by the
reasonable doubt rule. 499 U.S. at 291.
328. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S. Ct. 2078 (1993) (upholding the critical importance of
reasonable doubt rule instructions in criminal cases).
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In the past, federal courts have taken a conservative path by
invalidating only those convictions in which the proceedings were so
infected by error that the verdict was compromised. 29 For example,
courts have ruled that constitutional error is no longer harmless where
there is a total deprivation of the right to counsel,30 where the judge is
biased,331 and where the accused is deprived of the right to self-
representation.332 If the substance of the presumption of innocence
approaches its rhetoric, a failure to give jury instructions on this basic
and fundamental legal safeguard will be seen as something more than
harmless error.333
The presumption of innocence is recast as a factual presumption in
part IlI. Jury instructions are proposed that consider certain peculiarities
of human cognition and information processing. First, a body of
experimental research suggests that the formation of an initial impression
or belief tends to make subjects (e.g., jurors) less susceptible to alternate
impressions or beliefs. A juror's reliance on an initial impression, when
given additional information or evidence, is more commonly known as a
primacy effect. Second, a number of impressive laboratory studies
support the notion that initial impressions or beliefs persevere even in the
face of persuasive counterexplanations and contrary evidence. Third, a
related body of social psychological research also supports the fact that
jurors may overvalue evidence and information that would confirm
initial impressions, while undervaluing or ignoring disconfirming
evidence. And, finally, experimental attempts to undo initial
impressions, beliefs, and assumptions by psychologists suggest that it is
unlikely that jurors will produce counterexplanations and thus change
assumptions unless prompted to do so. By clearly stating the factual
assumptions with which all jurors are required to begin trial, the jury
instructions proposed in part Ii consider the primacy effects of initial
329. The focus is squarely on the effect of the error on the verdict, not the effect of the error on a
reasonable jury. See Chapman, 386 U.S. at 18.
330. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
331. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
332. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984).
333. See Ealey v. State, 232 S.E.2d 620 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977) (granting a new trial because court
failed to instruct on the presumption of innocence); Schuh v. State, 258 S.E. 2d 328 (Ga. Ct. App.
1979). Notably, some states have codified the requirement that jurors must be instructed on the
presumption of innocence in all criminal cases. See, e.g., S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 23A-25-3.1
(1994). However, even in such jurisdictions courts are hesitant to find reversible error where
instructions are omitted. See State v. Holmes, 464 N.W.2d 612 (S.D. 1990) (holding that failure to
instruct on the presumption of innocence does not automatically result in an unfair trial and may be
harmless error).
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predispositions, the perseverance of beliefs, the tendency to differentially
value and gravitate toward confirming evidence, and the need for
prompting. Both preliminary and charging instructions will specifically
address the pivotal importance of juror factual and legal assumptions.
A consideration of these cognitive processes and effects gives specific
meaning to the rhetoric of the presumption of innocence. The effort to
recast the presumption of innocence as a factual a3sumption, more
generally, recognizes the important function that the presumption of
innocence may serve as a guard against juror partiality.3" It recognizes
that the normative environment of the criminal process, while alternating
over time between ideological polarities, has moved far along in the
direction of a retributive formalism.335 Recasting the: presumption of
innocence also acknowledges that jurors frequently misunderstand
existing presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt rule
instructions.336
Finally, this reconstruction of the presumption of innocence is
testament to the limitations of voir dire to identify and foil juror bias.337
Few would contest that jury selection can be an important and powerful
means of dealing with the fixed opinions and biases of prospective
jurors.33 But the use of voir dire as a mechanism to root out
predispositions is often compromised by the adversarial nature of the
criminal process. Both defense counsel and the prosecution seek to
334. There are, admittedly, only a few prozedures and processes that control for impartiality, e.g.,
effective questioning during voir dire, effective use of peremptory challenles, and supervision of
deliberations. See Note, Juror Bias-A Procedural Screening and the Case for Permitting its Use,
64 Minn. L. Rev. 987 (1980). Courts have approved juror questionnaires with increasing frequency
over the last decade. For a report on the receptivity of California judges, see David B. Graeven,
Enhancing Voir Dire with Paper, The Recorder, November 3, 1993, at 8.
335. A strong, widely held ideological consensus, no matter which variety, affects juror
presumptions, perceptions, and considerations of innocence. For a fascinatirg account of the role of
criminal justice values and ideological consistency in juror decisionmaking, see Jonathan D.
Casper & Kennette M. Benedict, The Influence of Outcome Information and Attitudes on Juror
Decision Making in Search and Seizure Cases, in Inside the Juror 65-83 (Reid Hastie ed., 1993).
See also Reid Hastie, Algebraic Models of Juror Decision Processes, in Laside the Juror 84-115
(Reid Hastie ed., 1993).
336. See supra notes 161-83 and accompanying text
337. Voir dire is one of a handful of mechanisms to achieve impartiality. See Gobert, supra note
159, at 315. There is also juror polling, impartiality training, and a series of bias questionnaires. See
Sand & Reiss, supra note 171.
338. See Neil Vidmar & Julius Melnitzer, Juror Prejudice: An Empirical Study of a Challenge for
Cause, 22 Osgoode Hall L.J. 487 (1984); Valerie P. Hans, The Conduct of Voir Dire: A
Psychological Analysis, 11 Just. Syst. J. 40 (1986) (stating that individual, sequestered, and open-
ended questioning is superior method for uncovering bias); Babcock, Voi- Dire: Preserving "Its
Wonderful Power," 27 Stan. L. Rev. 545 (1975).
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empanel jurors whose dispositions are partisan.339 The use of peremptory
strikes, for instance, may decrease the impartiality of the venire.34 The
value of jury selection is further compromised by the law's commitment
to juror representations of impartiality.341 As one court has observed,
"[n]atural human pride would suggest a negative answer to whether there
was a reason the juror could not be fair and impartial."342 Add to this that
the effectiveness of voir dire in identifying fixed opinions or strongly
held biases is inconstant. Voir dire, for example, is an inadequate shield
against racial bias and prejudice.343 Slight impressions, suspicions of
guilt, and predispositions toward guilt are not generally identified in voir
339. See Valerie P. Hans & Neil Vidmar, Judging the Jury 74 (1986) (arguing that "[1]awyers
begin the selection process by claiming to the jury panel that their wish is for fair and impartial
jurors. Yet they do not desire impartiality but rather favorability."); Jerome Frank, Courts on Trial
121-23 (1949).
340. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T. B., 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994). Cf Dale W. Broeder, VoirDire
Examination: An Empirical Study, 38 So. Cal. L. Rev. 503 (1965); Susan E. Jones, Judge- Versus
Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire: An Empirical Investigation of Jury Candor, 11 Law & Hum. Beh.
131 (1987).
341. Cf Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215 (1982) (stating that "[g]iven the human propensity
for self-justification, respondent argues, the law must impute bias to jurors in [the respondent's]
position. We disagree.").
342. United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 375 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 970
(1973). The problem of social desirability is significant in voir dire. Jurors do not want to appear
impartial or uninformed. Candid response to questions are often colored by self-presentations of
fairness. To avoid public embarassment, some jurors claim not to have an opinion. This is not only
a problem in voir dire. Throughout trial, jurors' representations of impartiality are accepted
uncritically. In some cases, the cautionary instruction given by the judge is both naive and,
inadvertently, humorous:
Now, is there any member of the jury panel as it is now constituted that feels that they could not
put the fact that the Defendant is shackled out of their mind for the purpose of weighing the
evidence or determining the issue of the Defendant's guilt or any other issue in this case. If you
feel that would prejudice you, please raise your hand. I am instructing you that if you are
selected to sit on this jury to put that fact out of your mind for the purpose of determining the
Defendant's guilt or any other issue in this case. If you can't follow the instruction, raise your
hand.
Billups v. Garrison, 718 F.2d 665, 667 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 820 (1984).
343. For a comprehensive review of empirical research in juror bias, see Sheri L. Johnson, Black
Innocence and the White Jury, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1611 (1985). State and federal courts have adopted
a host of procedures to screen out racial bias from juries. This includes sequestered voir dire and
content questioning. See also American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice, 8-3.5(a)
(1980). The success of these efforts, however, must be seriously questioned. Mu'Min v. Virginia,
500 U.S. 415 (1991) (holding that the Constitution does not require content questioning of jurors in
cases involving pretrial publicity). In addition, the Supreme Court has responded inconsistently to
the exclusion of blacks or whites from petit juries by the use of peremptory challenges following its
ruling in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). See, e.g., Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991);
Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 (1990).
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dire.3" Finally, and perhaps most important, it is rare that courts
disqualify jurors on the basis of opinions, biases, or even fixed opinions
where it appears from representations and demeanor tha: the juror can lay
aside the opinions or biases and impartially render a verdict. 45 In such
cases, voir dire merely identifies juror biases and predispositions. 346 In
fact, some state legislatures have passed competence statutes that
explicitly allow for juror predispositions toward guilt.347
The revision of the presumption of innocence maintains the
distinction, discussed throughout this Article, between 6Ee notion of legal
guilt or innocence and factual guilt or innocence. Below, this distinction
will be explored in relation to initial assumptions (ai) at the start of a
trial, and those belief states (di) that are maintained at -the end of a trial,
concurrent with the decision to convict or acquit.
344. See Broeder, supra note 340, at 505; Hans Zeisel & Shari S. Diamond, The Effect of
Peremptory Challenges on Jury and Verdict: An Examination in a Federal District Court, 30 Stan.
L. Rev. 491, 528 (1978) (concluding that "[o]ur experiment suggests that, on the whole, the voir dire
as conducted in these trials did not provide sufficient information for attorneys to identify prejudiced
jurors').
345. Great deference is given to juror representations of impartiality. See Aldridge v. United
States, 283 U.S. 308,313 (1931):
As the juror best knows the condition of his own mind, no satisfactory condlusion can be arrived
at, without resort to himself.... [TR ask a person whether he is prejudiced or not against a
party, and (if the answer is affirmative), whether that prejudice is of such a character as would
lead him to deny the party a fair trial, is not only the simplest method of acertaining the state of
his mind, but is, probably, the only sure method of fathoming his thoughts and feelings.
346. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961). This point was supported by Justice John Marshall
in the trial of Aaron Burr
['1]o say that any man who had formed an opinion on any fact conducive to the final decision of
the case would therefore be considered as disqualified from serving on the jury, would exclude
intelligent and observing men, whose minds were really in a situation to decide upon the whole
case according to the testimony, and would perhaps be applying the letter of the rule requiring
an impartial jury with a strictness which is not necessary for the preservation of the rule itself.
United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49, 51 (C.C.D.Va. 1807).
347. In a remarkable legislative effort, the State of Mississippi has enacted a juror incompetence
statute that captures a growing view ofjuror impartiality.
Any person, otherwise competent, who will make oath that he is impartiad in the case, shall be
competent as a juror in any criminal case, notwithstanding the fact that he has an impression or
an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused, if it appear to the satisfaction of the court
that he has no bias...except that to which the evidence may conduct. Any juror shall be
excluded, however, if the court be of opinion that he cannot try the case impartially, and the
exclusion shall not be assignable for error.
Miss. Code. Ann. § 13-5-79 (1993).
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I. RECONSTRUCTING THE MEANING OF THE PRESUMPTION
OF INNOCENCE
At a meeting of the American Law Institute's Council on the Model
Penal Code in 1955, members decided to transform the presumption of
innocence into an assumption of innocence. The justification for this
change was simple: "Since this is not a true presumption, we speak of the
innocence of the defendant as 'assumed."' 348 If the presumption of
innocence were a true presumption, it would impose a burden of
production on an opponent of the party who bears the burden of
persuasion.349 Assumptions, on the other hand, allocate burdens of
persuasion. Thus, an assumption of innocence would impose a burden of
persuasion on the prosecution with regard to the defendant's guilt. While
the assumption of innocence is in effect, it is assumed that the accused is
not guilty.35
0
This semantic change does not give substance to the presumption of
innocence.35' Presumption of innocence rhetoric may be given meaning
only by moving away from the notion that this assumption is a burden
allocation device, and toward the view that factual innocence of the
accused must be assumed. After all, the presumption of innocence is not
held out as a fundamental right because it amplifies the burden of proof
or conveys intangible messages to criminal justice functionaries.352
348. See American Law Institute, Model Penal Code, (Tentative Draft, No. 4 (1955)). This
change remained in the Official Draft of the Model Penal Code § 1.12(1): "No person may be
convicted of an offense unless each element of such offense is proved beyond a reasonable doubt In
the absence of such proof, the innocence of the defendant is assumed." Model Penal Code § 1.12(1)
See also Harold A. Ashford & D. Michael Risinger, Presumptions, Assumptions, and Due Process in
Criminal Cases: A Theoretical Overview, 79 Yale LU. 165 (1969). As noted in McCormick, supra
note 26, at § 342, the presumption of innocence "is probably better called the 'assumption of
innocence' in that it describes our assumption that, in the absence of contrary facts, it is to be
assumed that any person's conduct upon a given occasion was lawful."
349. See Otis Harrison Fisk, The Law of Proof in Judicial Proceedings (1928).
350. Ashford & Risinger, supra note 348, at 173.
351. "Although the phrase is technically inaccurate and perhaps even misleading in the sense that
it suggests that there is some inherent probability that the defendant is innocent, it is a basic
component of a fair trial." McCormick, supra note 26, at § 342.
352. See, e.g., McCormick, supra note 26, at § 342 (noting that "[m]ost courts insist on the
inclusion of the phrase in the charge to the jury, despite the fact that at that point it consists of
nothing more than an amplification of the prosecution's burden of persuasion"). See also Taylor v.
Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 491 (1978) (observing that "[tihe function of the instruction is to make it
clear that the burden of persuasion rests entirely on the prosecutor. The same function is performed
by the instruction requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt.") (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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The presumption of innocence should earn its rhetorical prominence
by constraining the uninformed partiality of jurors. 3 The presumption
of innocence should operate as both an evidentiary restriction and a
constraint on partiality, deriving its meaning and authority from the right
to a fair trial, as well as the right to trial by an impartial jury. The Court
in Estelle v. Williams,354 Taylor v. Kentucky,3 55 and Kentucky .v.
Whorton,356 found the unarticulated constitutional authority of the
presumption of innocence in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause. In each case, the constitutional derivation of the presumption of
innocence was found in the right to a fair trial and, more specifically, in
the right to be judged on evidence presented at trial. The presumption of
innocence guards against extra-legal suspicion and unwarranted
inference. The right to be judged on evidence at trial and not on
suspicion and inference is also a basic element of the right to an impartial
jury, which is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, as well as the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.357
Impartiality requires that the jury represent a cross-section of the
community and that the jury base its verdict on evidence presented in
court. Given this second element of impartiality, it is likely that the
constitutional guarantee of impartiality will become more meaningful as
the presumption of innocence increasingly reflects an assumption
offactual innocence.358
The constitutional guarantees reflected in a factually based assumption
further distinguish a presumption of innocence from the reasonable doubt
353. Specifically, instructions will be proposed that focus on juror assumptions that are grounded
in bias, prejudice, and social stereotypes. Am effort will be made to inhibit commonly observed
cognitive biases that accompany initial impressions, suspicions, beliefs and opinions. See infra notes
437-50 and accompanying text.
354. 425 U.S. 501,503 (1976).
355. 436 U.S. 478,484-85 (1978).
356. 441 U.S. 786,788-89(1979).
357. The Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury is made applicable to the states through the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Baldwin v. New Yor, 399 U.S. 66 (1970);
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). See also Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968);
Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966); Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965); Irvin v. Dowd,
366 U.S. 717 (1961); Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162 (1950).
358. Not surprisingly, courts have assumed a constitutional connection between the principles of a
fair and impartial jury trial, and the presumption of innocence. See, e.g., United States v. Hollis, 971
F.2d 1441, 1453-54 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1580(1993); United States v. Vario,
943 F.2d 236, 239 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 882 (1992); Uni;ed States v. Walsh, 811
F.2d 608, 609 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that "[t]he right to a fair trial encompasses the right to an




rle. An assumption of innocence is a constitutional standard that
equates impartiality with a "mental attitude of appropriate
indifference." '359 The requirement of proof beyound a reasonable doubt is
a decision rule that reflects a state of mind (doubt) related to the degree
of proof required for conviction. This is not to say that the reasonable
doubt rule is only in effect at the end of trial, or that jurors fail to form
beliefs in the legal adequacy of evidence until a verdict is reached. As
discussed below, jurors bring to the court and then develop a vast array
of factual and legal assumptions.
A. Juror Assumptions and Initial Belief States
The five initial belief states discussed earlier inadequately account for
juror predispositions." As Table Two reveals, the initial assumptions of
jurors range widely, from the assumption of factual innocence (al) to the
assumption that it is more likely than not that the accused is guilty in fact
(a14).361 There is little doubt that these states are transient once evidence
is introduced. Moreover, while at first glance they may appear
theoretically distinct, most are not exclusive. Some jurors, for example,
have no predispositions regarding the accused's legal guilt (a5), but
consider it more likely than not that the accused is factually guilty (all).
Other jurors may believe at first that the accused is factually guilty (a4)
and also assume legal guilt (a3).
In any given criminal case, legal and factual assumptions may run
parallel as evidence is presented. If so, combinations of legal and factual
beliefs, depicted as multiple opinion meters, move from an initial belief
stage (bi) to an informed, decision stage (di) following the presentation
359. The idea that impartiality derives from an attitude of indifference comes from E. Coke,
Commentary Upon Lettleton § 155(b) (1832). See also Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 154
(1878). In the words of Chief Justice Hughes, "[i]mpartiality is not a technical conception. It is a
state of mind. For the ascertainment of this mental attitude of appropriate indifference, the
Constitution lays down no particular tests and procedure is not chained to any ancient and artificial
formula." United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 145-46 (1936). A more recent application of
"indifference" as impartiality appeared in Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 33 (1986). As Gobert has
noted, however, jurors should not begin as indifferent factfinders. Their mental state should be
"biased in favor of the accused." Gobert, supra note 159, at 276. Thus, the word "appropriate" must
take on special meaning. The presumption of innocence should mean that "appropriate indifference"
is an assumption of factual innocence in favor of the accused.
360. See supra notes 203-07.
361. These assumptions (al to a14) would replace so in a weighted average equation.
Alternatively, the relation between factual and legal innocence/guilt may be represented as a simple
function f f(LF).
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and weighing of evidence.362 Alternatively, jurors' opinions may not be
reducible to the dichotomous and discrete judgments of a single meter.
Even multiple dichotomous meters may be inadequate representations of
juror cognitions. Fuzzy set theory, for example, would suggest the
presence of a host of continuous meters for all the features and
dimensions that comprise the calculus of guilt and irmocence. Thus,
jurors might have composite meters that integrate a series of "fuzzy"
meter readings.363
Existing presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt jury
instructions tend to influence all consistent legal assumptions of jurors.
When understood, such instructions require an assumption of legal
innocence (a2), but would allow for other assumptions, including al, 5,
362. Meter models assume that evidence is received by the factfinder in independent "packets"
that vary in intensity. Over the course oftrial, opinions become increasingly informed. Notably, the
association and concordance between legal and factual beliefs is not perfect. This may be illustrated
in at least two ways. First, the relation between a9 and al3 or a12 and a4 may be depicted as parallel
meters.
Parallel Legal and Factual Meters
Initial Beliefs (bi) Informed Beliefs (di)
0 100 0 100
Legal Meter Legal Meter
A13 Inoet==-n
0 100 0 100
Factual Meter Factual Meter
A12 ]...
0 100 0 100
Legal Meter Legal Meter
A4 [ Guilt I3
0 100 0 100
Factual Meter Factual Meter
363. See Lola Lopes, Two Conceptions of the Juror, in Inside the Juror (Reid Hastie ed., 1993)
(discussing multiple meters in regard to fuzzy set theory). See also L. A. Zadeh, Fuzzy Sets as a





Assumption of Factual Assumption that the accused did not, in
Innocence (al) (F=0) fact, commit the offense
Assumption of Legal Innocence Assumption that the accused is legally
(a2) (L--0) innocent unless and until there is proof to
the contrary
Assumption of Legal Guilt Assumption that there exists evidence
(a3) (L=I) beyond a reasonable doubt of guilt.
Assumption of Factual Guilt Assumption that the accused did, in fact,
(a4) (F=I) commit the offense
No Predisposition/ Legal Guilt No initial assumption concerning the
(a5) sufficiency of incriminating evidence
No Predisposition/ Legal No initial assumption concerning the
Innocence (a6) sufficiency of exculpatory evidence
No Predisposition/ Factual Guilt No initial assumption concerning whether
(a7) the accused is guilty in fact
No Predisposition/Factual No initial assumption concerning whether
Innocence (a8) the accused is innocent in fact
Balanced Uncertainties/Factual Equally likely that the accused is factually
Guilt/Innocence (a9) (F..5) guilty or innocent
Balanced Uncertainties/Legal Equally likely that the accused is legally
Guilt/Innocence (al0) (L- .5) guilty or innocent
Imbalanced Uncertainties/ More likely than not that the accused is
Factual Guilt (al 1) (0< F< 1) factually guilty
Imbalanced Uncertainties/Legal More likely than not that the accused is
Guilt (al2) (0< L <1) legally guilty
Imbalanced Uncertainties/ More likely than not that the accused is
Factual Innocence innocent in fact
(al3) (0< F< 1)
Imbalanced Uncertainties/ More likely than not that the accused is
Factual Guilt (al4) (0 < F < 1) guilty in fact
407
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9, 11, 13, 14. Federal and state pattern jury instructions, however, do
little to ensure a juror's assumption of factual innocence. As observed
below, an assumption of factual innocence (al) is inconsistent with all
other factually based states.
The factual and legal assumptions in Table Two, while more elaborate
than earlier conceptions, fail to reveal the intensity of beliefs and
opinions that underlie the social cognitions of jurors. Is a juror's
assumption of factual guilt (a3), for example, based on a superficial
impression? Is a juror's assumption that it is more likely than not that
the accused is factually guilty (all) grounded in a suspicion? Or, is it
the product of a fixed opinion? These differences are fEr from subtle and
may reflect an acceptable level of suspicion or an unacceptable bias.
Once it is determined that a juror has a suspicion or fixed opinion, is it
based on knowledge of material facts (evidenced-based) or is it
hypothetical?3' Any revision of presumption of innocence instructions
to ensure juror impartiality must consider the continuum of both
hypothetical and evidence-based predispositions.
For any juror assumption al-14, there are at least five cognitive
constructions ranging in intensity from: impressions (cl), suspicions
(c2), beliefs (c3), opinions (c4), to fixed opinions (c5). 65 These
constructions may be either hypothetical (h) or evidence-based (e). 66 An
impression is a perception of the attributes, characteristics, status, and
traits of an object. Courts have not considered "light," "superficial," or
"slight" impressions that yield to testimony or evidence as obstacles in
juror selection. 67  Suspicions are impressions with a definite
orientation.3 68  A juror, for example, may suspect that the accused is
364. For obvious reasons, courts accord far less weight to the hypothetical cognitions of jurors.
See Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982).
365. C._ 5 would replace the wo term in an algebraic weighted equation.
366. Examples of assumptions and constructions that are either hypothetical or evidence-based,
include: a4 hc2 (assumption of factual guilt, grounded in a hypothetical suspicion), allhc3
(assumption that it is more likely than not that the accused is factually guilty, grounded in a
hypothetical belief), and al 3 hc1 (assumption that it is more likely than not that the accused is
factually innocent, grounded in a hypothetical impression).
367. Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415 (1991). See also Irvin v. Dowd, MI66 U.S. 717,723 (1961)
(noting that "[t]o hold that the mere existence of any preconceived notion as to the guilt or innocence
of an accused, without more, is sufficient to rebut the presumption or a prospective juror's
impartiality would be to establish an impossible standard"); United States v. Blanton, 719 F.2d 815,
830 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1099 (1984); People v. Butts, 527 N.Y.2d 880 (1988);
Durham v. Cox, 328 F. Supp. 1157 (W.D. Va. 1971). For an informative discussion ofpreconceived
impressions, see Sheppard v. Maxwell, 346 F.2d 707 (6th Cir. 1965), rev'd, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).




guilty because he was arrested and then indicted by the grand jury.369
Once again, suspicions that give way to evidence are not necessarily
incompatible with juror competence. Beliefs are learned predispositions
to respond in a certain manner to a particular object. Beliefs, like
attitudes, tend to have three components: (1) cognitive, i.e., what the
juror thinks; (2) emotional, i.e., what the juror feels; and (3) behavioral,
i.e., how the juror acts.37 Courts have distinguished between uninformed
and informed beliefs. Opinions are informed beliefs.37' Where jurors
have qualified opinions regarding the accused's guilt, there is implied
bias or bias presumed as a matter of law.372 And, finally, fixed opinions
are unqualified, unchangeable, settled beliefs.373 Courts have found fixed
opinions toward guilt to be evidence of actual bias, or bias in fact.374
Earlier it was noted that impressions, like suspicions, beliefs,
opinions, and fixed opinions, are subject to primacy effects.375 Initial
369. See, e.g., People v. Torpey, 472 N.E.2d 298 (N.Y. 1984) (finding that juror suspected that
the accused was a "hit man" for the Mafia); United States v. Bruscino, 687 F.2d 938 (7th Cir. 1982)
(a suspicion was planted in jurors' minds that the accused was a member of the Mexican Mafia),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1228 (1983).
370. See, e.g., Perryman v. State, 558 So. 2d 972 (Ala. App. 1989).
371. See State v. Massey, 382 A.2d 801 (RI. 1978); State v. Fuller, 87 S.E.2d 287 (S.C. 1955);
State v. Mittle, 113 S.E. 335 (S.C. 1922). According to the court in Dowd, "the influence that lurks
in an opinion once formed is so persistent that it unconsciously fights detachment from the mental
processes of the average man... ." Dowd, 366 U.S. at 722.
372. See Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982) (dismissing the significance of an implied juror
bias and holding that the Sixth Amendment is concerned only with actual bias); Sharon R. Gromer,
Supreme Court Review: Sixth Amendment-The Demise of the Doctrine of Implied Juror Bias:
Smith v. Phillips, 102 S. Ct. 940 (1982), 73 . Crim. L. & Criminology 1507 (1982); Leonard v.
United States, 378 U.S. 544 (1964) (per curiam).
373. Ala. Code § 12-16-150 (7) (1986). Cf. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 229 (West Supp. 1995).
374. See Phillips, 455 U.S. at 223-24. The court noted the proof problems associated with juror
bias in citing Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 183, 196 (1909):
Bias or prejudice is such an elusive condition of the mind that it is most difficult, if not
impossible, to always recognize its existence, and it might exist in the mind of one (on account
of his relations with one of the parties) who was quite positive that he had no bias, and said that
he was perfectly able to decide the question wholly uninfluenced by anything but the evidence.
See also State v. Green, 392 S.E.2d 157 (S.C.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881 (1990); Nobis v. State,
401 So. 2d 191 (Ala. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 401 So. 2d 204 (Ala. 1981) (noting that a fixed
opinion closes the mind of a juror and combats the testimony). According to the court in Dowd,
"[t]he influence that lurks in an opinion once formed is so persistent that it unconsciously fights
detachment from the mental processes of the average man." Dowd, 366 U.S. at 727.
375. See R. E. Nisbett & Lee Ross, Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social
Judgment (1980); Philip E. Tetlock, Accountability and the Perseverance of First Impressions, 46
Soc. Psychol. Q. 285 (1983); Robert F. Ahlering & Lisa D. Parker, Need for Cognition as a
Moderator of the Primacy Effect, 23 J. Res. Personality 313 (1989); Wendy J. Palmquist, Formal
Operational Reasoning and the Primary Effect in Impression Formation, 15 Developmental
Psychol. 185 (1979).
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impressions tend to cast a certain light on subsequent cognitions. 76 It
was also stated that the formation of impressions tended to make subjects
resist alternative explanations,371 that beliefs often persevere in the face
of counterexplanations,378 and that prompting was required to overcome
allegiances to certain predispositions. 379  Some researchers argue that
these cognitive effects and biases result from subjects' adopting a
conditional reference frame that allows for an estimate of the plausibility
of assumptions. 380  Framing, broadly defined as a decisionmaker's
conception of the acts, contingencies, and outcomes of a particular
choice, changes the way in which a problem is perceived.3 11 Important
alternatives may be overlooked.3"2 Evidence is interpreted in favor of the
frame that is currently in place.83 Framing also tends to result in a
confirmation bias, or the tendency to acquire evidence that confirms
predispositions .3 " Finally, framing limits or truncates the search for
disconfirming evidence.8 5
Efforts to manipulate counterexplanations reveal the importance of
tasks that reduce confidence in existing assumptions, i.e., tasks that will
376. See Lee Ross & C. A. Anderson, Shortcomings in the Attribution Process: On the Origins
and Maintenance of Erroneous Social Assessments, in Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases 129-52 (Daniel Kahnemam et al. eds. 1982).
377. See, e.g., Charles G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects
of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 2098
(1979); S. . Sherman et al., Social Explanation: The Role of Timing, Set and Recall on Subjective
Likelihood Estimates, 44 . Personality & Soc. Psychol. 1127 (1983).
378. See L. Ross et al., Perseverance in Self-Perception and Social Perception: Biased
Attributional Processes in the Debriefing Paradigm, 32 . Personality & Soc. Psychol. 880 (1975).
379. See Craig. A. Anderson, Innoculaticn and Counter-explanation: Debiasing Techniques in
the Perseverance of Social Theories, 1 Soc. Cognition 126 (1982); Craig A Anderson & Elizabeth
S. Sechler, Effects of Explanation and Counterexplanation on the Development and Use of Social
Theories, 50 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 24 (1986).
380. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kalmeman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of
Choice, 211 Science 453 (1981). For an outstanding review of the framing literature, see Derek 3.
Koehler, supra note 306. A general introduction to framing appears in Scoti Pious, The Psychology
ofJudgment and Decision Making (1993).
381. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 380, at 453.
382. See, e.g., A. Tesser & C. Leone, Cognitive Schemas and Thought as Determinants of Attitude
Change, 13 J. Experimental Soc. Psychol. 340 (1977).
383. See Loren J. Chapman & Jean P. Chapman, Genesis of Popular but Erroneous
Psychodiagnostic Observations, 72 . Abnormal Psychol. 193 (1967).
384. Mark Snyder & William B. Swan, Jr., Hypothesis-testing in Social Interaction, 36 .
Personality & Soc. Psychol. 1202 (1978).
385. See Harriet Shaklee & Baruch Fischhoff, Strategies of Information Search in Causal
Analysis, 10 Memory & Cognition 520 (1982). For a discussion of th analogous concept of
selective processing, see Galen V. Bodenhausen, Stereotypic Biases in Social Decision Making and
Memory: Testing Process Models of Stereotype Use, 55 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 726 (1988).
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encourage strong consideration of alternative impressions, beliefs, and
opinions. Following a brief review of existing state and federal pattern
jury instructions, new jury instructions for an assumption of innocence
will be fashioned that address such a task.
B. The Elements of an Assumption ofFactual Innocence
In the early 1970s, the National Commission on Reform of Federal
Criminal Laws ("Brown Commission') substituted the word "assumed"
for "presumed" in relation to the presumption of innocence, and changed
the word "defendant" to "accused" throughout the proposed code. The
Brown Commission also added some detail to the presumption of
innocence instruction, all to "dispel the cloud of suspicion hanging over
the accused, to dispel the jurors' notion that where there is smoke, there
is fire."38 6 The present effort follows in this tradition by assuring, to the
greatest extent possible, that all impressions, suspicions, beliefs and
opinions are consistent with factual innocence. The intended effect of a
factually, based assumption of innocence is to guide permissible
assumptions (for some, counterassumptions) before the presentation of
evidence. 87 (see Figure One).
Current state and federal pattern jury instructions poorly reflect the
rhetoric surrounding the presumption of innocence. To be fair, some
federal pattern instructions are clear in their admonition that an
indictment is not indicative of guilt, and that the accused begins with a
clean slate.388 Others, however, have unclear provisions that make
386. National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, 1 Working Papers of the
National Commission on Reform ofFederal Criminal Laws 14 (1970).
387. The purpose, however, is not to provide a frame of reference that would result in
confirmation bias and the overestimation of evidence favorable to the defense.
388. See, e.g., Committee on Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions, Sixth Circuit, Pattern Jury
Instructions § 1.03(l)-(3) (1991):
(1) As you know, the defendant has pleaded not guilty to the crime charged in the indictment.
The indictment is not any evidence at all of guilt. It is just the formal way that the government
tells the defendant what crime he is accused of committing. It does not even raise any suspicion
of guilt. (2) Instead, the defendant starts the trial with a clean slate, with no evidence at all
against him, and the law presumes that he is innocent. This presumption of innocence stays
with him unless the government presents evidence here in court that overcomes the
presumption, and convinces you beyond a reasonable doubt that he is guilty. (3) This means
that the defendant has no obligation to present any evidence at all, or to prove to you in any way
that he is innocent. It is up to the government to prove that he is guilty, and this burden stays on
the government from start to finish. You must find the defendant not guilty unless the
government convinces you beyond a reasonable doubt that he is guilty.
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Figure One
Intended Effect of a Factual Assumption
of Innocence on Factual Meters
a4hc2
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the distinction between the reasonable doubt rule and obscure the
presumption of innocence meaningless.389 State pattern and non-pattern
instructions vary considerably, ranging from implicit references to
factual innocence to complete rehearsals of reasonable doubt rule
instructions. Sometimes the only presumption of innocence instruction
given simply restates the reasonable doubt rule or its basic premises.'"
There are at least six different kinds of provisions found in countless
numbers of presumption of innocence pattern instructions: (1) innocence
as a required presumption, (2) legally required initial beliefs, (3)
duration, (4) burden allocation, (5) specific proof required to overcome
innocence, and (6) accused's obligation to offer proof of innocence.
Typically, these pattern instructions, and other creative variations, are
389. See United States v. Walker, 861 F.2d 810, 812-14 (5th Cir. 1988) (per curiam). Walker
upheld use of the following pattern instruction even though it was found to be insufficiently clear.
[t]he indictment or formal charge against any defendant is not evidence of guilt. Indeed, the
defendant is presumed by the law to be innocent. The law does not require a defendant to prove
his innocence or produce any evidence at all. The Government has the burden of proving a
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, if it fails to do so you must find the defendant not
guilty.
Id. See also United States v. Castro, 874 F.2d 230,233 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 845 (1989).
In Castro, the judge explained the presumption of innocence on at least six occasions, in addition to
giving the following instruction which, admittedly, was unclear.
I remind you that the indictment is merely the formal charge against the defendants; it is not
evidence of guilt. Indeed, the defendants are presumed to be innocent. The law does not require
a defendant to prove innocence or produce any evidence at all, and no inference whatsoever may
be drawn from the election of a defendant not to testify.
Id.; United States v. Stewart, 879 F.2d 1268 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 899 (1989); United
States v. Shaw, 894 F.2d 689 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 828 (1990). For additional pattern
instructions with less than adequate provisions, see Josephine R. Poluto et al., Federal Criminal Jury
Instructions §1.04A (1991):
The defendant has pleaded not guilty. You are required to presume that (he)(she) is innocent.
The defendant does not have to offer evidence, but if (he)(she) does you must consider it along
with the evidence that the government offers. The Presumption of innocence means that you
must find the defendant not guilty unless and until you decide that the government has proved
(him)(her) guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id.
390. Bear in mind that the Defendant is presumed to be not guilty of the charge against him,
until and if the State proves by legal and competent evidence the guilt of the Defendant beyond
a reasonable doubt.... Neither the fact that this [complaint] has been filed nor the Defendant is
here in Court is any evidence of guilt. As I stated earlier the Defendant must be presumed not
guilty until his guilt is established by legal and competent evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.
City of Crestline v. Gantzler, No. 3-91-15, (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 14, 1992). Surprisingly, courts have
not found that it is misleading to instmct jurors that an accused is presumed innocent "until you are
satisfied from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that he is guilty." State v. Brugier, 286
N.W.2d 1 (S.D. 1979). An instruction on the reasonable doubt rule compensates for the failure to
mention "unless"
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given to prospective jurors before or during voir dire, to a newly selected
and sworn-in jury as a preliminary charge, to a sitting Jury as a limiting
instruction or an admonishment during the case-in-chief; or to jurors as a
charging instruction after the close of evidence.39  The timing,
frequency, and substance 6f the instructions determine their
effectiveness.39 In any evaluation of effectiveness, courts tend to look at
391. Presumption of innocence instructions or admonitions may be given at any time, depending
on the need and circumstance. For example, in State v. Phippen, 494 P.2d 1137, 1140 (Kan. 1972), a
trial judge had to admonish the jury after the following remarks were made by the prosecutor during
voir dire:
Now, you realize that the State will present evidence to back up the facts--back up the charge;
that the criminal defendant, Vera Phippen has the opportunity to testify, and you can expect that
if she does testify, she is going to deny everything that the State says, or she is going to try to
contradict it. If she didn't do that, we wouldn't be here today.
Id. The trial judge responded.
I feel I should say something. In the first place, any person charged with a crime is presumed to
be innocent. That presumption goes with them until their guilt is establishted to the satisfaction
of the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. No person is required to give any evidence. I don't
know whether this lady is going to take the stand or not. She may testify; :he is not required to.
If she does, or if she doesn't, you will be appraised in the Court's instructions as to any effect
this may have....Now, I don't think Mr. Tomasic [the prosecutor] meant anything wrong by
saying that she would take the stand and deny it. He can't know this. Slte may take the stand
and deny it or she may not take the stand at all.... I think you may go ahead.
Id. The prosecutor continued-
Thank you, Your Honor. Ladies and gentlemen of the jury: What I was getting at is after the
State presents its evidence, the defendant will have the opportunity, if she desires, to present
evidence. Then when this is finished, you people-the twelve that are selected-will have ajob
to do. You are going to have to make a decision, and if you feel that the evidence warrants a
conviction, you will have to come back to this courtroom and tell th.- Judge and tell the
attorneys and tell Vera Phippen that you believe that she is guilty.... Now., what I want to know
is, is there anyone here who feels that either he or she cannot return to this courtroom and tell
the Judge that they feel the evidence warrts Vera Phippen being guilty? If anyone feels that
they can't do that, we would like to know right now.
Id.
392. Ajudge's repeated effort to instruct the jury on the presumption of innocence may, in certain
cases, overcome any error attributable to jury instructions that have inadequate provisions. See, e.g.,
United States v. Solomon, 856 F.2d 1572, 1575-78 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1070
(1989). In Solomon, the timing and substance of the instructions given by the trial judge were
overlooked in favor of frequency. The judge first instructed the jury after it had been sworn in and
before testimony was heard:
I want to caution you [that] the fact that the grand jury has returned a bill of indictment against
these defendants is not evidence, [or] a hint or inference of guilt. ... I further caution you [that]
each of these defendants comes[s] into court with the presumption of innocence in their favor.
That is they are presumed innocent of any offense there might be until the government produces
evidence which is sufficient to show guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and the government has
that burden.
Id. In a set of charging instructions, the judge then told the jury:
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the totality of the circumstances-at the testimony of witnesses,
argument of counsel, strength of evidence, instructions given by the
judge, context in which the instructions are given, and the way in which
a reasonable jury could have interpreted the instruction.393 A single
instruction that is defective must be considered in the context of the
overall charge, as well as counsel's objection, if any.394
C. Jury Instruction Content
Justice Jackson once quipped that it would be naive to assume that
prejudice could be overcome by the presentation of jury instructions. All
practicing lawyers would know this "to be unmitigated fiction." '  There
are no naive assumptions that juror predispositions will be "overcome"
by an assumption of innocence instruction. One reason, however, that
jury instructions may not be effective is that they are inadequately
conceived and poorly drafted.396 As noted earlier, jury instructions often
The law does not require the defendants to prove innocence or produce any evidence at all if
they don't want to. The return of the indictment places upon the government the burden of
proving each of the defendants guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and if it fails to do so, then you
must find each of the defendants not guilty.
Id.
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure give great latitude to judges as to when instructions may
be given: "The court may instruct the jury before or after the arguments are completed or at both
times." Fed. R. Crim. P. 30. See also United States v. Valencia, 773 F.2d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 1985)
(upholding presumption of innocence instruction given after all the evidence had been presented but
before closing arguments). The petitioner had claimed that it was prejudicial for "the prosecutor's
closing rebuttal argument.. [to be] the last impression left with the jury" before deliberations. To
the petitioner's credit, this decision was governed by an earlier version of Rule 30, providing that
"the [trial] court shall instruct the jury after the [closing] arguments are completed." Id.
393. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979); Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146-47
(1973).
394. See Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786 (1979); Peek v. Kemp, 784 F.2d 1479 (1lth Cir.),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 939 (1986); United States v. Smegal, 772 F.2d 659 (10th Cir. 1985). As noted
in United States v. PolowichaL:
[A] trial judge is not some patriarch upon whose shoulders falls sole responsibility for every
detail of the enterprise. A successful trial is rather a communicative and cooperative venture in
which able counsel shoulder their burdens too. 'It is the rare case in which an improper
instruction will justify reversal of a criminal conviction when no objection has been made in the
trial court.'
United States v. Polowichak, 783 F.2d 410, 421 (4th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted).
395. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (concurring opinion) (citations
omitted).
396. See supra notes 168-208 and accompanying text. See also United States v. Walker, 861
F.3d 810, 813 (5th Cir. 1988) (noting that "[t]he genesis of the concern over the adequacy of the
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blur the distinction between the presumption of innocence and the
reasonable doubt rule.397 The blurred lines between the reasonable doubt
rule and the duration and burden allocation provisions, for example,
reflect a conceptual muddle. Also, references to specific elements of the
presumption of innocence are nearly impossible to find in pattern
instructions. Even courts have acknowledged that existing presumption
of innocence instructions are ambiguous.39 Such provisions only
superficially cover aspects of legal innocence and burdens of proof. It is
no wonder that jurors are confused.3
The model presumption of innocence instructions proposed below
consider (1) innocence as a legally required assumpdion and (2) the
requirements of an assumption of factual innocence. The first
assumption of innocence instruction is restricted in scope to jurors'
factual assumptions. It is intended as a preliminary instruction. ° The
second also considers the assumption of innocence's duration and
integrates reasonable doubt rule provisions. It is designed as both a
preliminary and charging instruction." Unlike existing pattern
instructions, provisions in both instructions focus exclusively on the
accused's factual innocence (al). References to burdens of proof
flowing from the reasonable doubt rule or presumption of innocence are
instruction on the presumption may be traced to the realization that jurors frequently do not fully
comprehend instructions read to them").
397. Presumption of innocence instructions are legally inaccurate with a syntax that lacks clarity.
See Severance et al., supra note 166, at 200-01.
398. See, e.g., United States v. Walker, 861 F.2d 810 (5th Cir. 1988).
399. See supra notes 163-73 and accompanying text.
400. Assumption of innocence instructions are designed to be administered before the
presentation of evidence as preliminary instructions, as part of a substantive preinstruction, or in
concert with general instructions. The effectiveness of an assumption of innocence is contingent on
an administration prior to the weighing of evidence by jurors. Empirical evidence overwhelmingly
supports the importance of preliminary instructions and preinstructions. See Janice C. Goldberg,
Memory, Magic, and Myth: The Timing of Jury Instructions, 59 Or. L. Rei'. 451 (1981); Vicki L.
Smith, Impact of Pretrial Instruction on Jurors' Information Processing and Decision Making, 76 J.
Applied Psychol. 220 (1991); Vicki L. Smith, The Feasibility and Utility of Pretrial Instruction in
the Substantive Law: A Survey of Judges, 14 Law & Hum. Behav. 235 (199C); Lynne Forster Lee et
al., Juror Competence in Civil Trials: Effects of Preinstruction and Evidence Technicaliy, 78 J.
Applied Psychol. 14 (1993); Saul M. Kassin & Lawrence S. Wrightsman, On the Requirements of
Proof: The Timing of Judicial Instruction and Mock Juror Verdicts, 37 J. Personality & Soc.
Psychol. 1877 (1979).
401. Assumption of Innocence Instruction II allows jurors to be pre- and post-instructed. Pre- and
post- instruction is most effective in reducing juror reliance on stereotypes. Studies also suggest that
pre- and post-instruction contributes to the formation of impressions, beliefs and opinions based on
evidence before the court. See Vicki L. Smith, Prototypes in the Courtroom: Lay Representations of
Legal Concepts, 61 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 857 (1991).
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drafted in relation to the required factual assumptions of the assumption
of innocence.
Assumption ofInnocence Instruction I
A person accused of a crime is presumed by law to be innocent.
This means that you, as jurors, must begin with an assumption that
[X] did not commit the offense(s) with which he (she) is charged.
The assumption of [X's] innocence is a commitment to the idea
that a person accused of committing a crime is no different from
any other innocent member of the community.
The fact that [X] was arrested is not evidence of guilt and should
not result in any suspicions, beliefs or opinions on your part that he
(she) is guilty. The fact that the [X] was indicted for [or charged
with] [Y] is not evidence of guilt. The indictment [or charge] is
just a formal way of the state telling [X] what crime(s) he is
accused of committing. Once again, an indictment [or charge]
should not result in any suspicions, beliefs, or opinions on your part
that [X] is guilty.
[X] starts the trial with a clean slate, with no evidence against him
(her) and with no suspicions of guilt. A clean slate means the only
assumption the law allows is that [X] did not commit the crime(s)
charged. You should not assume that [X] may have or could have
committed the crime charged. I instruct you that, at this stage of.
the proceedings, you must assume [X] did not commit the crime
charged.
Assumption of Innocence Instruction II
A person accused of a crime is presumed by law to be innocent.
This means that you, as jurors, must assume that [X] did not
commit the offense(s) with which he (she) is charged. The
assumption of [X's] innocence is a commitment to the idea that a
person accused of committing a crime is no different from any
other innocent member of the community.
The fact that [X] was arrested is not evidence of guilt and should
not result in any suspicions, beliefs or opinions on your part that he
(she) is guilty. The fact that the [X] was indicted for [or charged
with] [Y] is not evidence of guilt. The indictment [or charge] is
just a formal way of the state telling [X] what crime(s) he(she) is
accused of committing. Once again, an indictment [or charge]
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should not result in any suspicions, beliefs, or opinions on your part
that [X] is guilty.
[X] starts the trial with a clean slate, with no evidence against him
and with no suspicions of guilt. A clean slate means the only
assumption that the law allows is that [X] did not commit the
crime(s) charged. You should not assume that [X] may have or
could have committed the crime charged. You must assume that
[X] did not commit the crime charged.
This assumption of innocence stays with [X] in relation to the
entire indictment [information or charge], through each stage of the
trial, until and unless it is overcome by evidence presented by the
prosecution. At no time must [X] take the stand and testify. At no
time must [X] present any evidence that would suggest that he
(she) is innocent. In our system of justice, a person accused of a
crime does not have to prove his (her) innocence. The burden of
proof is on the prosecution to establish [X's] guilt. In a separate
charge, you will be instructed that the obligation to prove guilt
remains with the prosecution. The prosecution must prove each
and every element in the complaint [indictment] beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Model assumption of innocence instructions suggest that factual
innocence is capable of definition. 2 As noted earlier, most courts avoid
defining reasonable doubt.03 Two Federal Courts of Appeals have even
warned district judges not to provide jurors wih definitions."
Definitions of "doubt" tend to confuse jurors, and onl.y reinforce their
lack of comprehension." 5 Understanding what constitutes a "reasonable"
doubt adds further difficulty. The same may not be said of the
assumption of innocence. A factual assumption of innocence is not
ambiguous. It is not a concept that is best left to the intuitions and
common sense of the jury. Carefully worded jury instructions on factual
402. It has been said that "No jury instruction can clarify a law that is itself ambiguous." Harvey
S. Perlman, Pattern Jury Instructions: The Application of Social Science Re.'earch, 65 Neb. L. Rev.
520,539 (1986).
403. See Victor v. Nebraska, 114 S. Ct 1239 (1994).
404. United States v. Adkins, 937 F.2d 947, 950 (4th Cir. 1991) (observing that "[t]his circuit has
repeatedly warned against giving the jury definitions of reasonable doubt, because definitions tend to
impermissibly lessen the burden of proof ) (citation omitted); United States v. Hall, 854 F.2d 1036,
1039 (7th Cir. 1988) (noting that "at best, definitions of reasonable doubt are unhelpful to ajury....
An attempt to define reasonable doubt presents a risk without any real benefit').
405. See Note, Defining Reasonable Doubt, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1716 (1990).
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innocence, building on the two presented above, would guide permissible
assumptions and counterassumptions before and during the presentation
of evidence.4" These instructions also would consider framing effects
and biases that change the way in which jurors process inculpatory and
exculpatory evidence." 7
There are, no doubt, limitations to the notion of an assumption of
innocence. Many of the steps taken toward a factually based
presumption raise empirical questions that deserve further inquiry. But,
to borrow from the Court's reasoning in King v. Lynaugh,4 8 the right to a
presumption of innocence is basic to our system of justice. This right
carries with it the concomitant right to take reasonable steps to ensure
that no matter what crime has been committed, and how strong the
evidence appears to be, a person accused of a crime is assumed innocent.
I have argued that there are at least five reasonable steps that may be
taken. These include a recognition that the presumption of innocence
must be considered more than a rhetorical device; that a presumption of
factual innocence is necessary for a fair and impartial trial; that existing
instructions do little, if anything, to counter factual and legal
predispositions of jurors; that the failure to properly instruct a jury on the
presumption of innocence amounts to more than harmless error; and that
the proposed assumption of innocence instructions counter juror
predispositions and provide a basis for recognizing the importance of
factual innocence at trial.
IV. CONCLUSION
In hearing the voices of pragmatist philosophers, we are reminded by
Richard A. Posner that objective truth at trial is unattainable.4" The
impossibility of recovering the past with complete confidence casts a
shadow on the truth-seeking function of the criminal process. We should
be cautious, Posner argues, in allowing additional post-conviction review
406. Robin Reed, Jury Simulation: The Impact of Judge's Instructions and Attorney Tactics on
Decisionmaking, 71 J. Crim. Law & Criminology 68 (1980).
407. Results of experimental studies of presumption of innocence instructions with mock jurors
show significant reductions in the ambiguity surrounding juror decisionmaking. In one study of the
effect of jury instructions on juror racial bias, it appeared that the instructions provided simulated
jurors "with guidelines that enable them to focus on legally relevant information such as the
elements of the crime rather than on their prejudicial attitudes when evaluating the guilt of the
defendant." Jeffrey E. Pfeifer & James R.P. Ogloff, Ambiguity and Guilt Determinations: A Modern
Racism Perspective, 21 J. Applied Soc. Psychol. 1713, 1721 (1991).
408. See supra note 305.
409. Richard A. Posner, The Problems ofJurisprudence 217-18 (1990).
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with the faint hope of obtaining a final determination as to whether or not
an accused's constitutional rights were violated. We must balance the
"slight gains in reducing one type of error (violating the defendant's
rights) against the costs in increasing another type of error (mistaken
acceptance of the defendant's claim of right). .. " 410
Lay pragmatists and hardened utilitarians alike read annual surveys of
victimization and official police reports with considerable frustration.
They watch as those accused of crime are subjected to increasingly
difficult standards of proof. They observe the good faitf efforts of police
and the neutrality of magistrates at arraignment. They see the
impartiality of judges in preliminary hearings and the objectivity of the
grand jury in exercising their power to indict. It should come as no
surprise then that many find the presumption of innocence at trial to be
counterfactual. Experience with the criminal process, whether personal
or vicarious, often leads to a conclusion that there is more than adequate
consideration of factual innocence.
To those who understand the evidentiary value of an indictment, the
critical importance of plea bargaining, the likely meaning of the
accused's decision not to testify, and the importance of placing realistic
limits on the review of post conviction petitions, the meaning of factual
innocence, and its place in the criminal process, is tempered by
experience. Experience and a pragmatic vision may be realistic and
logical, but together both fail to acknowledge that the basic dilemma of
the criminal process is greater than the frustration and disappointment of
critics and reformers.4" Beyond the realities of crime and our
administration of justice is a commitment to rational procedure, i.e.,
presuming innocence while rationally determining culpability. Honoring
this commitment may at times seem strange and, in some cases, may
even appear to be irrational. But with this commitment comes an
acknowledgment that the more readily we assume guilt, the less
important an accused's innocence becomes. With this commitment
comes a caution not to abandon fundamental values embodied in the
Constitution in the name of pragmatism. Finally, with this commitment
comes an obligation to honor the rhetoric of innocence with meaning and
substance. Justice Thurgood Marshall once noted that "[h]onoring the
presumption of innocence is often difficult; sometimes we pay
substantial social costs as a result of our commitment to the values we
410. Id. at 218.




espouse. But at the end of the day the presumption of innocence protects
the innocent; the shortcuts we take with those whom we believe to be
guilty injure only those wrongfully accused and, ultimately,
ourselves." '412 The same may be said of the notion of innocence
throughout the law.
412. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 767 (1987).

